Western commentary about Chechnya rests on two vastly different interpretations of what that conflict is about. Each side has a hard time understanding the other, partly because each view is based on a variety of unstated assumptions about Russian policy.
To clarify what is at stake it would help to summarize these two positions to see if, despite the strong differences of opinion over Russian policies, there is a common ground that points to a viable strategy for resolving the Chechen crisis.

In the first scenario, the goal of Chechen separatists is just that--separation from Russia. If given the chance to leave Russia, there would be no more reason to attack it. Should the Chechen separatists succeed, therefore, the region would quickly become more stable because Russian imperialism in the region is the root cause of the conflict.

In the second scenario, whatever its original goals may have been, international terrorists wedded to Islamic fundamentalism now dominate the Chechen opposition. These Islamists have two goals. The first is regional--to keep state institutions weak, fan ethnic tensions, and maintain a high level of lawlessness and uncertainty. These all serve to increase dissatisfaction with Russian rule throughout the Caucasus.

The second goal is to weaken Russia's political resolve through unpredictable terrorist attacks anywhere within the Russian Federation. By spawning fear and popular discontent with Putin, this would ultimately force Russia to withdraw from the Caucasus.

For those who ascribe to the first scenario, the solution to the Chechen crisis is simple--Russian withdrawal from the Caucasus. Negotiations leading to a cessation of hostilities would be a necessary precursor to Chechen independence, but the end of this particular crisis would not end Moscow's ambitions in the region. Since it is these ambitions that fuel the conflict, Russia must eventually be forced to withdraw from the Caucasus region entirely.

Theoretically conceding the possibility that a democratic Russia might someday abandon its imperial ambitions, the weight of Russian history and psychology, they say, makes this highly unlikely. Analyst's who espouse this scenario, therefore, blame Putin for succumbing to the temptations of Russian imperialism, and for suborning the political regime to its needs.

For those who ascribe to the second scenario, the solution to the Chechen crisis also has two parts. The first is regional--winning the hearts-and-minds of the Chechen and other local peoples. This is to be done by proving Russia can "stay-the-course" and support her allies in the region; providing more monies to rebuild the local infrastructure and economy; and transferring security functions to local militias, thereby redefining the fight from the "Russians" against "Us," into "Us" against the Islamist "Outsiders."

The second part of this scenario is national--strengthen the powers of regional officialdom to combat terrorism, and give the President the right to fire them if they can't. Why change the entire system of gubernatorial election, rather than simply institute martial law in the Caucasus? Because the terrorists have shown that they can reach anywhere in the country. Security, therefore, cannot be dealt with at the local level alone, it requires a comprehensive overhaul of the entire system of accountability, to give the President the powers he currently lacks.

These two views of the causes of the Chechen crisis and the solutions to it are, in fact, mutually exclusive. One demands that Russia withdraw from the Caucasus; the second seeks to bind the Caucasus more strongly to Russia.

There is, nevertheless, common ground between them--the need to involve the Chechens and other local nationalities in the re-establishment of a viable government, a process commonly referred to as "Chechenization." The first scenario, however, offers no realistic hope of achieving this, for it rests on the assumption that separatist leaders, absent Russian influence, would be able to marginalize Islamic fundamentalists in the region.

This is highly unlikely for two reasons.

First, it presumes that the separatist rebels could agree on a legitimate political leadership, presumably under ex-president Aslan Maskhadov, and that this leadership could then establish effective control over Chechnya. This is precisely what Maskhadov was unable to do after the first Chechen war ended in 1996. As a result fundamentalists seized control of much of its territory, and then began to raid neighboring territories. This time around, by all accounts, the fundamentalists are even better organized and better funded.

Second, it presumes that Western military and financial support would be available to back such a new political leadership. The analogy has been made to Western support for Georgia, but the ravages of war have been far more extensive in Chechnya. As a result, the West would have to make the sort of long-term commitment it has made in Iraq and Afghanistan in order to, in essence, adopt Russia's strategy of Chechenization as its own.

The common objective that Russia and the West share, therefore, is the desire to Chechnize the conflict, and the only real difference of opinion is whether this can be accomplished best through Russian efforts or through Western efforts. Even if Russia were to concede Chechen sovereignty tomorrow, however, the prospect of Western involvement on a scale comparable to Afghanistan and Iraq is remote. This fact alone means that there is no real recourse for the West but to support Putin's efforts to bind the region to Russia.

The stakes could not be higher for Russia. With Putin's proposed governmental reforms, the country is wagering not just its current policy, but its very political system on preserving the Caucasus as an integral part of Russia.

Given these high stakes the West should stop caviling and openly commit to helping Russia succeed, for if she fails the prospects of stability in the region become hopelessly remote, Islamic fundamentalists will have established a foothold in a region of strategic importance to the West, and we will have embittered Russian relations with the West for a very long time to come.

Nicolai N. Petro is a professor of political science at the University of Rhode Island and author of Crafting Democracy (Cornell University Press, 2004). Under the first President Bush, he was State Department policy adviser on the Soviet Union.

 Updated 10/01/04