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The New "Big Four?"
Nikolas K. Gvosdev
One of the debates that has enlivened the (virtual)
pages of In the National Interest for the past
two months has concerned the future of the Euro-Atlantic
security relationship. The United States and its
European allies have increasingly divergent views about
global security and the international order. David
Rivkin and Lee Casey noted, "In part because of
these differences in threat assessment, the Europeans
have been mostly lukewarm in their support of the
American military operations in Afghanistan, and
outright hostile to the idea of a regime change in Iraq.
These military disputes, coupled with other highly
visible diplomatic estrangements – e.g., the
jurisdiction of the permanent International Criminal
Court (ICC) and the Kyoto Protocol – have put
considerable stress on the Atlantic alliance." (1)
No one questions that the trans-Atlantic relationship
will continue to play an important role in the
maintenance of international peace and prosperity. It
is, however, no longer the sole "axis around which
American grand strategy" revolves. American ties to
Europe, both the bilateral relationships with individual
countries as well as through collective institutions
such as NATO, will remain a key component in American
foreign and security policy. However, as Josef Joffe
concluded, these ties will "still play prominent
roles, but in a system that is now touts azimuts."
(2)
Some have detected the first stages of a realignment
in international affairs, leading to closer security and
economic ties, and perhaps even a "security
entente", between China, India, the Russian
Federation and the United States, to complement the
existing Euro-Atlantic partnership. In section eight of
the National Security Strategy of the United
States, we read: "The events of September 11, 2001,
fundamentally changed the context for relations between
the United States and other main centers of global
power, and opened vast, new opportunities. With our
long-standing allies in Europe and Asia, and with
leaders in Russia, India, and China, we must develop
active agendas of cooperation lest these relationships
become routine and unproductive."
After all, all four countries believe that they have
been targeted by Al-Qaeda (an impression confirmed by
some of the documents captured in Afghanistan, which
indicate that the transnational Islamist terrorist
network has indeed aided or abetted violence in
Chechnya, Xinjiang and Kashmir, as well as planning
attacks against American interests around the world).
Each government, while espousing the need for greater
cooperation among states, remains jealously protective
of its sovereign prerogatives. None plans to ratify the
treaty creating the International Criminal Court, for
example.
Some observers also feel that there are sound
economic and political foundations for closer relations
among the four. Within these four states resides half of
the world's population. Three of the four are electoral
democracies based upon federal principles, while the
fourth--China--is widening its zones of economic and
political pluralism. These four account for
three-quarters of the globe's military expenditures, and
a total of 41.6 percent of the world's gross domestic
product. In short, an absolute majority of the world's
military, and a preponderance of the world's economic,
power lies in the hands of Washington, Beijing, Moscow
and New Delhi.
Proclaiming a new "Grand Alliance",
however, is grossly premature. The Bush Administration
realistically recognizes that it will take time and a
sustained effort to nurture and enhance strategic
cooperation between and among these new partners.
Nonetheless, there are several areas where focused,
pragmatic proposals for cooperation between these four
powers could pay important dividends. The training of
anti-terrorist units is one such area. There are a
number of areas in which American training methods and
technologies could have assisted Russian special forces
in their operation to eliminate the suicide terrorists
and rescue the hostages in Moscow this past week and
perhaps lessened the overall number of casualties. It is
also true, however, that American units could learn
valuable lessons in dealing with suicide bombers and
religious fundamentalists from their Indian
counterparts. A permanent "committee of
experts", comprising Russian, Chinese, Indian and
American experts and law enforcement officials, is one
such step. Another is to formalize the sharing of
intelligence related to Al-Qaeda.
The real test for cooperation, however, lies
ahead--in Central Asia. Here, cooperation between these
four states is essential if the threat posed by Al-Qaeda
is to be contained and eliminated. A leading Indian
newspaper recently editorialized: "If the war is to
be won, sane strategy dictates that Central Asia be
sanitised first. . . . Operations in Central or West
Asia are unsustainable without partnerships. India in
Asia is more valuable than many realise. The other
element is to carry regional players along, whose
security concerns must be included in a policy
frame[work]." (3)
Patience will be required. Dimitri Simes' counsel to
the administration concerning Iraq is apropos in this
context as well. The United States must resist giving in
to "the messianic unilateralist temptation rather
than begin the complex and time-consuming task of humble
but effective leadership. It is now clear that the
latter approach is especially important precisely
because the United States is the world’s only
superpower and, accordingly, suffers inevitably from
suspicion of its motives and goals." (4) Much
suspicion remains in Beijing, Moscow and New Delhi over
America's intentions. (5) Thus, it will be crucial for
the United States not to demonstrate any insensitivity
toward the vital interests of the other three,
especially when Central Asia forms a part of their
immediate neighborhood.
Reliable alliances do not spring
"ready-made" from thin air. They have to be
cultivated and cared for. With careful and prudent
engagement (6), the United States can work to foster a
set of common interests that can promote and deepen
cooperation among these major powers--and in so doing,
enhance our own security.
David B. Rivkin, Jr. and Lee A. Casey, "A House
Divided? War, Extradition and the Atlantic Alliance,
Part I", In the National Interest, Vol. I,
no. 4 (http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/vol1issue4RivkinCasey.html).
- Josef Joffe, "Of Hubs, Spokes and Public
Goods", in this issue of In the National Interest.
- The Pioneer
(New Delhi), October 21, 2002.
- "Learning to Lead", In the National
Interest, Vol. I, no. 5 (
http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol1issue5/Vol1issue5Simes.html).
An October 26, 2002 editorial in the Indian
newspaper Prajavani, while praising joint
Indo-American military and training exercises,
nonetheless closes with the exhortation for India to
become a "powerful nation" that need not
please "any power. Including the United
States."
American policymakers may find it useful to read
about China's expansion of its diplomatic and
military contacts, especially with its neighbors
within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, to examine ways in which Chinese and
American efforts might be harmonized. The following
article also speaks approvingly of the resumption of
Sino-American military contacts in the aftermath of
9/11. Wei Wei, "China's Military Diplomacy Is
Entering a New Stage", Jiefangjun Bao,
September 23, 2002.
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