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The Failed European Constitution and US Interests
Marcel
H. Van Herpen
After the EU vote resulted in the dismantling of the EU
Constitution, some journalists reported a feeling of
schadenfreude in the United States. At this time,
the question to consider is whether or not this covert
glee is misdirected, for it is possible that the EU's
failure to copy the Philadelphia Convention does not
serve US interests. In fact, the consequences of this
failure might shepherd in, not only, a prolonged period
of institutional stagnation in the EU, but, might also,
mark the beginning of the downfall of the European
Union. Both possible consequences of the failed
Constitution might impact the US negatively.
In order to properly analyze the way in which the failed
European Constitution impacts the US, it is crucial to
monitor the way in which Europe, itself, was impacted.
The most important reactions to the failed Constitution,
by both Europe and the United States, up-to-date, are
the following:
Since France voted against maintaining the Constitution,
French President, Jacques Chirac, has experienced a
weakening in the polls, dropping from 42 percent
approval to 26 percent, which is, according to The
Guardian, the lowest approval rating in France since
1978. Seeing as how Chirac strongly opposed the US led
intervention in Iraq and attempted to establish the
European Security and Defence Union in the wake of the
Iraq War as a separate defence structure alongside NATO
together with Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg, his
historically low ratings probably account for the
schadenfreude felt in the US. All the same, the
United States needs France for its veto power in the
United Nations and its international sway.
Similarly, there is a big chance that in the coming
German elections of September, 2005, the German
chancellor, Gerhard Schröeder – another European ‘foe’
of the US during the Iraq war - will be replaced by
Angela Merkel of the more pro-Atlantic CDU. These power
shifts in both France and Germany mean that two leaders
of the so called camp de paix, the group known
for criticizing the Bush administration before and
during the war in Iraq, will be weakened or removed. On
the other hand, it is possible that Germany might fall
into the hands of politicians equally, if not more,
opposed to the war in Iraq, the war on terror, and the
spreading of democracy. Moreover, if the Franco-German
alliance were to incur strong support on its own, in the
embodiment of an organization such as the European
Security and Defence Union, the alliance would pose a
greater threat to the US than as it stands now, checked
by other member states of the EU.
More obvious reasons for the US to support, at least,
the short term longevity of the EU include the fact that
Britain’s Tony Blair will take over the EU Presidency in
the second half of 2005, which will certainly lead to a
more US-friendly and pro-Atlantic EU approach. The
EU-US partnership will be a greater asset to the US if
the EU remains a strong organization, strengthened by a
uniting constitution. Conversely, the US might find it
more befitting their objective to see the EU weaken in
spite of Blair's approaching authority, for his
predecessor is still undetermined, as is the future
potential of the EU body.
With the weakening of the EU, new EU member states could
increasingly turn to the US and NATO for their security,
thereby jeopardizing efforts to build a common European
defence- the same defence which offers to both
strengthen and weaken the US, simultaneously. In the
near future, looming over the US is the possibility that
past reluctance of the present EU-25 to accept new
member states will be exaggerated by the constitution's
failure, making the entrance of two close US allies,
Bulgaria and Romania even more delayed.
The US may try to exploit the internal divisions in the
EU to gain short term benefits or, on the other hand, it
may lend its full support to the process of European
integration. One can hear voices in the US saying that
‘Europe has been integrated enough’ and that a deeper
integration, especially in the field of defence and
foreign policy, could hasten the emergence of a
multi-polar world, thereby threatening US hegemony.
There are others however, such as Secretary of State,
Condoleezza Rice, who not only in her Sorbonne speech in
February, but as recently as the US-EU Ministerial
Meeting in Washington, on June 2nd, emphasised her
support for ‘a strong and united Europe that is able to
act as a global partner with the United States, given
its democratic values and our long history together’.
Around the world nations have been responding to the
failed EU constitution, some, clearly satisfied. The
day after the French no vote, for example, China
announced it would suspend its self imposed export
duties on textiles, a measure especially desired by the
French. Russian President Putin expressed his great
satisfaction with the internal EU problems, clearly
expecting that this would give him more freedom to act
with or in the former Soviet republics. A same sense of
satisfaction might be felt in Tehran as well as in other
nations threatened by a great power, for a divided EU
front does not exude the same strength as a united
front. Therefore, although the US might see a temporary
gain in exploiting the present crisis in the EU as a
means of weakening the organization further and
preventing the EU from challenging the
US
hegemony,
by jeopardizing the EU, the US
might fail
in retaining enough worldwide support to combat
terrorism and safeguard fundamental rights.
A strong and united Europe, on the other hand, which
shares ideations with the United States, is a greater,
long term interest to the US and its mission to secure
and preserve democracy.
July 8, 2005
Marcel
H. Van Herpen
Director
The
Cicero Foundation
www.cicerofoundation.org
Updated 7/8/05
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