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How to Stop the Sudanese Genocide
(and How Not To)
Michael M. Rosen and Daniel I.
Silverberg
On January 9, the Sudanese government inked a deal with
southern rebels to end the country’s 21 year-long civil
war. While the agreement gives hope to a region that
has not experienced a shred of development in ten years,
it does not cover the 22-month conflict in Sudan’s
western Darfur region, where approximately 70,000 people have died and more than 1.8
million others have been displaced from their homes.
According to Human Rights Watch, the Sudanese government
continues to attack civilians in
Darfur and has failed to take any steps to “neutralize and disarm the
Janjaweed/armed militias.” Meanwhile, rebels have
launched several small-scale offensives, in blatant
violation of cease-fire accords signed with the
government last November. Given the threat of ongoing
calamity in the region, President Bush must bolster the
African Union (AU), which negotiated the most recent
peace accords, in order to arrive at a political, and,
if necessary, military resolution to the crisis.
For too long, efforts to stem the bleeding in Darfur
reflected a 1990's mindset. During the nineties,
international crisis resolution revolved around a
toolkit comprising international law, institutions, and
commerce. This toolkit first emerged after the fall of
the Berlin Wall, when theorists of international
politics from across the political spectrum waxed
lyrical about the "End of History" and the "new
paradigm" of international cooperation. As described by
Robert Kagan, the hallmarks of global politics would
place "emphasis on negotiation, diplomacy, and
commercial ties, on international law over the use of
force." International law, supported by multilateral
institutions and global commerce, would emerge as the
defining regime for global affairs.
Sadly, however, these tools have grown corroded from
misuse and desperately need reforging.
First, international law has been reduced to a porridge
of diplomatic double-speak. During the debate over the
invasion of Iraq, numerous EU members spoke of law as a
hallowed arbiter of conflict; yet the EU has failed to
acknowledge that genocide is occurring in
Sudan despite overwhelming evidence. At the UN, diplomats who recently used
broad legal strokes to describe the
U.S. as a violator of
international law, now wriggle out of defining Darfur as
genocide, all while thousands face slaughter.
Second, multilateral institutions like the UN, EU and
the Arab League have turned a blind eye. All three
allude to the "humanitarian crisis" - not the genocide -
in Darfur but none has taken significant action in response. The Security
Council passed toothless resolutions calling on
Khartoum to rein in
the Janjaweed and is "considering" imposing sanctions.
The EU sent humanitarian aid. And an Arab League
fact-finding mission went so far as to blame the
"conflict" on drought and under-development in Darfur.
Finally, international commerce has, if anything,
compounded the crisis. Economics, according to the
post-Cold War paradigm, were supposed to offer both
carrot - free trade and export markets - and stick -
sanctions - to ensure good international citizenship.
Instead, the economic ties of Security Council members
like France, Russia, and China to the Khartoum regime
and its oil spigots have hampered forceful action or
even sanctions.
But if these three tools have failed miserably,
unilateral American force will not save the day either.
The U.S., stretched thin by the war on terror, can
ill-afford to open a new front, let alone in another
oil-producing Muslim country.
How, then, can the tragedy be stopped?
Fortunately, a solution is in reach. The U.S. should
strengthen the efforts of the most important regional
multilateral institution – the African Union. The U.S.
should empower the AU to offer incentives to both sides,
including recognizing Darfur’s autonomy within a unified
Sudan. Without such incentives, there’s little reason
for the rebels to endorse the cease-fire -- much to the
detriment of civilians -- or for the government to rein
in the Janjaweed.
Simultaneously, the U.S. must militarily reinforce the
AU if an invasion of Sudan is deemed necessary.
Currently, the African Union lacks both the will and the
resources to invade a sovereign state. The AU has
deployed 900 troops of a possible 3,500 designated for
peacekeeping duties, and none of these soldiers is
armed. The U.S. and its allies must immediately provide
assistance to deploy the remaining peacekeepers, then
offer substantial aid, including arms shipments and
special operations training, to the AU. Both President
Bush and John Kerry voiced support for exactly this plan
during the campaign and recently our outgoing UN
ambassador, John Danforth, suggested beefing up the AU
force with more troops and international monitors.
President Bush must now act on these recommendations.
If we successfully fortify the AU, we can place our own
power and prestige behind a retooling of international
law, institutions and commerce – for the betterment of
Sudan and the world.
Michael M. Rosen is an attorney in San Diego. Daniel I.
Silverberg is an attorney in San Francisco.
Updated 1/24/05
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