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Matters of Evidence
Nikolas Gvosdev
"Evidence" was the common theme connecting
several meetings I attended last week. On Thursday,
David Gamkrelidze, a member of the Georgian parliament,
questioned the veracity of evidence that purports to
link senior Georgian officials with terrorists in
Chechnya. On Friday, Dimitry Rogozin, the chairman of
the Russian Duma's International Affairs Committee,
requested evidence to substantiate American claims that
Iraq is pursuing weapons of mass destruction. (Both
gentlemen, by the way, are authors for this week's issue
of In the National Interest.)
Evidence, of course, is a problematic matter.
Evidence can be tampered with, falsified, or simply
manufactured. It can be assessed in different ways,
depending on one's point of view or one's interests. It
is often weighed (or simply discarded) depending on its
provenance.
Charles Krauthammer raised an interesting point in
his contribution to In the National Interest's
symposium on Iraq and the War on Terrorism. He pointed
out that while the United States may lack the
"smoking gun" at this time, "we are going
to have retroactive evidence" to answer doubts now
raised. ( http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol1Issue14/Vol1Issue14Krauthammer.html).
"Retroactive evidence", however, is a
tricky concept. No doubt some of the Russian generals
who urged a pre-emptive strike on camps in the Pankisi
Gorge also insisted that conclusive proof of Chechen
malfeasance could be obtained that would retroactively
justify a cross-border incursion into Georgia. This is
not a precedent that the United States should want to
set. Suspicions must have some credible basis in fact so
that other observers would also conclude that action is
warranted or justified.
On the other hand, Krauthammer's point reminds us
that the level of evidence needed to act in
international affairs need not rise to the level of
standards employed in a domestic courtroom.
"Retroactive evidence", however, works best as
part of an overall case, to substantiate items that
other pieces of evidence point to, for example, in
confirming items contained in the dossier released by
the British government some months ago.
This is why I think that the Bush Administration
should heed L. Paul Bremer's advice. Ambassador Bremer
suggested that sensitive evidence obtained from
intelligence sources does need to be shared, not with
the general public, but with the key decision-makers—the
other permanent members of the UN Security Council and
America's principal military allies in Europe and the
Middle East who would be asked to provide personnel,
equipment or bases. ( http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol1Issue14/Vol1Issue4Symposium.html
) Sharing the intelligence—to the degree that this can
be done prudently, without risking sensitive assets—helps
to allay fears that the United States has no real
evidence, only assumptions and estimates, or that the
Bush Administration is seizing any pretext to implement
"regime change" in Iraq. It strengthens the
administration's position (that Iraq is engaged in
developing weapons of mass destruction).
This is not to suggest that the United States must
run its foreign policy by seeking the consent of other
powers before acting. CIA Director George Tenet, the
keynote speaker at The Nixon Center's annual dinner
(December 11, 2002) made this point clear: "Of
course, with the safety of our country in the balance,
there are times when dialogue and engagement are not
enough. In intelligence, as in other fields of national
security, the principle that guides our actions is a bit
less elegant, but no less practical: with others if
possible, alone if necessary." But consultation is
not a sign of weakness or lack of will. Harvey
Sicherman's distillation of the lessons Winston
Churchill might have for the administration (in the
Winter 2002/03 issue of The National Interest),
are worth repeating here: "If Churchill opposed a
crippling multilateralism, he was nevertheless no great
fan of fighting alone. As he once said, 'When one has
reached the summit of power … there is a danger of
being convinced that one can do anything one likes.' To
which he would add, 'The only thing worse than fighting
with allies is fighting without them.'"
The passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1441
notwithstanding, a significant "trust deficit"
remains between the United States and other major powers
over the question of Iraq. The administration must
openly deal with this problem, not ignore its existence.
A willingness to engage our partners and assuage their
concerns is a pragmatic gesture worth making. We, after
all, would expect no less of others in comparable
situations.
Nikolas Gvosdev is editor of In the National
Interest.
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