When recruiting allies to a cause (in this case, war with Iraq), America must regard rebuff from Britain, America’s staunchest ally, as the least propitious of signs. Thus, Washington is closely monitoring the reaction of both the British establishment as well as popular opinion to the case that the Bush Administration has laid out vis-à-vis Iraq.

Not surprisingly, the critical wing of the British media and the old Left of the Labour Party have acted in character. When Prime Minister Tony Blair voiced support for the United States in a speech to the Trade Unions Congress, he was met with angry silence. Columnist John O’Farrell put forward in the Guardian an analogy between President Bush, "a scary American president [breaking] through the flimsy doors into the UN’s cockpit", and the perpetrators of the September 11th terrorist attacks. Meanwhile, Robert Fisk observed how struck he was by the fact that President Bush, speaking from the podium in the General Assembly, appeared physically very small--noting that smallness of stature was a characteristic of Napoleon and several other unnamed less savory historical figures. Yet, in their very shrillness--comparing Bush to the terrorist hijackers and Hitler--the voices of outright dissent suggest the less than central position they occupy on the spectrum of British opinion.

This does not suggest, however, that the rest of the political spectrum in Britain has universally endorsed the President's case. Intelligent and measured questions appeared in all the major London broadsheets, and parliamentarians, including members of the historically Atlanticist Conservative Party, had questions of their own. Within the Conservative Party, an Arabist bloc, led by the Shadow Foreign Minister Alan Duncan and former Defense Minister Nicholas Soames, calls for caution, while a nationalist Right states somewhat more vociferously that the UK should not engage in military action unless there is a direct threat to British interests.

Certainly, the British public and media give President Bush high marks for having taken the case about Iraq to the world’s most broadly constituted international organization. Though the United Nations enjoys greater respect in Scandinavia, its prestige in Britain nonetheless runs high. Even the Independent, which rapidly asserted itself after September 11, 2001 as the most unrestrained opponent of the United States within the major UK media, admitted that Bush made a powerful case when he underscored eleven years of Iraqi disregard for Security Council resolutions. Some of the praise may be as much on a procedural as a substantive scorecard, but it suggests nonetheless the positive influence the UN speech has exercised over UK opinion.

However, the British like the Chinese, French and Russians are not willing to grant a blank check to the United States. At the core doubts remain over whether the factual allegations of Iraqi misconduct presented by the United States have been fully corroborated. From academics at Oxford University to taxi drivers in London to corporate lawyers and investment bankers in the City, the evidentiary question arises repeatedly in discussions about Iraq. Politicians—running the gamut from Liberal Democratic Party leader Charles Kennedy to Tory backbencher Bill Wiggin—have all raised the question of proof. This points to a real gap in the administration’s public diplomacy. A needed concomitant to the President’s widely admired presentation to the UN is an aggressive presentation of the facts favoring action. Until the administration’s warnings sink in about Iraq’s programs to develop weapons of mass destruction, the skepticism, in both the pubs and the common rooms, may be expected to linger.

Professional polling also reveals that UK residents do not agree on military action against Iraq. MORI, the major UK-based polling organization, has released a poll (taken in early September) that reveals that over half British subjects disapprove of the way Tony Blair is handling the British response to the war on terror. Consistent with the general applause across the spectrum of media for the President’s decision to take the case against Iraq to the United Nations, 69% of Britons indicated to MORI that the UK should involve itself in action against Iraq only if the UN supports such action.

Crucially—and herein lies the source of relief for the Bush Administration—the key decision-makers in Britain have lined up, virtually to an individual, in support of the President’s initiative. Notwithstanding division within Tory ranks, key members of the Opposition, including Michael Howard (Shadow Chancellor), David Forth (Shadow Commons leader), John Bercow, and Liam Fox, endorsed the President’s approach. Within Tony Blair’s Cabinet, signs earlier in the summer of a serious rift appear now to be melting in the afterglow of Bush’s speech. The Defense Secretary, Geoff Hoon, indicated that the UK wants the Security Counsel to issue a "clear ultimatum" to Iraq—with military action the price for non-compliance. Gordon Brown, the Chancellor and chief locus of power independent of Tony Blair within the Cabinet, had maintained a lengthy public ambiguity over Iraq, and rumors had surfaced that he might challenge the Prime Minister, if Blair tacked too closely to the American view. However, Brown endorsed the Prime Minister’s position. "The international community", he stated, "cannot tolerate or leave untackled proliferation where a regime flouts international guidelines and agreements, and threatens stability in its region, and potentially outside that region." Foreign Secretary Jack Straw made his support clear as well, stating that the "consequences will be severe", if Iraq does not respond rapidly to clear-cut UN demands. Straw reiterated the main theme of Bush’s address, "the authority of the UN is at stake." Clare Short, the International Development Secretary, speculated to be a possible dissenter from Blair’s favorable position toward the United States, expressed pleasure that President Bush had taken the UN route. John Prescott, the Deputy Prime Minister and also a figure whose leanings had been subject to speculation, has committed himself not only to the Prime Minister’s position but also to leading the Government’s campaign to sway public opinion in the direction of UN-guided action against Iraq. Rumors of a major Cabinet rift were unfounded; the only major sign of dissent was a call for Cabinet opposition by a former secretary for Culture, Media and Sport.

But, at the same time, the Prime Minister has maneuvered to avoid a Commons vote on action against Iraq. As debate begins on this issue, substantial dissent with the Prime Minister's position has been registered in the Labour backbenches—and among some Opposition MPs as well. Several Members, recently back in their constituencies, have confirmed that there is little support among the grass roots for action against Iraq.

The Prime Minister, however, appears to have concluded that conviction against action, though very broad, is not very deep. Indeed, reports indicate that the British public is concerned more by the ongoing debates over education and the future of the National Health Service than by Iraq. Blair, by supporting Bush, has mortgaged no real political capital at home (unless the outcome of military action is less than successful)—but having conveyed to Washington the appearance that supporting the United States put him at political risk, he will expect valuable concessions from his ally. Blair very much may be seen turning back to the Bush Administration and requiring repayment in some other form. It should come as little surprise in the United States if our staunchest ally, in the wake of its support on Iraq, revisits steel tariffs, the Kyoto protocol, the International Criminal Court and other matters of enduring concern to the self-identified multilateralists of the Blair Cabinet.

Thomas D. Grant is the Warburg Research Fellow for international affairs at St. Anne's College (Oxford).