The diplomatic pageantry of the last several weeks is
befitting of the winter season of Hollywood
blockbusters. Imminent war in Iraq, NATO’s new future,
and the deployment of Russian forces to a Kyrgyz airbase
just across town from a main staging ground for allied
forces in Central Asia are all major marquis items. The
best peace of diplomatic theater, though, came out of
Russia’s Vladimir Putin as he made his way from
Beijing to Delhi and heightened talk emerged of a
Russia-China-India strategic partnership being offered
as an alternative to the United State’s global
leadership.
The good relationships being built bilaterally
between Russia and China and Russia and India cannot go
unrecognized, especially in the increasingly worrisome
area of arms sales, but this is hardly the foundation
for major strategic cooperation and trust. This is
increasingly true given the preeminent priority these
three nations have in establishing better relations with
America and the West and the fact that China and India
are no where close to being strategic partners. Perhaps
this alliance should be called a strategic
"V."
As one former senior American diplomatic explained
(after a much more succinct, colorful, and unpublishable
description), this talk is the sort of diplomatic
rhetoric that makes Russia and India feel good about
themselves and reminds India of the heyday of Nehru’s
Third Way foreign policy and Russia of its lost Cold War
era global leverage. Still, the U.S. must pay attention
to these developments and give them careful analysis, so
as not to be blinded by future developments or make
preventable mistakes that will alienate important
nations and potentially close allies.
First, let’s take the Russian-Chinese relationship.
The current relationship between these historically
cyclical friends and enemies is at one of its best
levels in the last thirty years, though still diminished
from the near revolutionary high of the late 1990’s
and first months of the Bush administration. In 2001,
both nations entered into a new treaty of Peace and
Friendship and initiated the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, an organization including both China and
Russia as well as the four Central Asian states of
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. And
the military relationship between these nations is even
better, with a robust arms trade that has fueled China’s
military modernization and funded Russia’s struggling
economy and crumbling armed forces. For some, it
appeared as if China and Russia were beginning to unify
in a way that could seriously challenge America’s
position of global power.
As a Pentagon official recently noted, though, it
appears as if the military relationship between these
nations has gotten ahead of their political
relationship, which, at certain points, has merely
become a bargaining chip with the West. In a repeat of
history, Richard Nixon’s brilliant calculus that
Russia and China’s vital national interest
fundamentally was focused in opposite directions was
again realized as Russia, in a major foreign policy
shift, firmly aligned itself with America and the West.
Similarly, China, in a Kissinger Diktat redux,
also realized that it had more to gain from relations
with America than it did with Russia. Still, Russia and
China’s relationship continues to grow, based
primarily on practical necessity than related strategic
interests. However, for the immediate future, both
nations will give priority to their ties to America and
continue to stake their strategic futures in opposite
global regions.
As for the India-Russian relationship, there is room
for much future growth and a strong foundation of
historic cooperation. During the Cold War, these nations
had robust diplomatic ties and barter trade that greatly
benefited the Indian economy. Now, cash-for-goods trade
has dwindled to $1.5 billion a year, though Russia will
likely sell India a nuclear attack sub in the coming
months. Moreover, India’s relationship with the United
States has drastically improved over the last ten years.
Though they still value their ties, at the basic level,
Russia and India do not require each other’s help as
they once did and are not yet close to having a new
strategically significant bond.
The main weakness in the triangle comes from China
and India’s competitive relationship. Above all, it
cannot be forgotten that China, too, has a stake in
Kashmir and is a major arms supplier to Pakistan. Add in
the competition for global investment, particularly the
new challenge China is mounting to India’s essential
technology sector, as well as conflicting visions of
regional dominance, and you have a recipe for conflict.
Although there are areas of growing cooperation,
especially in the commercial sectors, cooperation will
not come easy to these countries and any sort of
strategically significant relationship is very far off.
However, there is a real appeal for this possible
triangular relation; specifically, in the voice it gives
these nations in the war on terrorism. All three have a
similar view of the terrorist threat based on their
"internal" situation: Uyghurs in China’s
Xinjiang Province, rebels in Russia’s breakaway
province of Chechnya, and militants in Indian held
Kashmir. If anything, expect that these three nations
will have an increasingly coordinated position on the
direction the global war on terrorism should take and
what is considered permissible action. (1)
It is far too early to tell if this relationship will
become anything more than rhetoric, but some foundation
does exist. These nations, especially China and India,
will have to overcome many difficult issues first,
including fundamentally different views of the
international order. In the meantime, there is no reason
to fear this talk of union, though the U.S. should
recognize that some of this discussion does originate
from dissatisfaction with the direction of the war on
terrorism. This triangular diplomacy offers the United
States an opportunity to understand the needs of these
countries and continue to nurture its own relations with
these vitally important nations.
(1) These similarities, and their possible
convergence with positions held by the United States,
were explored in Nikolas K. Gvosdev's "The New 'Big
Four'?", In the National Interest (October
30, 2002), at