At the recent 16th Party Congress, the Chinese Communist Party’s
leadership began its passage of position and power. While this peaceful
and orderly transition has been praised, experts question the
possibilities for true political reform. Observers must be prepared to
accept that real democratic reform will remain, for the foreseeable
future, a focus of discussion rather than policy.
Throughout China, civic organizations have grown in number and size.
Sports, business, academic and issue-focused associations are increasingly
common. However, observers should not mistake grassroots developments for
real political change. New communal ties are strengthening the social
fabric that binds Chinese society; but they do not indicate a certain path
to democracy. Instead, they represent something Chinese people value more:
freedom.
In China, new personal freedoms are undeniable. People now purchase all
they wish and say what they wish on numerous issues. But these changes
exist because they are fundamental to the development of China’s market
economy. Markets cannot exist without unfettered demand and product
innovation cannot occur if ideas must be explained with ideology.
Unfortunately, true academic freedom is conspicuously absent in
history, politics and religion, fields essential for political reform.
Press freedom, vital for true governmental accountability, also seems far
off. The Party’s news agency, Xinhua, controls all legal news and while
the Internet could provide other perspectives, in China the Internet is
subject to Party censorship.
Urban Chinese love newspapers and despise corruption. Despite popular
support for anti-corruption measures, the government insists on tackling
the problem rather than enlisting the media as a political watchdog. The
Party rationalizes that dissidents and irresponsible or sensational
journalists would hijack a free press, causing confusion and chaos.
Chinese people, raised on propaganda and conscious of their violent modern
history, share the Party’s desire for stability. By playing upon these
feelings, the Chinese government has convinced citizens to fear their own
freedom.
A Chinese graduate student explains, "My parents were students
when the Cultural Revolution started. They saw humiliation and
discrimination heaped on those who contested the mass line. They often say
to restrict my words to those acceptable to the Chinese Communist Party.
If I encounter political trouble I risk my own career, but also risk my
parents’ livelihood and our relationship."
China’s leaders underestimate frustration with government
inefficiency and corruption. A Chinese proverb says if the foundation is
crooked, the house will be too. Local officials, the Party’s foundation,
are corrupt to the core. Nearly 160,000 people every year travel to
Beijing seeking redress against local leaders. Pilgrims fear intimidation
by provincial officials seeking to intercept them before they are heard.
Corrupt officials do not gradually stop; public sentiment must flood
over them bringing the accountability the West prides itself upon.
Community publications could provide people a voice catalyzing local
solutions; this process would grow effective as journalistic standards
develop.
Recently, China has experienced a swell of nationalist zeal.
International achievements, including China’s successful bid to host the
2008 Olympics and World Cup appearance, have been used with political
events like the EP3 collision to successfully intertwine Party legitimacy
and nationalism. Thus, the political realm remains a CCP monopoly.
One problem is how to overcome years of propaganda proclaiming the
Taiwan issue purely domestic. For Chinese to appreciate their government’s
complex position, they must reexamine the numerous interests involved.
More open public discourse would result in increased tolerance of the
delicate diplomacy and patience needed to resolve the Taiwan question.
Taiwan should be demystified, and Chinese citizens should see Taiwan
for what it is. The so-called "rogue province" holds its people’s
freedom and economic interests as its highest priority. The Chinese
frustration with and antagonistic behavior toward Taiwan must be tempered
with an understanding of the difficult position the island faces.
Mr. Ling, a middle-aged computer programmer, explains that the
connection between Taiwan and media control is rooted in history.
"During the early 20th century China’s physical and intellectual
disunity combined to destroy millions of lives. This explains the Party’s
focus on China’s territorial integrity. Conflicting reports in the news
could result in confusion among less educated people."
China has an opportunity to eliminate fears and remove barriers that
hamper citizens' freedom of information. The Party ought support both
increased discourse in history, politics and religion, and the
establishment of a free and private Chinese media. Leaders could begin
this process by loosening restrictions on the Internet,
smaller-circulation publications, and book publishers. These policies
foster dialogue among China’s youth, peasants, and academics crucial to
attack official corruption and revive a languishing Taiwan strategy. Most
importantly, they provide the forum necessary for young Chinese to
deliberate the potential and possibilities for political reform.
Joshua Eisenman is the Assistant Director of China
Studies at The Nixon Center.