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Two Ships Passing in the Night: The
Story of US-Iranian Relations
Hossein Askari
Even before
the Iranian Revolution (IR), Iranians had concerns about
US policy toward Iran and since the Revolution both
countries have legitimate issues that should be resolved
if for no other reason than to enhance security and
stability in the Persian Gulf region. But no progress
has been made simply because neither side understands
the other and there is no appropriate venue on the
horizon for achieving any real measure of appreciation
for the other side’s perspectives.
The average
American views Iranians as people who hate the US and
call it “The Great Satan.” Americans see Iranian as
terrorists, supporting terrorist organizations, and who
spend much of their time shouting “Death to America”.
Average Iranians look at the US as an arrogant country
(its government, not its people) that interferes in the
affairs of other countries. The US supported Iraq in all
manner of ways in its efforts to kill Iranians
(including selling chemical weapons to Saddam Hussein).
Iranians believe the US is trying to take over the
Middle East. What is sad and dangerous is that the view
of policymakers on both sides is marginally above this
media-driven and superficial level of misunderstanding
and comprehension. Let me explain.
On the Iranian
side, the majority of the key technocratic decision
makers continue to be Western educated. But these post
revolutionary leaders who came to the West (especially
to the US) for their university education, viewed their
educational goals much more narrowly than those that
ruled Iran before the IR. Today’s Iranian ruling class
came to the West, studied their intended field and read
very little outside of their narrow field of study. They
interacted only with Iranians from similar backgrounds,
did not melt into US society, and went back to Iran.
Indirect evidence of these simple generalizations is
that these “educated” technocrats’ command of the
English language (some from renowned universities),
spoken and especially written, is to say the least
sub-par, and their appreciation of Western history,
traditions and culture almost non existent. It is
difficult for individuals of such general
characteristics to understand the true context of the
decisions and pronouncements of a Western diplomat.
On the US
side, since 9/11 we have a proliferation of experts on
everything from Islam, terrorism, the Middle East and
yes, on Iran. It is on these newly minted policy experts
on Iran that US decision makers ostensibly rely for
guidance and direction in dealing with Iran. Who are
these Iranian experts? They fall into two broad groups:
those of Western origin and those of Iranian origin. In
the case of those of Western origin, many speak very
little or no Farsi, some have never visited Iran, most
have not visited Iran since the IR, even fewer have met
a broad spectrum of Iranians in Iran and none to my
knowledge have gone to Iran to interact with senior
clergy, cabinet ministers and Iranian national security
leaders on a regular basis. So do we have any US born
policy experts on Iran? In the case of Iranian born
experts living in the US, many have not visited Iran
since the IR and have thus not had an opportunity to
interact with a broad spectrum of the populace. I would
venture to say that less than a handful have had
extensive interactions with senior clergy, cabinet
ministers and Iranian national security leaders. Most
critical, many Iranian born Americans have their own
personal agenda (as perhaps Ahmad Chalabi had in the
case of Iraq); they dream of going back and recovering
their lost wealth or even better, ruling the country and
getting even more wealth than they had before. So are
there even a handful of trustworthy Iranian-American
experts on Iran?
To fill the
gap, the US has used a variety of foreign governments as
intermediaries. These have included Switzerland, Japan
and even Saudi Arabia. Sadly each of these countries has
its own extensive commercial or political agenda to
thwart better US-Iranian relations.
Given this
state of affairs, it is no wonder that no progress has
been made in enhancing US-Iranian relations. If anything
relations may be getting worse. While Iranians continue
to shout “Death to America” and the US president places
Iran in his “Axis of Evil”, the average Iranian feels
increasingly threatened by US actions in Iraq and is
becoming more and more nationalistic as the American
President continues to publicly threaten Iran. Yes,
Saddam may be gone but the US is still occupying Iraq
and innocent Iraqis are dying next door on a daily
basis. In such an atmosphere of mistrust it is hardly a
wonder that the average Iranian may want to see the US
bogged down in Iraq. Nor is it surprising that Iranians
now want their own government to acquire a nuclear bomb
to dissuade US aggression. US public threats against
Iran only re-enforce Iranian nationalism, lend further
support to the mullahs in Teheran, and are in turn an
outward sign of the little that US policymakers and US
“experts” on Iran understand about Iran. In Washington
the basis for dealing with Iran continues to be the
appropriate mix of carrot and stick with little
understanding of the possible reaction of the intended
recipients of the carrots and sticks. It seems that both
in Washington and in Teheran policymakers will continue
to “drink their own bath water” for the foreseeable
future with little hope for improved relations.
Updated 12/3/04
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