U.S. and Pakistan: Status Quo is not Working

Kaushik Kapisthalam

Recent events suggest that Pakistan is perhaps a part of the problem as well as the solution to many of America’s foreign policy challenges today, the most important of which is the Global War on Terror. Embarrassed by news that at least two of the alleged suicide bombers involved in the July 7 London bombings reportedly trained in jihadist camps in Pakistan, President Pervez Musharraf initiated a fresh campaign against his country’s Islamic militant groups in late July in the face of skepticism from observers.

At an event at the Nixon Center, which ironically took place on July 7th, terrorism analyst Dr. Alexis Debat presented a summary of his observations from his recent visit to Pakistan. Dr. Debat’s main argument was that Pakistan is committed to fight the war on terror “but only within the narrow framework of its own national security interests.” Dr. Debat went on to suggest that instead of trying to alter Pakistan’s fundamental national outlook, the US should embrace Pakistan by offering significant military and financial assistance along with diplomatic support to Islamabad on issues like the Kashmir dispute with India.

These views appear to be consonant with the US policy towards Pakistan since 9/11. In contrast to its recent activist approach with Middle Eastern Islamic nations, which is based on the idea that stable but despotic regimes need to be replaced by democratically elected governments even at the cost of short-term stability, Washington seems to be extremely unwilling to upset the status quo in Islamabad. Unfortunately, this approach with Pakistan is unlikely to produce the desired results and its unintended consequences could prove deleterious to America’s long-term security interests.

To understand why, one needs to analyze key elements of the conventional wisdom on Pakistan and see if they withstand scrutiny. The first is the idea that Musharraf is the only person standing between radical Islamists and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. This theory finds favor with some analysts, but long-term Pakistan specialists and Pakistani insiders scoff at this notion. Stephen Cohen of the Brookings Institution, one of the most respected American experts on Pakistan, avers that should Musharraf is involuntarily removed from power or even assassinated, he is likely to be replaced by another General who would continue to cooperate with America.

Cohen notes in his definitive book, “The Idea of Pakistan,” that the country’s policies are largely determined by what he dubs “the Establishment,” which is essentially an oligarchy of a few thousand made up of Army Generals, feudal landlords, bureaucrats, clerics and business tycoons. At the present moment, the Establishment sees American support as vital to its interests and would therefore be unwilling to confront Washington even if Musharraf steps aside.

Pakistani academic Husain Haqqani concurs with this view. Haqqani should know because he used to be the ultimate insider in Islamabad when he served as advisor to two Pakistani Prime Ministers. In his seminal book “Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military,” Haqqani documents the fact that Pakistan’s establishment has had a symbiotic relationship with Islamic extremists since 1947, when it was carved out of British India.

Haqqani’s views suggest that while the Islamists and the Pakistani military may publicly lock horns, they cooperate behind the scenes to advance their common interests such as the preservation of Pakistan as an ideological state, installation of a client regime in Afghanistan and the effort to pry the territory of Kashmir from India. The Islamists act in ways to stoke Western fears of a radical takeover in Islamabad and also furnish a steady stream of indoctrinated jihadists to fight the military’s proxy wars in Afghanistan and Kashmir. In return, the military creates a disproportionate political space for the Islamists by thwarting the growth of a secular civil society. This essentially demolishes the myth that the Pakistani military is somehow the only force in Pakistan fighting against the Islamists. They are, in fact, two sides of the same coin.

Kashmir is at the root of another shibboleth namely that Pakistan can only be coaxed to end its support of jihadist groups by extracting concessions from India over the Kashmir issue. Soon after 9/11, Pakistan faced a military crisis with India and Western commentators were sympathetic to the notion that it was unrealistic to expect Musharraf to take on Kashmir-linked militants in the face of India’s threat of force and a refusal to even discuss Kashmir with Pakistan.

Since that time, the Indian forces have moved to the barracks and India has changed its long-term policy by talking to Pakistan on Kashmir. Despite this, Musharraf has not so much as lifted a finger against the jihadist groups and he recently hinted that he would act against the jihadists only if India agrees to territorial concessions on Kashmir. It would be naive therefore for the US to let Pakistan hold a meaningful jihadist crackdown hostage to its maximalist dream of gaining territory from India in Kashmir.

In addition, the London attacks have shattered the idea that giving Pakistan space to sustain Kashmir-jihadists would not pose a direct threat to the war on terror. What is more alarming is that sleeper cells of jihadists trained in camps run by Kashmir-linked Pakistani groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba have been found in Australia, France, Spain and even in the United States. When one adds to this the recent news that US Homeland Security officials have been specifically on the lookout for individuals who may have trained in jihadist camps in Pakistan, it is undeniable that the continued existence of state-tolerated jihadist machinery in Pakistan poses a clear and present danger American security.

What then is the way out? At the very minimum, the US must start questioning the validity of the assumptions that underlie its current Pakistan policy. Making a realistic assessment of the likelihood of an Islamist takeover in Pakistan would be a good place to begin. Once a candid assessment of Musharraf’s hold on power in Pakistan is made, the US should try to set unambiguous boundaries with Islamabad in the areas such as terrorism and nuclear proliferation. This has been a historical weakness of US diplomats in their dealings with a Pakistani leadership that tends to presume a larger American tolerance for risky behavior than Washington would prefer, unless the limits are made explicit.

At a recent talk in Washington, former Pakistani diplomat Touqir Hussain narrated an incident from his days in Islamabad in the 1980s. When a US State Department official was due in Islamabad in the wake of a particularly damaging exposé of a Pakistan government role in a nuclear equipment smuggling deal, Hussain mentioned that he expected to hear a tough message. However, to his surprise, Hussain found the Americans apologetic about the whole incident and acted as though the US was at fault for “embarrassing” Pakistan. Had American diplomats noted up front with Pakistan that such blatant proliferation acts were unacceptable, Hussain observed, Pakistan would have complied. As it later turned out, extreme American leniency encouraged Pakistan to pursue riskier nuclear proliferation activities in the following decade.

It is therefore vital for the US to set unambiguous threshold points for Pakistani activities that threaten American security interests. While Musharraf may not be able close all jihadist camps, he can and should be asked as a first step to shut down the facilities that have direct links to recent terror attacks overseas.

For instance, one or more of the 7/7 bombers reportedly trained in the Lashkar-e-Taiba’s 190-acre “campus” that is situated near Lahore. There is no reason for the US to tolerate the continued existence of such large and well known jihadist training and indoctrination facilities when they have been credibly and directly linked to terrorist attacks abroad. Given that the Pakistani establishment views jihadists as military assets, it is perfectly reasonable for the US to demand that Pakistan dismantle key elements of its jihadist infrastructure concurrently with the transfer of major weapons systems from America, like the F-16 fighters.

Defense cooperation brings up another risk factor. Historically, hard line elements in the Pakistani establishment have tended to interpret public praise of Islamabad combined with the lavish military assistance as a tacit green signal for risky military adventures by Pakistan in Kashmir. Each resultant Pakistani military operation ended with a bitter breakdown of US-Pakistan ties. This time around the US should not repeat past mistakes by making it amply and repeatedly clear that Washington will not support any aggressive military operation initiated by Pakistan with or without deniability.

Another critical policy detail for the US to consider is the need to create a context for Musharraf to be able to take reform steps. Currently, the military establishment needs the Islamists for its legitimacy and therefore is unable to develop a constituency for moderation even if it is serious about the process. This constituency can only be created if the Pakistani military allows space for non-religious political parties to operate. It is vital therefore that the US to press Musharraf to permit all political parties to contest upcoming general elections in 2007 without hindrance.

At the end of the day, the US has little choice but to have a candid talk with the Pakistani leadership. The only question is the context in which such a conversation might occur. If Washington continues to accept Musharraf’s episodic “reform” steps with the justification that the alternative is worse, it may lead to a day when a US President is once again forced to present Islamabad with an ultimatum in the aftermath of a precipitating event such as a mass casualty terrorist attack that is traced back to Pakistan or perhaps a near nuclear crisis with India triggered by the actions of a Pakistani jihadist group.

The other option is to make an honest reappraisal of the current policy and effect changes at a time when the US has enormous positive leverage over Islamabad and when the Pakistani establishment is still able to exercise control over the jihadist elements. Only time will tell if the US heeds the lessons of 7/7 and alters course with Pakistan.

August 16, 2005

Kaushik Kapisthalam is a freelance commentator on South Asia related topics. He can be reached at contact@kapisthalam.com

Updated 8/16/05