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The
Realist
The
Morality of Results: The Cyprus and Kosovo Challenges
Nikolas
K. Gvosdev
Last week, I wrote that realists
"believe policy should be evaluated by its likely
results, not by the motives or intentions of its
framers." (http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol1Issue12/Vol1Issue12Gvosdev.html)
I stand by that sentiment. It is very easy to claim the
moral high ground by claiming the one stands for
"justice" or "fairness" in
international affairs, especially when one can so easily
denounce the pragmatic compromises often required to end
difficult or protracted stalemates. Self-righteousness
is not a good prescription for security.
The problem is that the rhetoric
of morality, particularly the notion of
"self-determination," is particularly
beguiling. Politicians, especially American ones, are
easily seduced by it into advocating positions that,
while they may appear "just" on paper, impede
real settlements that can help to lay the foundations
for lasting peace and prosperity. Last year, in
discussing the "sympathy loophole" that is so
often cleverly exploited by terrorist organizations, I
noted:
We do not live in a perfect
world. A united Ireland, a Palestinian state
encompassing the entire British Mandate, a greater
Albania — are not feasible or realistic. As a
result, the United States — and more importantly,
American politicians who sometimes unwittingly
encourage the continuation of violence by holding
out for maximalist solutions — needs to make some
hard policy choices. Sometimes aspirations can only
be met part way. However, are these outcomes really
so odious as to justify continuing struggle and
violence—Kashmir remaining part of a democratic
and secular India, continued power sharing in Bosnia
between Serbs, Muslims, and Croats, Chechnya as an
autonomous republic of the Russian Federation, self
rule in Northern Ireland and the Basque regions? (http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-gvosdev101101.shtml)
When the states of the European
Union gather for the Copenhagen summit (December 12-13,
2002), two pressing security problems will be on the
agenda: the continuing division of Cyprus and the
unresolved final status of Kosovo. Indeed, these two
problems are the principal threats to the stability of
Europe. Kosovo's nebulous existence as an international
protectorate has created a political vacuum in
southeastern Europe. As one observer noted:
Today Kosovo is a
socio-political mess, despite the presence of the
peacekeepers and the administrators. … The
American-led Western intervention in Kosovo has
brought no real relief from oppression, no increase
in political or economic stability and transparency,
no serious rise in the standard of living, no
establishment of strong democratic institutions, and
most significantly, no resolution to the underlying
causes which led to the interventions in the first
place. (1)
Cyprus is an even more serious
issue. A year ago, Henri J. Barkey and Philip Gordon
warned:
Unless something is done to
alter the current course of events, the entry of a
divided Cyprus into the EU will reverse much of the
cooperation that has developed recently between
Greece and Turkey, increase tensions on the island,
further alienate Turkey from Europe and generally
worsen Turkish domestic political considerations.
The resulting crisis could lead to Turkish
annexation of Northern Cyprus, the permanent
division of the island, a deep rupture between an
aggrieved Turkey and Europe, and a possible military
confrontation between two NATO members. (2)
Some idealists, who elevate the
principle of self-determination above all others,
maintain that the solution is simple and easy: recognize
an Albanian Kosovo state and the Turkish Republic of
North Cyprus as sovereign, independent entities. Such an
approach, however, would completely and totally
undermine the guiding principle of stability on the
European continent for the last half-century, as
reconfirmed by the 1975 Helsinki Final Act: the
inviolability of frontiers. Indeed, Chapter III stated:
The participating States
regard as inviolable all one another's frontiers as
well as the frontiers of all States in Europe and
therefore they will refrain now and in the future
from assaulting these frontiers. Accordingly, they
will also refrain from any demand for, or act of,
seizure and usurpation of part or all of the
territory of any participating State.
Any feasible solution,
therefore, cannot undermine the primary foundation upon
which European stability rests.
In an effort to avert a crisis
over Cypriot accession to the European Union, UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan has put forth a series of
proposals that he hopes can lead to the creation of a
bi-communal, bi-zonal federation for Cyprus. Is the plan
proposed by Kofi Annan a perfect plan? No, it is not. It
will not satisfy the desires of some Turkish Cypriots
for absolute and total self-determination; it will not
return every Greek Cypriot to the homes and properties
they were forced to abandon in the wake of the 1974
invasion.
What it attempts to do is to
provide a workable mechanism for the two communities to
live and co-exist on the island within the framework of
the internationally recognized Cypriot state. It hopes
to create the conditions for the withdrawal of Turkish
forces, whose presence is arguably the single most
destabilizing factor in the Eastern Mediterranean. A
reunified Cyprus as a member of the EU could also pave
the way for eventual Turkish accession. Certainly, the
admission of a united Cyprus would be an important step
in acculturating the EU to Turkish membership (for
example, Turkish, as an official language of Cyprus,
would become an official EU language as well).
A different type of pragmatism
is required for Kosovo. Serbs and Albanians have
overlapping claims to the same territory that cannot be
easily reconciled within a single common framework.
Tito's federalist approach (substantial autonomy for
Kosovo) as outlined in the 1974 constitution failed to satisfy Kosovo
Albanian desires for full independence (or union with
Albania) and, at the same time, could not guarantee to
the province's Serb population adequate guarantees of
their property or rights. Similar provisions as put
forth at Rambouillet in 1999 will likewise prove
unworkable and unsatisfactory to both sides, and will
certainly not create the conditions that will be
required for the eventual withdrawal of international
peacekeepers from the region.
Unilateral independence for
Kosovo, however, as envisioned by some members of the U.
S. Congress, would be a major blow to the principles of
the Helsinki Final Act. Moreover, it could precipitate a
major international crisis. It is inconceivable that
China, Russia, France or Great Britain would approve a
precedent that permits the alteration of the territory
of a sovereign state without its express consent simply
because of an armed uprising on the part of a
disaffected minority group. Nor could such a precedent
be isolated to Kosovo. If the U. S. Congress were to
legislate recognition of Kosovo as an independent state,
it would be nigh impossible to prevent the currently
unrecognized statelets of Nagorno-Karabakh, Trans-Dniestria,
Abkhazia or Ossetia from seeking the same status,
creating real headaches for the United States in the
years to come.
The only feasible option left is
partition, a process that would split Kosovo into
separate ethnic zones, in much the same way as Bosnia
was divided after the war. Again, this is not the
optimal solution; it will most certainly require some
resettlement of populations. Serbs would have to concede
areas they consider part of their historic patrimony;
Albanians would have to abandon the dream of total
independence for every square inch of Kosovo. (On a
related note, it would also be useful to have Kosovo's
Albanian leadership recognize the inviolability and
integrity of Serbia proper and Macedonia.)
Not surprisingly, the
international bureaucracy has opposed this idea. In
August 1999, the then-head of the UN Administration
Bernard Kouchner said any move toward partition would be
"contrary to our current efforts to encourage a
multi-ethnic society in Kosovo." The alternative,
however, is worse. The inevitability of a de facto
ethnically pure Albanian state emerging in Kosovo, even
without the express consent of the government in
Belgrade, who according to UN Security Council
Resolution 1244 still enjoys de jure sovereignty
over the territory, grows every year. The indecision of
the international community has also emboldened the
leadership of breakaway entities on the periphery of
Europe, especially those that have engaged in
"ethnic cleansing" of their own (such as
Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia) to delay settlement
talks.
If partition occurs as part of a
negotiated settlement between Belgrade and Pristina, and
if this settlement enjoys the sponsorship and backing of
the European Union, Russia and the United States, it
could promote stability. Re-drawing Kosovo's
administrative borders as part of a mutually-agreed
process of dispute resolution reinforces the principles
contained in Chapter V of the Helsinki Final Act, which
calls upon parties to resolve disputes "by peaceful
means in such a manner as not to endanger international
peace and security, and justice. . . . In the event of
failure to reach a solution . . . the parties to a
dispute will continue to seek a mutually agreed way to
settle the dispute peacefully."
A united Cyprus and a
partitioned Kosovo offer the best and most realistic
opportunity to decisively settle these simmering
conflicts and decrease regional tensions. The current status
quo--forcibly keeping Cyprus divided and Kosovo
united--serves no one's national interests--least of
all, our own.
Nikolas K. Gvosdev is editor of In
the National Interest.
- Damjan de Krnjevic-Miskovic,
"The Conflict in Kosovo", Society
(September/October 2002), 82.
- See the Winter 2001/02 issue
of The National
Interest.
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