Nikolas Gvosdev

For the last week, the ripple effects of the address delivered by President George W. Bush to the General Assembly of the United Nations have continued to reverberate around the globe. As the United States continues to lobby members of the Security Council, as Saudi Arabia concedes the use of military bases on its territory for any UN-sanctioned response, as Iraq itself announces its willingness to accept weapons inspectors, it is clear that, by going to the United Nations, the president has successfully changed the tenor of the debate over Iraq. Instead of focusing upon American predilections for unilateral action, the spotlight has shifted to Iraq's record of noncompliance and outright defiance of United Nations instructions. UN Secretary General Kofi Anan said that Bush's speech "galvanized the international community."

The initial and largely positive reaction to the President's speech again demonstrates that it is unwise to underestimate the legitimating power of UN Security Council resolutions as a basis for action. Yang Jiemian succinctly summed up the Chinese position (a position held to some extent by the other permanent members of the Security Council): "China is for a UN solution and will not support the use of force by the United States against Iraq without the consent of the United Nations." Dimitry Rogozin, chairman of the Russian parliament's International Affairs Committee, observes that the "entire legal and political legitimacy of moving against Iraq rests on the 16 UN resolutions" cited by the President. General Charles Boyd alluded to this in his recent interview for In the National Interest, pointing out that having the United States work through the United Nations "certainly has more appeal" to Russia, China or France "than the alternative, being left out, ignored, bypassed."

Nevertheless, it is just as clear that the evidentiary question will remain critical. It is striking how French, British, Russian and Chinese commentators all highlighted how it is an imperative for the Bush Administration to provide hard facts and undisputed evidence, either of Iraq's links to terrorism, and/or of the immediate threat posed to the region and the world by Iraq's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. Unsubstantiated allegations will not suffice. Thomas Grant, in his contribution, zeroes in on this as "the real gap" in American public diplomacy.

Providing conclusive evidence of Iraq's complicity with terrorism (or of its violations of UN resolutions) is also a sine qua non given the strict scrutiny to which the Bush Administration has subjected the claims advanced by Russia or China regarding the links of Chechen or Uighur separatists to international terrorist organizations. The United States cannot then expect the other major powers to accept American allegations of Iraqi misdeeds solely on the word of the President--a sentiment strongly conveyed by Yuri Shchekochikin in his comments, and echoed to a lesser extent by Pierre Hassner.

In forging an international coalition against Saddam Hussein, however, the United States also needs to ensure that its goals are shared by its coalition partners. If the Administration accepts the perspective advanced by Pang Zhongying that "an international problem requires an international solution", it must be prepared for the probable outcome of such an approach. It may be true, as General Boyd, Henry Kissinger, and others have argued, that effective weapons inspections and disarmament will, in essence, lead to regime change in Baghdad by rendering Saddam impotent to act. It is just as likely, however, that the outcome could be, as Rogozin has noted, a disarmed Iraq with Saddam remaining in power. The administration's greatest nightmare would be if the majority of UN members accept Saddam's offer of an "unconditional" return of weapons inspectors as sufficient compliance with UN resolutions. Thus, the Bush team must continue to stress--both in public statements and private demarches--that the type of inspections envisioned are not toothless, occasional visits but something along the lines of the "armed inspections" General Boyd and others have proposed. The recent French proposal advanced by Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin--to separate a resolution encouraging Iraqi compliance with inspections from one authorizing force in the event of defiance--falls short of American expectations.

To prevent Saddam Hussein from wriggling his way out of the trap set for him by President Bush, the administration will also need to confront head-on the question of the quid pro quos that the other permanent members of the Security Council may seek to extract from the United States in return for supporting a new resolution that unambiguously demands Iraqi compliance with all past resolutions and provides for the use of force to compel acquiescence, should that prove necessary. It is clear that each of the other great powers (and, no doubt, the other non-permanent members of the Security Council) all have wish lists. Even a casual perusal of the comments contained in this issue give some indication of what those concessions might be; for Britain, greater American flexibility on issues such as the International Criminal Court and trade disputes with the EU. The French would like to see the Iraqi issue more closely linked with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Russians and the Chinese both want to re-inforce the standing of the UN Security Council as a way to check perceived American "unilateralism" as well as to ensure that the United States will interfere as little as possible in their own anti-terrorist operations. It is likely that other Security Council members--such as Mexico or Colombia--will try to trade their votes for items of interest to them (increased aid, relaxation of immigration controls, and so on).

By choosing to work through the United Nations, the Bush Administration must be prepared to accept the limitations this forum imposes on American flexibility and freedom of action. It should have no illusions, however, that this will be a cost-free process.

Nikolas Gvosdev is editor of In the National Interest.

What influences American policy still remains a mystery. President Bush's address reminds one of a comic-book plot, where the United States is cast in the role of the superhero (Superman, or Spiderman) who faces not complex political issues, but megalomaniac characters--Saddam Hussein as "the Joker", or bin Laden as "the Penguin." The "End of History" should have resulted in the end of politics, leaving a world that only needed to grapple with moral and technical issues. But politics still remain because man, in the words of Kant, remains a crooked timber, no matter how much effort is devoted to making him straight. With regard to Iraq, the policy of the Bush Administration appears to be dominated by three conscious--or perhaps unconscious--ambiguities.

1) A pre-emptive military action against Iraq can be justified in one of two ways. One is an imperial justification: The United States, as an imperial, hegemonic power, will not tolerate any disorder within its domain. Why should it? It implies, however, that the United States is determined to fulfill an imperial mission--the transformation of Iraq into a submissive and loyal client. There is also a democratic justification. The United States, as the leading power in the world, enjoys a specific position--it must intervene to counteract any threat against the global order (Iraq, by producing weapons of mass destruction, thus qualifies as a threat of that sort). In other words, the United States acts as the global cop. Can a policeman be legitimate, however, if he is not the tool of society, having received a legal mandate from this society (in this case, the United Nations)? In a democratic world (and the United States, domestically a democracy, has also promoted international democracy through its child, the United Nations), police work is a collective task. There is something paradoxical in the fact that the Bush Administration is becoming--whether willing or not--the self-styled policeman of the world. But images can be very revealing. By giving a major speech in front of the UN General Assembly, under the watchful eye of Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Bush appeared to be making his case before the international community. This is important, for in today's environment, especially for the Western democracies, the "international democratic dimension" to world affairs (e.g. the UN system) cannot be discarded. By delivering the speech, President Bush appears to have understood that.

2) A pre-emptive strike, so defined, should be surgical, short, neat, and precise. But war is unforeseeable and unpredictable. Moreover, a military intervention in Iraq cannot be limited to police work (the elimination of weapons of mass destruction capacities), for if it is truly a "democratic" action, it must take charge of the country and rebuild it from scratch. This is the major lesson of World War II: the only legitimate goal (and the test of success) of "democratic war" is whether democracy takes firm root in the countries of the former enemy. If Iraq is to be refashioned, the task of democratization could not be limited to one country alone, but has been envisioned as eventually covering the whole Middle East, since this region is trapped in a historical crisis. The strike against Iraq, therefore, cannot be kept limited. Perhaps, however, the Bush Administration has kept secret its grand blueprint for how it plans to transform the Middle East …

3) The United States--and more broadly the entire Western world--wants to be the "good guy" and, more important, wants the rest of the world to consider it to be "the good guy." But, are we spoilt children? So many unfinished projects: the Balkans, Afghanistan... We seem to be like people so enthusiastic at the start of a project, who quickly tire of it and want to move on to something else once it becomes clear that "all that stuff is too complicated." Let us not forget, however, that all of these "unfinished" and abandoned sites fester, breeding problems and destabilizing entire regions around them. Yes, the Western world is eager and ready to transform the Middle East. Is it prepared, however, to do this, not by dictating, but by patiently negotiating a peaceful means for political and economic modernization?

Philippe Moreau Defarges is senior research fellow at the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) and teaches international relations at the Institut d'Études Politiques de Paris. Prior to this, he spent much of his career as the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, focusing upon European Union issues.

It is both logical and reasonable that in an interdependent era, an international problem requires an international solution. President Bush’s remarks at the United Nations General Assembly signals a return to the right direction -- seeking international support for a determined action against Iraq that is adequate for coping with a regime he termed "a grave and gathering danger" to the world. However, we cannot ignore the timing of Bush’s speech -- delivered at a time when there is very little international backing for a possible attack on Iraq and when there has been broad and vocal disagreements not only around the world but even within the United States over the proper course of action.

The unilateral policies undertaken by the Bush Administration since taking office two years ago have evoked a great deal of criticism and opposition. This was dramatically reconfirmed only a few weeks ago at the Johannesburg Summit on sustainable development, when fierce attacks were launched on American government policy by many government representatives as well as members of the NGO community.

The tendency toward unilateral action, indeed, Bush's seemingly headstrong insistence that the United States could act without consultation with other states, has produced real headaches even for America's close allies. British Prime Minister Tony Blair shares Bush's assessment that Saddam poses a "grave threat." Nevertheless, Blair has been concerned about Bush's lack of attention to working within the international system. Thus, his advice that the United States should set a deadline for Iraqi compliance through the United Nations, with a strike only occurring if Saddam refuses to surrender to UN-based demands. For Blair knows very well that no war against Iraq can be fought without a solid and clear international mandate to legitimize any action, even more so since mainstream public opinion around the world does not support an American attack against Iraq.

It is also clear that the Bush Administration's unilateral policy vis-à-vis Iraq could widen the cracks in the international coalition of the war against terrorism. The president's speech to the General Assembly, in essence, his speech to the world, was his declaration of war against Iraq. If Iraq is not prepared to surrender on the terms outlined, Washington has made it clear that it will not rule out military strikes, whether with or without international support. This raises the specter of real anarchy in the international system, which affects the ongoing campaign against terrorism. Moreover, military power has its limits, particularly with regard to Iraq. Unilateral military intervention against Iraq does not provide an effective solution to the problem of international terrorism, and runs the risk of further aggravating uncertainty and disorder throughout the Middle East, and the rest of the world.

One cannot also ignore the domestic factors behind this speech. Bush's challenging international diplomacy takes place only weeks before midterm elections, and retaining control of the Congress is the number-one consideration of his staff. They have concluded that the Iraq issue would help the Republicans to win, since they are facing attacks from the Democrats, a troubled economy, and the President's own position is eroding. So, the President, by speaking before the General Assembly, and negotiating with the other permanent members of the Security Council, keeps the Iraq issue in the headlines through to November.

Pang Zhongying is Associate Professor of International Relations and Director for the "China's Relations with East Asia" program of the Institute of International Studies at Tsinghua (Qinghua) University (Beijing).

The Honorable Yuri P. Shchekochikin is a member of the Russian State Duma and the vice-chairman of its Committee on Security, and a leading figure within the liberal Yabloko party. He spoke with In the National Interest editor Nikolas K. Gvosdev after President George W. Bush made his speech before the United Nations General Assembly.

Shchekochikin expressed concern at the course of American policy, saying that he fears President Bush is making "a classic mistake" in his approach to Iraq. Unilateral American designations of other regimes and leaders as "enemies, partial enemies, partial friends, or true friends" carries with it the seeds of an anti-American backlash. Shchekochikin felt that Russian public opinion, not simply among traditionally anti-American sectors (leftists, the elderly) but across all classes, would recoil from any assertion that the United States has the right to attack Iraq on its own, even if Iraq is in violation of UN resolutions. Indeed, he noted that until recently, the Bush Administration appeared to place little value on the UN system as a means for finding a solution. After having displayed scant trust in the UN system, why should the other members of the UN trust Bush and his assessments that Saddam Hussein is the enemy of the international community? In other words, Shchekochikin intimated that broad sectors of the international community are not going to be convinced that Hussein poses a threat to international peace and security simply on the assertion of the American president.

Shchekochikin stressed that Russia is committed to the war on terrorism, but reiterated a long-standing demand that the United States provide conclusive proof that Iraq is linked to terrorists or is engaged in open support of terrorism. In the year since the tragic events of September 11^th, he noted, the American intelligence community appears to have been unable to clearly demonstrate such a link.

Asked whether he sees any parallels between President Bush's speech on Iraq and President Putin's comments regarding Georgia(1), Shchekochikin answered with an emphatic yes. "As Iraq is for you, so Georgia is for us", he noted. The Bush Administration, he emphasized, cannot turn a blind eye to what is happening in Georgia, ignoring Russian concerns about the transit of fighters and funds from Georgia into Chechnya. If the United States dismisses Russian concerns, Putin has no incentive to support Bush with regard to Iraq. (2)  Shchekochikin worries that such disagreements could then prevent Russia and the United States from working together to find constructive settlements that address their concerns vis-à-vis Georgia and Iraq, opening the possibility that each country may conclude the only alternative is to launch unilateral military operations, which he fears in both cases (whether Russian action in Georgia or American action in Iraq) could escalate into major conflicts.

Indeed, Shchekochikin advises the administration not to rule out negotiations as a way to find a peaceful solution to the Iraqi crisis, noting that despite the links between the Chechen separatists and international terrorism, especially Al-Qaeda, the Russian government last fall opened up a dialogue with the Chechen leadership in an ongoing attempt to try and end the fighting. He feels that the United States should not and cannot ignore the opposition of most of the international community to military strikes against Iraq. He also reiterated that if the United States ignores the concerns of other states, again raising the question of Russian complaints against Georgia's harboring of suspected terrorists, it cannot then expect that other states, including Russia, will support its efforts with regard to Iraq.

Shchekochikin was not at all certain that Russia would automatically support (or at least refrain from vetoing) new UN resolutions authorizing use of force against Iraq.  (3)  In 1990, he observed, the situation was different. Iraq had invaded and occupied another sovereign state, Kuwait. There was a clear reason and justification for coalition military action. Now, there is little support for pre-emptive action. Shchekochikin was doubtful that a majority could be obtained in the Security Council, and cited a prevailing mood in Europe that the situation with Iraq, even if not ideal, was stable.

Shchekochikin's final words of caution was that the United States not undertake a course of action vis-à-vis Iraq without full knowledge of the potential consequences. He does not share the expectations of some in the administration who feel that a military campaign against Baghdad would be of short duration, instead raising the specter of a long and bloody campaign. Moreover, "American boys are not suited to be colonial soldiers"--in other words, Washington is not prepared to shoulder the burdens of a long-term occupation and reconstruction of Iraq.

(1)  On September 11, 2002 in Sochi, President Putin declared he has asked Russian military commanders to draw up plans for military strikes against terrorist bases located on the territory of Georgia.  Citing Georgia's unwillingness to consider joint action with Russia, and the fact that the Georgian government does not have the ability to control and police all of its territory, Putin declared that under Article 51 of the UN Charter and under the terms of Security Council Resolution 1373 (September 28, 2001), Russia retains the right to undertake military operations on Georgian territory to combat terrorist cells.  The full text of the speech is available from the presidential press service, at http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2002/09/19396.shtml.

(2)  Earlier this year, Shchekochikin expressed concern that the United States was not sufficiently interested in Russian warnings about a surge in narcotics trafficking emanating from Afghanistan.  He noted that a source of particular concern was that not one of the Afghan narcotics processing labs located by Russian special services--information he maintains was passed along to the United States government--appears to have been destroyed or otherwise taken out of commission.  Shchekochikin's statement was distributed by ITAR-TASS on April 22, 2002.

(3)  Despite initial statements of support from Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, the Russian position now appears to be that Iraqi willingness to accept international inspectors removes the need for an immediate resolution authorizing the use of force.