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The
Muslim Brotherhood in France
Glen Feder
In the wake of the recent London attacks, we are once
again reminded of a seemingly irresolvable clash, across
the Atlantic and in the United States, between
secularism and religious fanaticism. Furthermore,
nowhere has this debate raged more fiercely than in
France, where religious insignia such as the hijab were
banned in a law passed by the French Senate in March,
2004. In fact, over the past three decades, there been a
struggle over the hearts of a new, rapidly growing,
generation of Muslim youth in France. On one side is the
largest Islamist organization today- the Muslim
Brotherhood- which has spawned notorious terrorist
organizations such as Hamas and Al Qaeda. The
Brotherhood has seen the growth of the Muslim population
in France as an opportunity to promote an extreme
Salafist interpretation of Islam. The results of the
most recent elections among the primary Muslim
organizations in France, which took place June 19, 2005,
shows that for the second year in a row, the Muslim
Brotherhood maintains a strong foothold in France. On
the other side there is the French government, who has
tried, through democratic elections, to promote a
moderate Islam more harmonious with liberal French
principles. Thus far, the clear victor has been the
Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood has taken hold of
the most powerful Muslim organization in France today,
and is quickly penetrating into the political and social
fabric of secular France.
The Growth of the
Muslim Community
In the fall of 2004, dozens of top Muslim Brotherhood
leaders met in an undisclosed location somewhere near
the Persian Gulf.
The session, while shadowy, may signal a renewed effort
to expand in Europe and even shift the leadership of the
Muslim Brotherhood from the Middle East to Europe.
Increasingly, the Muslim Brotherhood is making
France their
battlefield in their effort to rollback secularism and
assimilation.
The Muslim Brotherhood’s choice of France is largely a
byproduct of history. As Arab governments moved to
crush the Muslim Brotherhood, its leaders sought to find
new territory in which they could operate more freely.
France became a popular refuge. After all, the French
had colonized Algeria (1830-1962), Morocco (1912-56),
Tunisia (1881-1956), Syria (1920-46), and Lebanon
(1918-46). Post-World War II labor shortages
encouraged the French government to welcome
French-speaking migrants from the Arab world. While no
firm figures are available because the French law of
1905 separating church and state prohibits government
censuses by religion, experts estimate that France’s
Muslim population had grown from 100,000 in 1945 to
between six and seven million today, about ten percent
of the total population.
Until the 1970s, the French government was largely
indifferent to the spread of Sunni radicalism, believing
its growth to be a temporary
phenomenon and an effective counterweight to the
communist and revolutionary ideologies of the time.
Successive French policy advisors
expected that most of
the Muslim immigrants who provided fodder for such
movements would return to their country of origin once
employment levels dropped as reconstruction efforts came
to an end.
They were wrong. Immigrants realized that they were
better off unemployed in Europe than unemployed at home.
After the student protests and cultural upheaval of
1968, many leftists extended their sympathy for what
Gilles Kepel, perhaps France’s foremost expert on Islam,
calls “Islamic neo-mysticism.”
The renewed French affinity for Arab culture began with
Napoleon’s 1798 invasion of
Egypt.
A century of administering
Algeria, acting as
protector of Maronite Christians, and decades as the
Mandatory power in Lebanon and Syria, engendered further
sympathy toward Arab society.
Aided by Saudi funding, and taking advantage of French
democracy and naïve elites, the Muslim Brotherhood
spread rapidly in France.
French authorities first began to suspect a problem
after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in
Iran, Islamist
movements, both Sunni and Shia, looked at Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini’s success with envy, and bolstered
their own radicalism. French authorities responded,
with some success, by putting pressure on other
countries to manage their proxy Islamic institutions in
France.
The situation slowly changed toward the end of the
1980s. Increasing immigration from the Middle East,
Pakistan, and Turkey began to change the character of
the French Muslim community.
The fall of the Berlin wall a decade later left an
identity vacuum for the disenfranchised once attracted
to Marxism.
This void coincided with a generational shift in the
Muslim community away from traditional Islam, toward
more extreme Salafism (Wahabism) and the politics of the
Muslim Brotherhood.
Fluent in European languages, protected by their
newfound French citizenship, and equipped with the
fashionable rhetoric of liberation movements, many
younger Muslims began to reject assimilation and assert
their Muslim identities.
The growth of politicized Islam alarmed the French
government.
In 1990, Interior Minister Pierre Joxe sought to gain
control over the direction of French Islam by starting
an umbrella group called Conseil de réflexion sur
l’islam de France (Council on the Study of Islam in
France), consisting of 15 members appointed by the
minister. However, when Charles Pasqua succeeded Joxe in
1993, Pasqua instead bestowed all power to a coalition
headed by the Algerian Grande Mosquée de Paris,
eliminating the
Conseil de réflexion sur l’islam de
France.The Grande Mosquée de Paris, however, failed to
train moderate imams, gain a monopoly on certification
of halal meat, and exert itself on other key
issues, allowing more radical groups to expand.
In 1996, the coalition headed by the Algerian Grande
Mosquée de Paris collapsed, and French authorities were
back to square one. In 1997, interior minister
Jean-Pierre Chevènement tried again to create a unified
and moderate voice for “French Islam.” Influenced by
French Islam expert Jacques Berque
and major contributor to the Institut d’Études des
Societes Musulmanes (Institute of the Study of Muslim
Societies), Chevènement was both sympathetic to Islam
and a proponent of Muslim assimilation.
Seeking to centralize communal leadership, Chevènement
proposed a new council which would later become known as
Le Conseil Français du Culte Musulman (French Council
for the Muslim Religion). As a condition for
membership, groups would have to sign a document
stipulating agreeing to maintain public order and accept
the religious neutrality of the French
Republic.
Nevertheless, deadlock ensued when component groups
could not decide on communal leadership, a struggle that
only became more pronounced after 9-11.
On December 19thand 20th 2002, the
new Minister of Interior Nicolas Sarkozy gave the French
Council for the Muslim Religion two days to form a
representative body. He demanded that all participants
cease communicating with the media during this period,
and fixed the meeting at the isolated Château de
Nainville-les-Roches- which is property of the Interior
Ministry. Those who did not participate risked losing
their seat on the new council.
In order to encourage a moderate Islam, French
authorities stipulated that the chair would be Dalil
Boubakeur, the imam from the predominantly Algerian
Great Mosque of Paris. This move by the government to
choose the president angered many of the participating
groups.
However, Sarkozy thought it would be the only way to
ensure that the council would remain moderate.There
would be two vice presidents- one from the National
Federation of French Muslims and the other from the
Union of French Islamic Organizations. The imposition of
moderates, though, did not lead to any reduction in
Islamist influence.
In April 2003,
the new Conseil
Française du Culte Musluman (French Council for the
Muslim Religion) became the official voice for
the Muslims in France.
The Islamist Triumph
It leadership shocked the French authorities. With no
scientific census possible under French law, the
community decided to apportion seats by square meterage
of mosques, a system which financed those groups
receiving large donations from Saudi Arab and the
Persian Gulf emirates. The largely Moroccan Fédération
Nationale des Musulmans de France won 16 seats, the
radical Union des Organisations Islamiques de France won
14 seats, and the more moderate Paris Mosque, attended
largely by Algerians, won only six representatives out
of 41 total. Two seats went to the Comité de
Coordination des Musulmans Turcs de France (Coordinating
Committee of Turkish French Muslims) and the other three
to independent groups. In this years election, which
took place on June 19th, the UOIF slipped
slightly by losing 4 more seats to the FNMF. Even
without the plurality though, the Union des
Organisations Islamiques de France won the most
influence in both elections by winning much of the vote
in Paris and its suburbs, as well as in the
Provence,
Alpes, and Côtes-d'Azur.
It has also had greater success in recruiting the
younger generation of French Muslims, while the
Fédération Nationale
des Musulmans de France has had difficulty exerting a
united voice or transcending the generational divide.
President Dalil Boubakeur found himself in a position
without power last year and threatened to boycott the
most recent elections if procedures do not change. He
has repeatedly expressed concern over how the
Conseil Française du
Culte Musluman has isolated moderate groups in France,
and has condemned the increased Islamist connections
among the Union des Organisations Islamiques de France
and the Fédération Nationale des Musulmans de France
whose president, in September 2004, met with
Abassi Madani, leader of the Front Islamique du Salut
(Islamic Salvation Front).
The Union des Organisations Islamiques de France’s
showing is a political victory for the Muslim
Brotherhood. With a combined membership of over 100,000
people and more than 200 groups,
the Union umbrella encompasses student groups such as
the Union de Jeunes Musulmans
de France (Young Muslims of France) and the Étudiants
Musulmans de France (Muslim Students of France),
self-described humanitarian organizations such as the
Comité de Bienfaisance et de Secours à la Palestine
(Committee for Palestinian Charity and Aid) and
l'Institut Européen de Sciences Humaines (The European
Institute for Human Sciences), which trains the next
generation of imams.
Founded in 1983, the Union’s
leadership has shown a tendency to radicalism. Its
spiritual guide, Shaykh Faisal Mawlawi, sits on the
European Council for Fatwa and Research with radical
Muslim Brotherhood cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi.
Both Mawlawi and Qaradawi have expressed hatred for the
United States
and Israel, and both have praised and encouraged suicide
“martyrdom” operations.
The Union has hosted both at its annual convention in Le
Bourget, and they have been guests of honor among the
Union’s
affiliate groups.
The Union
has also hosted Tariq Ramadan, grandson of Muslim
Brotherhood founder Hassan al Banna, who has had his
American visa revoked by the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security.
In 1995, Pasqua denied Ramadan entrance into France
after French authorities linked him to an Algerian
terrorist group which carried out attacks in Paris.
More recently, the
Union asked a French television station to cancel a
program critical of Ramadan, and denounced the
journalist who produced it.
Union officials have also
systematically
defended Hamas leaders such as the late Sheik Ahmed
Yassin and Abdelaziz Rantissi, and have raised money
for Hamas through a French organization called the
Comité de Bienfaisance et de Secours aux Palestiniens
(The Committee for
Palestinian Charity and Aid), which the U.S. Treasury
Department has called a “primary fundraiser of Hamas.”
The
Union’s two youth organizations remain well-endowed and
the bedrock of Muslim Brotherhood activity. In 1989,
the Union des Jeunes Musulmans established the al-Tawhid
bookshop and press in Lyon.
Managed by Tariq Ramadan and his brother Hani, and
subsidized by Saudi donations, the press publishes
Islamist tracts which have become influential with the
poorly
assimilated Muslim youth of Lyon.
In 1989, current Secretary General of the Union des
Organisations Islamiques de France Fouad Alaoui founded
the Étudiants Musulmans de France, which was formerly
called the Union Islamique des Étudiants de France
(Islamic Union of French Students) . Despite its
radicalism, the Étudiants Musulmans de France has
misrepresented itself on elections for seats on large
secular student organizations in
France
such as the Centre Régional des Oeuvres Universitaires
et Scolaires (Regional
Center
for University and Academic Projects) and Fédération des
Associations Générales Étudiantes (Federation of General
Student Associations).
While senior members of the Étudiants Musulmans de
France have insisted that it is a “secular” organization
in order to win the votes, there has been an outcry even
among French public officials.After
the Centre Régional des Oeuvres Universitaires et
Scolaires elected 11 of its members, Laurent Monjole, a
national delegate for the region of Brittany, protested:
“We know that in several towns where they are already
present, the Étudiants Musulmans de France has insisted
on the creation of rooms reserved exclusively for
Muslims in university restaurants, who refuse to attend
courses given by women, and organize in certain
universities conferences by Tariq Ramadan of whose ideas
we know. This isn’t just empty accusations but well
founded facts.”
Many students indoctrinated by the Union des Jeunes
Musulmans and Étudiants Musulmans de France have opted
to become imams. Around the small village of
Saint-Léger-de-Fougeret
sits the beautiful Chateau Chinon, headquarters of the
Union des Organisations Islamiques de France’s Institut
Européen des Sciences Humains. While its director
Zuhair Mahmoud, a former Iraqi nuclear scientist sent to
France by Saddam Hussein two decades ago as part of a
cooperation deal with Paris,
has said, “The Muslims have a lot to learn from Europe,
if secularism means neutrality and not refusal of
religion… We ought to spread the great values of
humanity, such as liberty, tolerance and dialogue,”
potential contributions to European civilization has
been undercut by the use of near exclusive use of Arabic
for instruction, denying its students the opportunity to
interact in larger European society. The Qur’anic
school has no academic prerequisites for admission other
than basic Arabic competence. Just three percent of the
Institute’s courses address Western civilization; the
remainder focuses on Qur’anic studies.
Guest lectures like Qaradawi, who has called for the
killing of American and Israeli citizens,
undercut respect for the “great values of humanity such
as tolerance and liberty.” Qaradawi sits on the
Scientific Council at the Institute, which meets
annually to establish the curriculum.
France’s Islamist
Problem
The French government is now aware of the extent of its
problem. In a recent
newspaper interview, Interior Minister Dominique de
Villepin said that it was unacceptable that so many
imams in
France
do not speak French and are not educated in subjects
like law, history and civics. Villepin stated “Today,
out of the 1,200 imams who practice in our country, 75%
are not French and one third don’t speak our language.
This is unacceptable.” He continued “In France, we
ought to have Imams who speak French” Starting in
September 2005, Villepin vowed to make such studies
obligatory for
France’s
estimated 1,200 imams.
At present, the French government’s efforts to encourage
moderation and Muslim toleration of non-Muslims have
backfired. Instead, the Conseil Française du Culte
Musluman has marginalized more moderate institutions
like the Mosque de Paris in favor of Muslim
Brotherhood-affiliated groups. These new groups have
cast aside the goals of integration and adherence to
French values, and instead are implementing an outside
agenda. As Zuhair Mahmood said, “We are pursuing two
goals. The first is an authentic Islam, authentic
Muslims. The second is to be in conformity with the
rules of society, with the laws of the Republic. It is
not easy. It is not always possible.”
This is partly because their brand of Islam is global in
its aspirations, and supports terrorist groups like
Hamas as a means of spreading it.
Lhaj Thami Breze, president
of the Union des Organisations Islamiques de
France, summed up
their stance on religious accommodation within a secular
state when he said, “The Qur’an is our constitution,” a
saying that is also a motto of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Aline Gerard, Proche-Orient.info, “REPORTAGE, À
Rennes, malgré l'échec des Étudiants musulmans de
France au CROUS, les syndicats étudiants
s'inquiètent de l'arrivée de listes confessionnelles,”
April 6, 2004
Le Parisien, February 12, 2003.
Updated 9/21/05
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