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Terror Strikes London: An Analysis
Marco
Vicenzino
The brutality in
London marks the continuation of attacks in Western Europe, which began with
the Madrid bombings on March 11th, 2004. The circumstances surrounding the
bombings in London clearly point to the work of an extremist Islamic group,
likely to be a cell that is operationally independent, but an Al-Qaeda
affiliate or like-minded group that shares the same jihadist ideology.
Some may suspect the
IRA. However, traditionally the IRA would either engage in targeted
assassinations, plant bombs in public places to kill civilians in limited
numbers or issue warnings of a bombıs presence in advance to prevent deaths
but to make a statement, that is, to instill fear in society and demonstrate
its effectiveness and ability to strike at will. Others may point to a more
radical splinter group of the IRA, such as the Real IRA, that was
responsible for the massive Omagh bombing in Northern Ireland. However,
considering the circumstances of the London attacks, this is highly
unlikely.
The London attacks
follow a standard jihadist pattern, involving meticulous planning and
coordination, and simultaneous execution directed at soft targets and
generating the maximum amount of death and damage. Like the Madrid
bombings, the London bombings did not involve any suicide bombers (according
to the facts at present) and were coordinated to occur at the time of a
major event. In Spain, it involved national elections, while in the United
Kingdom it was the G8 summit.
There is a
misleading tendency to lump al-Qaeda and other like-minded jihadist groups
under the same command and control structure, as if they operate under a
single, centralized hierarchy. Loosely organized and affiliated, operating
as self-sufficient independent cells and carrying out their own operations,
these cells continue to be active throughout Western Europe and operate in
over 60 countries around the world.
Like the bombings in
Madrid, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Morocco and
Indonesia, the London attacks were directed at soft targets with a high
concentration of civilians. Perhaps this indicates a consistent inability
since 9/11 to strike critical infrastructure, potentially signifying limited
flexibility in the operational capabilities of local affiliates. The
pre-9/11 attacks against the USS Cole, the bombings of U.S. embassies in
East Africa and the attacks of 9/11, marked a high level of operational
sophistication. The current and consistent focus on soft targets is clearly
a deliberate strategy of inflicting mass terror on populations with minimum
means and maximum results.
Despite these
bombings, British intelligence services have recorded many successes in
preventing attacks in recent years, such as cracking an Islamist terrorist
cell that was planning a chemical attack with ricin. In addition, the
British authorities and, above all, the British public are accustomed to
living with terrorism after more than 30 years of IRA attacks. However,
unlike the IRA, a secular movement pursuing a secular objective,
contemporary terrorism of the al-Qaeda jihadist brand is an international
ideological movement rooted in a radical interpretation of Islam, in which
death is a great sacrifice and rewarded in the afterlife. Al-Qaeda and its
affiliates are at war with the entire Western world and those states of the
Arab and Muslim states that cooperate with the West, that is, the United
States and Europe.
It's simply physically impossible to protect all public places, and
terrorists exploit this impossibility to create maximum fear. The main ways
to combat this violence include addressing its sources and increasing
coordination and cooperation between international intelligence services,
which must remain engaged in the constant exchange of information and
relentless penetration and elimination of terrorist cells.
July 7, 2005
Marco Vicenzino is
Executive Director of the Global Strategy Project in
Washington, DC, and served as the Deputy Executive
Director of the International Institute for Strategic
Studies-US (IISS-US). E-mail: msv@globalsp.org
Updated 7/7/05
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