Global Energy Markets:
Worse Than You May Think
Anna Chambers and Nikolas K. Gvosdev
Speaking at a briefing on global energy markets, organized by The
National Interest, a leading authority on international energy issues
warned that the United States could face an acute energy crisis—including
supply disruptions and price increases to $70 per barrel for oil and $2.80,
or more, per gallon for gasoline—in the next few years.
J. Robinson West, founder and chairman of PFC Energy, one of Washington’s
most influential international energy consulting firms, is a former
Assistant Secretary of the Interior in the Reagan Administration and a
member of the advisory council of The National Interest. Former
National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, moderated the discussion at The
Nixon Center.
Using his essay “The Future of Russian Energy” (in the Summer 2005 issue of
The National Interest) as a departure point, Mr. West noted that
after 9/11, many were predicting that, to reduce dependence on Saudi Arabia,
the United States would increase its reliance on Russia as an alternative
source of supply. “I am here to tell you,” he declared, “that Russia is
not the key to America’s energy future.”
The energy sector is being mismanaged in Russia, he observed, and there is
no competent bureaucracy to oversee operations. More broadly, West
asserted, the country’s political leadership has not set clear priorities
for what it wants. The heavy and inefficient hand of the state is bearing
down on the energy sector and little has been done to improve weak
management accountability. Moreover, he said, despite high oil prices,
Russian firms are not investing in upgrading existing infrastructure or
developing new pipelines and fields. As a result, PFC Energy’s analysts no
longer feel that Russian oil production is set to peak at 10 million barrels
per day in 2008—they see production reaching a lower plateau much sooner.
In part, due to uncertainty following the Yukos case, foreign investors are
still reluctant to come into Russia, West said.
Yet, he added, Russian energy sector managers do not seem to
understand that the oil business requires constant reinvestment and take
money out of their companies instead. Gazprom—as a company—is making
less now than it was three years ago, when oil prices were around $20
per barrel.
In fact, West argued, one of the curses of the Russian energy sector
is the equally high prices for oil and gas- as a result, there is no
incentive for the government to reform while money is still flowing in in
such large supply. There is a
lot of “gravy” circulating widely instead. Of course, he continued, these
problems are not unique to Russia. State oil companies hold 77 percent of
world oil reserves and high prices are discouraging needed changes (and
funding massive public sector spending) in Mexico and other countries as
well.
Global energy markets are in a peculiar stage today in which demand is not
being dampened by rising prices, West said, creating a situation where—in
the absence of reinvestment—there is nowhere for the excess capital to go.
Today’s markets are also
unique in that what is and will remain a cyclical business does not seem
susceptible to the normal cycling down after a price boom. The price of oil
will fall significantly from today’s levels again in the future, West
asserted, but asking when is like asking a Maine lobster fisherman if he’s
been a fisherman all his life; the answer will likely be “Not yet.” If you
ask him if the fog will rise, he answers, “Always does.” Unfortunately,
finding the specific answers to these questions that business leaders and
policy-makers crave is extremely difficult.
West also noted that the high level of uncertainty in today’s energy market
is a key driver of high prices. There are considerable political
uncertainties hanging over most of the major producers—including Russia,
Venezuela, Iran, Iraq and Nigeria, he explained.
The very real problem of declining production compounds these uncertainties.
In Iraq, West said, the petroleum sector is in a shambles. The interim
government does not have the authority to make binding deals, and the
professional cadres in the oil ministry are being replaced by “acolytes of
Chalabi.” As a result, he continued, corruption is increasing to such a
point that Anglo-American oil firms will not be able to do business in
Iraq—leaving the field open to Chinese, Russian or other less constrained
companies.
West continued, pointing out that Iranian production is declining as well,
and a new team is coming to power that is more prepared to pursue Iranian
interests in the region, which could lead to conflict. This new team is
also not interested in international investment and ideologically opposed to
the presence of foreign companies, he concluded. Turning to Venezuela, West
described the state oil company as being on the verge of collapse, and the
Chavez government as unstable. Mexican production is about to drop due to
aging fields and infrastructure, and the Mexican constitution prohibits
international investment in its oil sector. Moreover, Mexican politicians
have been diverting a cash flow out of PEMEX into other projects, leaving
little for reinvestment, he concluded. For politicians, West said, “oil is
like plumbing … as long as it works they don’t care” about efficient
operations or long-term sustainability. This leads to underinvestment in
infrastructure, pipelines, and development of new assets.
In the past, West suggested, there was always some excess production
capacity that could pick up the slack during any major disruptions—but now,
there is nearly none (only two million barrels a day, 85 percent of which is
in Saudi Arabia). Saudi Arabia is equivalent to the central bank of oil
production, West said, and, without condoning its domestic governance in any
way, Riyadh has been very responsible in managing its key part of the oil
sector; Saudi Aramco is very competent and professional.
But even Saudi Arabia has limits on what it can do today. When a strike in
Venezuela halted production, Saudi Arabia increased its production. But
Venezuela is six “steaming days” away from U.S. refineries; it takes 45 days
for an oil cargo from Saudi Arabia to reach the United States.
If just one major oil-producing nation stops producing or faces a severe
disruption of supply, West warned, oil prices—which closed earlier this week
at $60.54—could easily rise over $70 a barrel, which could translate into
gasoline prices of $2.80 or more per gallon in the United States. West
suggested several plausible scenarios, such as a coup in Venezuela, that
could lead to precisely this outcome.
Many have suggested that sharply increasing demand for energy is fueling a
race for resources between China and the United States that will define the
future of the energy market, West observed. But in his view it remains to
be determined whether the U.S. and China will cooperate or compete. He does
not believe that the United States and China have to be in “a zero sum game”
over energy, and even raised the prospect of Washington helping to
facilitate Chinese international investment and access to guaranteed streams
of production.
West acknowledged that the bid by the Chinese National Offshore Oil Company
(CNOOC) for UNOCAL has raised hackles in Washington, but asserted that the
deal will die on its own. CNOOC has received a 25-year, no-interest loan
from the Chinese government—which he described as “a case of Airbus on
steroids” that would never receive WTO clearance. The best way to handle
the issue, West said, is to treat it as a commercial transaction. Then
ultimate responsibility lies with the board of UNOCAL, not the U.S.
government, to decide whether or not to accept CNOOC’s bid.
In the end, West said, the real problem is that the Bush Administration is
not paying enough attention to energy security. Everyone likes to believe
that there is more than enough oil to meet current needs, he noted. So, for
example, when PFC Energy warned that passage and renewal of
ilsa (the Iran-Libya Sanction
Act) would have a real and negative impact on increasing production, people
seemed to think that the oil would come from somewhere else. Demand is
estimated to be 120 million barrels per day by 2030—but PFC analysts cannot
see supply increasing much beyond 100 million barrels per day. Where is the
rest of the oil going to come from? West noted that Saudi Arabia is engaged
in a $50 billion investment program, but said this would bring the country’s
capacity to 12 million barrels per day and ultimately perhaps 15 million
barrels per day, but no more. At the same time, he argued, the resource
base in Central Asia has been “grossly exaggerated” and capital investment
is an order of magnitude less than West Africa, where production is much
higher. There will be ongoing competition for Central Asian supplies, but
to call it a “Great Game” seems a bit much; rather it would better be
described as a series of “knife fights in dark alleys.”
West predicted that 2015 could be the tipping point where global demand for
oil exceeds supply and urged all the serious stakeholders in the United
States to sit down and assess the situation. The current American
lifestyle—based on the spread of suburbs and exurbs—depends on cheap credit,
cheap land, cheap energy and the Federal Highway Act to build roads. It is
not the SUV, West said, but Wal-Mart which is the symbol of this way of
life—and Wal-Mart’s earnings are starting to decline. In West’s view, the
reliance on cars as a way of life has prevented the elasticity of demand
that the current oil price surge should have produced: automobiles are no
longer a luxury or just the way people get to work, but an integral and
unavoidable part of people’s lives. As a result, an energy crisis will be a
“big deal” politically—the suburbs and exurbs are the heart of Red America,
and if gasoline prices top $3 per gallon, Social Security will pale in
comparison.
July 8, 2005
This brief was
prepared by Anna Chambers, assistant managing editor for
The National Interest, and Nikolas K. Gvosdev, editor of
The National Interest.
Updated 7/8/05
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