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THE REALIST
Winning the
Fight Without Losing the War
Dimitri K. Simes
The first issue is what to do
about Iraq, specifically Saddam Hussein. In my view he
has to go. I think that he will make plenty of
blunders--if we play our cards right--to provide a
plausible pretext that will allow the United States to
remove him. With a modicum of creative diplomacy and
some humility in presenting our evidence, I think we can
succeed with minimal necessary international support.
Why does he need to be removed?
I believe that Saddam is a special case. We are still
technically at war with him. We have evidence that he
tried to assassinate former President George Bush. It is
quite clear that we are not able to reach any kind of
modus vivendi with him. If this administration
decided to make a deal with Saddam, something along the
lines of "we leave him alone if he leaves us
alone," coupled with more perhaps more intrusive
inspections--but essentially if we agree to allow him to
be just another Middle East tyrant, that is not going to
work. It is not going to be accepted by the American
body politic. In the practice of international relations
when you deal with a serious adversary you either try to
cut a deal or you crush him. I don’t see as us
prepared as a country, not simply this administration,
to make a deal with Saddam Hussein. That means he has to
go.
The second question concerns our
goals. Here I am a little uncomfortable with the
direction of the discussion--how the removal of Saddam
Hussein is the first stage in the grand reshaping of the
Middle East according to American specifications. (1)
This is not because I don’t prefer democracy to
tyranny--I voted for democracy with my feet. However, we
have to be concerned about winning a very important
fight, but losing an even more important war. And that
raises a fundamental question in my mind.
Former Russian Prime Minister
Yevgeny Primakov (2) who is also, among other things, an
experienced Middle Eastern expert, drew a parallel with
the Soviet experience. He said that in his view the most
unfortunate thing that happened to Soviet foreign policy
was the American defeat in Vietnam coupled with the
Soviet victory in Angola. It gave the Soviets an
impression of invincibility--the belief that they could
walk on water, at almost no cost. And we all know what
followed.
I do not believe in simplistic
comparisons. It is obvious the United States has
incomparably greater resources than the Soviet Union in
the late 1970s and a much broader reach not only
militarily but also economically and culturally than the
Soviet Union at that time. But I am worried that we
might learn the wrong strategic lessons from a likely
tactical success. I thought that our campaign in
Afghanistan was a clear case. Following 9/11, we had to
go--we had no choice. We engaged in a military campaign
in Afghanistan because the Taliban, by refusing to turn
over Osama bin Laden and dismantle Al-Qaeda, posed a
direct threat to the security of the United States.
I think that Iraq is a more
complicated matter. On balance, I do think that we need
to remove Saddam Hussein and decapitate his regime, and
this will require the use of force. But I am concerned
when people want to use a war in Iraq as a tool to
achieve larger goals beyond removing the present,
immediate danger.
Why is it not preferable, for
example, to foment a coup d'etat, where Saddam might be
removed, in one way or another. A new group of generals
could rise to power as the ruling junta, allow
unfettered inspections, and end any threat posed by the
Iraqi WMD program. That would be, in my view, the
neatest solution. I don’t know if it is feasible or
not, but somehow I have a hunch that the President of
the United States would not mind it if it were to occur.
But if this was not possible, I would look for something
closer to that model than a grand, ambitious scheme
requiring a long presence in Iraq. In the name of
promoting democracy in the Arab world, we would have to
do things that would be looked at as rather nasty and
would not be appreciated by the population we are
supposedly trying to help. In the end, we may find
ourselves on receiving ends of those very things that we
want to avoid by taking out Saddam Hussein.
Finally, I want to say that no
one expected when the Soviet Union collapsed, the next
existential threat would arise from Al-Qaeda and Saddam
Hussein. I think that what we are dealing with today is
a combination of Muslim extremism and a global backlash
against the United States. If we behave in a manner that
encourages this global backlash, I have no idea where
the next threat will come from. But I can only tell you
when I go to Moscow, it is the younger, well educated
people, many of whom studied in the United States, who
are more anti-American than the older generation. I
think that much of this can also be seen in China. So,
it seems to me that we have to be quite careful in
finding the right balance. We need to remove Saddam
Hussein from power and liquidate his weapons of mass
destruction. We need to ensure that a post-Saddam regime
is something better for the people of Iraq--even if it
is not a democracy. After all, the Soviet regime
post-Stalin and the Chinese regime after Mao Zedong,
even if not liberal democracies, were still immeasurably
better. Finally, we need to lay the foundation that will
permit the United States to gracefully, but fairly
quickly, exit post-war Iraq, under suitable
international cover, if possible.
- See especially Charles
Krauthammer, "Time to Come Ashore", in
this issue of In the National Interest.
- Yevgeny Primakov wrote for
the October 23, 2002 issue of In the National
Interest. An archived copy of his article is
available at http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol1Issue7/Vol1Issue7Primakov.html.
Dimitri K. Simes is the
President of The Nixon Center and the Publisher of In
the National Interest.
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