 |
Australian
Foreign Policy after Bali
Mark
Beeson
Australians are
famously uninterested in foreign affairs. For many
post-war Australians, life has been characterized by a
rather insular and innocent hedonism untroubled by the
problems that afflict other, less "lucky"
countries. Current Prime Minister, John Howard, came to
power in 1996 promising to reinforce this good fortune
by focusing overwhelmingly on domestic affairs and
making Australians feel "relaxed and
comfortable" about themselves and their place in
the world.
Any lingering hopes
that such a goal was achievable, or that Australia could
remain insulated from the conflicts and convulsions that
have gripped other parts of the world were brutally
snuffed out by the bombing in Bali. As Australians
attempt to come to terms with a post-Cold War order in
which they find themselves exposed to random,
unfathomable acts of violence, a major domestic debate
has been sparked about the adequacy of Australia’s
preparedness for such events and the basis of future
foreign policy, especially toward the United States and
its more immediate neighbors in East Asia.
For the Howard
government, the Bali bombing is especially troubling
because it raises awkward questions about the nature of
Australia’s relations with the region generally and
Indonesia in particular. Australia’s prominent role in
helping East Timor achieve independence may have been
applauded internationally, but it was widely resented in
Indonesia. Likewise, the Howard government’s response
to the problem of illegal immigrants and/or refugees
transiting through Indonesia helped precipitate a major
bilateral crisis as Australian electoral imperatives
were seen to trump longer-term foreign policy interests.
The one positive
emerging from the Bali bombing may be that
Australian-Indonesian relations will become a good deal
closer and more cooperative as both nations grapple with
the strategic and economic implications of the tragedy.
While the Howard government may not feel the same sort
of warmth and identification toward Indonesia as it does
toward the United States and Britain, it has become
painfully apparent that–like it or not–the effective
security of Australians at home and abroad is
increasingly dependent on the cooperation of regional
governments. Whether Indonesia’s political elites have
the capacity to act effectively, even if they want to,
is a moot point and one that threatens to make relations
between the disparate neighbors a continuing source of
anxiety for both sides.
Yet even if bilateral
ties with countries like Indonesia do improve, critics
contend that questions still need to be asked about
possible intelligence failures, Australia’s overall
strategic and foreign policy priorities, and about the
basis of its future relationship with the region. In the
immediate aftermath of the bombing, the Howard
government had to fend off criticism that it had
seriously underestimated the importance of available
intelligence, both its own and detailed warnings from
American sources, which suggested that Indonesia
generally and Bali in particular could be terrorist
targets.
As in post-9/11
America, there is now much talk about the need for a
specific domestic-security coordination agency. There
is, however, one big difference between the post-attack
debates in Australia and America: in Australia, it is
not simply Australia’s own actions that are under the
microscope, but the wisdom of identifying Australian
foreign policy so closely with that of another country.
For Howard, this is an
especially uncomfortable question. For a prime minister
with no great personal affinity for East Asia, and who
deliberately set out to "reinvigorate" ties
with the United States upon coming to office, the
suggestion made by Australia’s Anglican Primate, Peter
Carnley, that Australia’s close identification with
the United States and its enthusiastic support for the
latter’s "war on terror" actually led to
Australians being targeted, is deeply resented. Although
Carnley’s comments were dismissed by the government
and many other commentators, anecdotal evidence and
talk-back radio suggest they reflect the views of a
majority of the general population.
The Howard government
has generally been acutely conscious of popular
sentiment and, as the recent "refugee crisis"
demonstrated, quite prepared to manipulate it where
possible. Given that there is significant popular
support for the strategic alliance with the United
States, there ought not to be much long-term fall-out
from the Bali bombing as far as U.S.-Australia bilateral
ties are concerned. Yet, the possible costs of close
Australia-U.S. ties, especially in the wake of an
increasingly unilateral American foreign policy, have
provoked a critical re-examination of this pivotal
relationship among Australian opinion makers and special
interest groups.
While much of this
criticism has emerged from the usual suspects on the
left (environmentalists and peace activists), some of
the most telling criticism of American policy has come
from conservative ranks. Australian farmers and
manufactures have complained long and loud about
discriminatory trade policies and the difficulty of
accessing American markets. Former Australian Prime
Minister Malcolm Fraser highlighted the potential
conflicts of interest and strategic dangers of close
strategic ties with the United States long before Bali.
Opposition leader Simon Crean has warned of the danger
of becoming an American "lap dog". Indeed, in
the wake of the Bali attack a widespread chorus of
concern has been raised about the optimal use of
Australia’s limited defense capacities, already
stretched by continuing commitments in Timor and
Vietnam.
Significantly, even
Howard, an early and staunch supporter of America’s
targeting of Iraq as part of its anti-terror strategy,
has begun to backtrack and to suggest that Australians
should concentrate on protecting "our own
patch". Not only do many commentators in Australia
remain highly skeptical about the alleged connections
between Iraq and the attacks on America and Bali (1),
there is a growing concern that the preoccupation with
the Middle East has caused strategic planners to
overlook the far more immediate threat posed by what
seem to be surprisingly extensive terror networks in
Southeast Asia.
Paradoxically,
Australia’s ties with the United States and East Asia
have been both strengthened and weakened by recent
events. Howard’s instinctive response to 9/11 was to
offer immediate, open-ended support for America; yet
Bali served as a powerful reminder that Australians are
easy targets in a wider international conflict, and that
Australia must make difficult decisions about how to
utilize its limited resources. Similarly, relations with
neighbors like Indonesia may have improved in the
short-term, but unless tangible progress can be made in
improving regional security, such relations will
inevitably become strained and a source of continuing
tension.
John Howard won office
by explicitly repudiating the supposed
"obsession" his predecessor and political
opponent, Paul Keating, had with Asia. Certainly, no one
could accuse Howard of such a failing. Yet it is clear
that, as far as Australia is concerned, the epicenter of
the "war on terror" is uncomfortably close to
home and necessitates a major re-engagement with the
region. Whether the present Howard government will be
capable of this whilst simultaneously maintaining the
practical and ideological support for closer relations
with the United States remains to be seen. Although
Howard is currently riding a wave of unaccustomed
personal approval, his success in addressing this
complex, multi-dimensional challenge will help define
his political legacy and shape Australian foreign policy
for the foreseeable future.
Mark Beeson is a Senior
Lecturer in the School of Political Science &
International Studies at the University of Queensland
(Brisbane, Australia). He recently edited Reconfiguring
East Asia: Regional Institutions and Organisations After
the Crisis (London: Curzon Press, 2002).
- The debate
over the "link" between Iraq and
international terrorism has also been a subject
covered in In the National Interest. See
Michael O'Hanlon, "Rumsfeld's Exaggerations: On
the Saddam/Al-Qaeda Link", at http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/vol1issue4OHanlon.html,
and
L. Paul Bremer, "Bush, Iraq and the War on
Terror",
at
http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol1issue5/Vol1issue5Bremer.html.
|
 |
