At the recent 16th Party Congress, the Chinese
Communist Party’s leadership began its passage of
position and power. While this peaceful and orderly
transition has been praised, experts question the
possibilities for true political reform. Observers must
be prepared to accept that real democratic reform will
remain, for the foreseeable future, a focus of
discussion rather than policy.
Throughout China, civic organizations have grown in
number and size. Sports, business, academic and
issue-focused associations are increasingly common.
However, observers should not mistake grassroots
developments for real political change. New communal
ties are strengthening the social fabric that binds
Chinese society; but they do not indicate a certain path
to democracy. Instead, they represent something Chinese
people value more: freedom.
In China, new personal freedoms are undeniable.
People now purchase all they wish and say what they wish
on numerous issues. But these changes exist because they
are fundamental to the development of China’s market
economy. Markets cannot exist without unfettered demand
and product innovation cannot occur if ideas must be
explained with ideology.
Unfortunately, true academic freedom is conspicuously
absent in history, politics and religion, fields
essential for political reform. Press freedom, vital for
true governmental accountability, also seems far off.
The Party’s news agency, Xinhua, controls all legal
news and while the Internet could provide other
perspectives, in China the Internet is subject to Party
censorship.
Urban Chinese love newspapers and despise corruption.
Despite popular support for anti-corruption measures,
the government insists on tackling the problem rather
than enlisting the media as a political watchdog. The
Party rationalizes that dissidents and irresponsible or
sensational journalists would hijack a free press,
causing confusion and chaos. Chinese people, raised on
propaganda and conscious of their violent modern
history, share the Party’s desire for stability. By
playing upon these feelings, the Chinese government has
convinced citizens to fear their own freedom.
A Chinese graduate student explains, "My parents
were students when the Cultural Revolution started. They
saw humiliation and discrimination heaped on those who
contested the mass line. They often say to restrict my
words to those acceptable to the Chinese Communist
Party. If I encounter political trouble I risk my own
career, but also risk my parents’ livelihood and our
relationship."
China’s leaders underestimate frustration with
government inefficiency and corruption. A Chinese
proverb says if the foundation is crooked, the house
will be too. Local officials, the Party’s foundation,
are corrupt to the core. Nearly 160,000 people every
year travel to Beijing seeking redress against local
leaders. Pilgrims fear intimidation by provincial
officials seeking to intercept them before they are
heard.
Corrupt officials do not gradually stop; public
sentiment must flood over them bringing the
accountability the West prides itself upon. Community
publications could provide people a voice catalyzing
local solutions; this process would grow effective as
journalistic standards develop.
Recently, China has experienced a swell of
nationalist zeal. International achievements, including
China’s successful bid to host the 2008 Olympics and
World Cup appearance, have been used with political
events like the EP3 collision to successfully intertwine
Party legitimacy and nationalism. Thus, the political
realm remains a CCP monopoly.
One problem is how to overcome years of propaganda
proclaiming the Taiwan issue purely domestic. For
Chinese to appreciate their government’s complex
position, they must reexamine the numerous interests
involved. More open public discourse would result in
increased tolerance of the delicate diplomacy and
patience needed to resolve the Taiwan question.
Taiwan should be demystified, and Chinese citizens
should see Taiwan for what it is. The so-called
"rogue province" holds its people’s freedom
and economic interests as its highest priority. The
Chinese frustration with and antagonistic behavior
toward Taiwan must be tempered with an understanding of
the difficult position the island faces.
Mr. Ling, a middle-aged computer programmer, explains
that the connection between Taiwan and media control is
rooted in history. "During the early 20th century
China’s physical and intellectual disunity combined to
destroy millions of lives. This explains the Party’s
focus on China’s territorial integrity. Conflicting
reports in the news could result in confusion among less
educated people."
China has an opportunity to eliminate fears and
remove barriers that hamper citizens' freedom of
information. The Party ought support both increased
discourse in history, politics and religion, and the
establishment of a free and private Chinese media.
Leaders could begin this process by loosening
restrictions on the Internet, smaller-circulation
publications, and book publishers. These policies foster
dialogue among China’s youth, peasants, and academics
crucial to attack official corruption and revive a
languishing Taiwan strategy. Most importantly, they
provide the forum necessary for young Chinese to
deliberate the potential and possibilities for political
reform.
Joshua Eisenman is the Assistant
Director of China Studies at The Nixon Center.
