Q: Some commentators, both here in the United States and in Europe, were hoping that the President would present a more detailed position for action against Iraq. Some of the post-speech reaction is that the President said "nothing new" in Cincinnati. Do you think that President Bush strengthened the case that action needs to be taken against Iraq?

A: Well, I think that there were a couple of new elements in the speech, but I don't think that anything in it was strikingly new nor do I think anything was intended to be. I must also say that I don't think the President's remarks were directed at the Europeans, but rather at a domestic audience--the American people and the Congress. I believe he certainly began to lay out a stronger case in support of taking action against Iraq. Judging by the reaction of American politicians, what they are saying, it seems to me that he achieved that goal. The White House quite properly cautioned that this speech would not present a great deal of new material, and there was not much new in it--but it was a well laid-out case. What was new, however, was that President Bush essentially went through each of the arguments that has been presented as a reason for not taking action against Iraq, and addressed each one.

It is also clear that there are reports --reports that are credible and that date back for the past decade--of meetings between Al-Qaeda and members of the Iraqi government. We know that Iraqi officials have helped to train members of Al-Qaeda in the use of biological and chemical weapons. So then you have the question of September 11.

I read Michael O'Hanlon's article, which I felt was very narrowly focused on the question of whether Iraq is, in some fashion, culpable for the September 11 attacks. That is a narrow question. Certainly, if you indeed had conclusive evidence of Iraqi sponsorship of that specific attack, you would certainly have a causus belli. However, in my view, it does not really have much bearing on the larger issue--there is more than sufficient evidence to establish Iraq's support of terrorism.

Indeed, I think O'Hanlon misses the point about the meeting in Prague [between the 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta and an Iraqi intelligence officer operating under diplomatic cover, Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani, in April 2001], that he seems to dismiss offhand. For the last six months, people have gone back to the Czech Intelligence Service, over and over, and every time, the Czechs reply that they are positive that this meeting took place. To then implicitly call the Secretary of Defense a liar in the face of that seems a bit over the top. However, I must again reiterate that I think the whole article is a bit of a red herring. Its implication--that we should not pursue action against Iraq because we do not have proof that Saddam Hussein masterminded September 11--is incorrect. Saddam's support for terrorism is clear, it is documented, and it has been there for years. In fact, Saddam's support for terrorism has been going on for years, long before the whole issue of his weapons of mass destruction rose to the fore, which is, after all, a separate issue.

Q: Based on your assessment of the reactions to the speech, what happens now? Where do we go from here?

A: For more than three months, I have been saying that once the President made up his mind on Iraq, three things would happen. First, the President would have the complete support of his Cabinet. Second, he would have overwhelming support in the Congress to take action. Third, our allies would join us. I believe that even the Germans will find a way to participate, whether by sending military police or hospital units. The Europeans will be there.

At that point, the question then becomes: What happens, once a resolution is passed? I predict that Saddam at first will proclaim his defiance, that he will not accept its conditions, but as the deadline draws closer he will change his position, in an attempt to have last-minute negotiations. The administration hopes, however, and I share this hope, that at that point, there will be no negotiations, just a recognition that the game is up.

Q: For the last year, some people have cited the old proverb, "If you chase two rabbits, you'll catch neither", meaning that preparing for action against Iraq will distract from the war against Al-Qaeda.

A: I thought that the president handled that issue rather well on Monday. The "two rabbits" approach strikes me as confusing tactics with strategy. The strategic interest in the war on terrorism is to find a way to reduce state support for terrorism, because, in the end, terrorists need territory from which to operate--whether that is Afghanistan or Iraq or Sudan or Somalia. They have to have some place where they can put their feet on the ground. From a strategic point of view, therefore, dealing with the regime in Iraq in fact is a major step in the fight against terrorism. Now, we have the biggest military force in the world--and we certainly can find a way to continue pursuing the terrorists while dealing with Iraq. Moreover, the war against Al-Qaeda, at this point, is no longer a military war--it is now a war of intelligence and law enforcement. It is not as if we are going to have to have five divisions deployed somewhere in the world to fight Al-Qaeda; that part of the war is over. So I just don't see the contradiction here.

The President has to keep his eye on the strategic vision behind the war on terror--that is his job. I agree with him that dealing with Iraq is a good step in the long-term strategy of defeating terrorism as a force in international affairs.