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A Speech Heard Round the World:
Reaction to the President's Cincinnati Address
In the National Interest asked respected
commentators from around the globe to comment on
President Bush's October 7, 2002 address in Cincinnati.
How was the speech received? To discuss this question,
we have turned to Georgy Bovt (Russia), Stefan Kornelius
(Germany), Steven Everts (United Kingdom), Li Weijian
(China) and Tim Potier (Cyprus).
A Coalition of the Half-Hearted?
Georgy Bovt
President Bush began his remarks on October 7 by
saying, "Tonight I want to take a few minutes to
discuss a grave threat to peace, and America's
determination to lead the world in confronting that
threat." This speech, however, was targeted
primarily at an American audience and revealed quite
nothing principally new, either about the Iraqi regime
in general or Saddam Hussein personally.
What is interesting about Mr. Bush's position--most
of all for his potential coalition partners--is his
resolute determination (despite all the accusations of
acting without advise and consent on the international
arena as the only superpower) to secure a kind of a
broad international coalition. Despite all the
accusations that have been levied against him and his
administration, of acting without the "advice and
consent" of other states in the international
arena, the President is anxious to marshal diplomatic
support for his case against Saddam. The President does
not wish to appear to be acting
"unilaterally"; in his speech, he declared,
"Many nations are joining us in insisting that
Saddam Hussein's regime be held accountable. They are
committed to defending the international security that
protects the lives of both our citizens and theirs. And
that's why America is challenging all nations to take
the resolutions of the UN Security Council
seriously." At minimum, Mr. Bush seeks to convince
other partners to remain neutral in any clash between
the United States and Iraq. After all, under current
conditions, staying neutral is tantamount to reluctantly
adhering to the American position.
I believe that Mr. Bush, so far, has been successful
in mastering that type of international coalition--one
that passively acquiesces to American action. However,
this is not due to his propagandistic efforts. The
speech revealed no new facts about Saddam Hussein's
weapons program that were previously unknown to the
international community (these programs are in fact no
secret despite even the absence of clear UN-proven
evidence). Instead, this coalition has formed due to the
growing understanding around the world that there is
probably no other way to preserve the existing
international order other than to allow the only
superpower (which is also the world's most powerful
economic driving force) to strike against those
"badly-behaving regimes" who don't find it
acceptable to obey the "commonly-accepted"
rules of international behavior.
What Mr. Bush is doing now is trying to use a
military action to compensate for the lack of any new
principles governing international affairs, principles
that have become badly needed since 9/11 in order to
address--and reassess--new international realities.
Unfortunately, real dialogue about the contours of a new
international order has not yet even begun, and the
doctrines have yet to be drafted, whether in the halls
of the United Nations, the summits of the G-8, or even
in the bilateral relationship between the United States
and Russia.
Georgy Bovt is Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the Russian
newspaper Izvestia.
A Smoke Screen on the Ohio?
Stefan Kornelius
Most Europeans have made up their mind about George
W. Bush and his intentions regarding Iraq. The President
wants to go to war; most of his advisers want a war; and
the majority of the American public will willingly
acquiesce to this--even if only out of patriotic duty.
Once again, the Europeans might be proven wrong. Even
though President Bush's address in Cincinnati, Ohio, was
intended mainly for domestic consumption--designed to
beef up public opinion in favor of war in the wake of
the congressional vote and the looming midterm
elections--there is a lot to draw from his words. Take
the part where the President told the world that
disarmament of Iraq would amount to "regime
change." What a nice, if backhanded, way to admit
that tough inspections could do the work: If Saddam
Hussein disarms, then his regime will be changed and
Washington would have achieved its goals without firing
a single shot.
The President desires international approval; he has
decided that he cannot go it alone. American voters
wouldn't appreciate that at all. For this he needs a
coalition. The speech in Ohio helped by laying down the
smoke screen behind which the mechanism of bringing Iraq
down to her knees can be hammered out. As Bush rightly
said: He hasn't decided on going to war--yet.
Forget about Congress, forget about the panicky
Democrats desperately trying to get out of the
patriotism trap. "Showtime" won't be this week
when all of Washington watches the formal debates and
voting on the Hill. The fate of Iraq and the probability
that there will be war will be decided within the next
ten days or so behind closed doors--ironically enough
for those assumingly unilateral "Bushies"--at
the United Nations.
Stefan Kornelius is the editorial page editor of Süddeutsche
Zeitung.
London Calling: Trans-Atlantic
Reaction to the President's Remarks
Steven Everts
President Bush's speech on Monday evening reminded
Europeans how different--and how much more advanced--the
American debate is on what to do about Iraq. It
confirmed, as if there was any need, that for "Team
Bush" Iraq is the key strategic question of the
moment. On the whole, it was a useful but not a great
speech. Its main target audience was clearly domestic.
By repeatedly highlighting the danger of Saddam's regime
in vivid language, it aimed at shoring up support in
Congress and among the American public for eventual
military action. In this respect it may well have
succeeded.
But it did not convince those Europeans who are
skeptical about the rationale for a possible war against
Baghdad. Because it did not contain any new arguments,
it did not register high on the political Richter scale.
Bush said that Saddam Hussein is a homicidal dictator.
This is surely correct. But for Saddam to be a real
threat to the West, Bush has to prove that Saddam is
suicidal--not homicidal. (He knows that if he ever uses
any of his weapons of mass destruction, he and his
regime will be annihilated). Bush also invoked another
possible justification for military action--what would
the world do if Saddam hands some of his weapons of mass
destruction to terrorist organizations? Hence the
reference to the "nuclear mujahedeen". But
this alleged connection between Saddam and Al-Qaeda has
never stood up to careful scrutiny.(1)
There is a strong case for saying that the threat of
force (and, eventually, perhaps the use of force)
against Saddam may be justified. But it rests, as the
Europeans have consistently argued, on Iraq's continued
non-compliance with UN resolutions. Paradoxically, Bush
may be undermining his case by using tough-sounding but
imprecise and misleading rhetoric. This may play well
back home--but it does not travel the Atlantic very
well.
Steven Everts is Senior Research Fellow at the Centre
for European Reform (London).
Bush's Speech on Iraq: A Chinese
Scholar's View
Li Weijian
President Bush's October 7 speech to the American
public laying out the American position on the issue of
Iraq took place within the following context: (1) UN
weapon inspectors are poised to enter into Iraq at some
time in the near future; (2) The United States is
actively persuading the Security Council to pass a new
resolution on Iraq drafted by the United States and
sponsored by the United Kingdom; (3) The Congress of the
United States is engaged in heated debate over the bill
submitted by President Bush on the issue of Iraq; (4)
Anti-war demonstrations are rising around the world
including many American cities; and (5) a new round in
the Palestine-Israel conflict has been set off.
Bush's intention is quite evident as he spoke at this
juncture. First, he again wants to show American
resolution to counter Iraq and "topple Saddam"
as divergent voices are emerging in the international
community on the issue of Iraq. Second, by underlining
the threat posed by Iraq to the United States and the
world, he wants to garner American public support and
gain authorization from Congress to attack Iraq by
military means. By this, he wants to demonstrate
American unity and obtain legitimacy to take military
action in the future. Third, he wants to put new
pressure on Iraq, looking for the opportunity to use
military force, but, at the same time, give himself some
leeway if war appears unlikely as a viable option.
There is nothing new in President Bush's speech,
especially in comparison with his previous speeches on
Iraq. Nor does his speech provide any more convincing
evidence on Iraq as a threat to the United States and
the world at large. In sum, the rhetoric of "Saddam
must disarm himself" and "I have asked the
Congress to authorize the use of American military"
does not mean that military action is imminent or
unavoidable; however, it offers the Bush Administration
more leeway to maneuver. In the period to come, the Bush
Administration will continue to put pressure on Iraq,
and at the same time seek support from the UN and the
international community, and make a final decision
according to the development of the situation.
Li Weijian is the Director of Department of Middle
East Studies at the Shanghai Institute for International
Studies.
A Case Against Premature Action
Tim Potier
After listening to President Bush's address, I
believe it will have alarmed many people in Europe.
There is no love lost between Europe and the Iraqi
regime, of course, but Europe is currently very
sensitive to the perceived "unilateralist"
trend in Washington. This word "unilateralist"
has almost become a cliché, I admit, but I did note
some instances of it from the speech. Mr. Bush, for
example, said, "I have asked Congress to authorize
the use of America's military, if it proves necessary,
to enforce UN Security Council demands." This will
horrify people in Europe. Unfortunately, it is horror
from a rather hypocritical perspective. Many
policymakers in Europe are perfectly happy for the
United States to be the world's policeman, but not to
allow the United States to determine (by itself, alone)
what it wishes to police.
The strategy was wrong from the outset. "Regime
change", in particular, was a mistaken phrase. When
you've said it, there is not much else to say. Europe's
current fears are multiplied when they hear President
Bush or Vice-President Cheney or Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld saying the above types of things. Furthermore,
they are not convinced when President Bush states that
"Some worry that a change of leadership in Iraq
could create instability and make the situation worse.
The situation could hardly get worse, for world security
and for the people of Iraq." Iraq is a problem,
certainly, but it has so dominated the news throughout
the summer, that people have almost forgotten about
September 11 and the "war against terror"--as
well as other potential crises waiting to explode.
My advice? Weapons inspections must be given one last
chance to work--not with a deadline of a few weeks, but
for the coming year. Imagine the reaction. If the Bush
Administration gave the inspectors one last chance, the
Western world (not to mention the rest of the world)
would be stunned (in all the right ways). It would,
also, then give the United States twelve months to
engineer all the changes in not only the Middle East,
but the wider region, that everyone agrees are necessary
for the long-term stability of the area. Crucially, when
the inspectors fail in their endeavors, as they will,
the Western world (Europe in particular) would not be
able to utter a word and then the United States would be
able to build a mighty coalition. The winter of 2003 is
one year too early for a clash with Iraq.
The United States must be prepared to deal with all
of the possible outcomes of a conflict in Iraq, and this
requires careful planning. This goes beyond what people
have already anticipated--the risk of a complete loss of
confidence among Arab peoples toward their rulers.
Sooner or later, an Arab ruler will be assassinated (I
term this the "Sadat effect"); is the United
States prepared for the ramifications of popular unrest
spilling out of control in Jordan, or Egypt, or even
Saudi Arabia? The position of the "reformers"
in Iran could be seriously undermined, allowing the more
virulently anti-American conservatives to reconstitute
their base and end all hopes for a rapprochement between
Tehran and Washington. A war in Iraq could lead Turkey
to invade northern Iraq to deal with the threat posed by
a Kurdish parastate. With American attention diverted to
Iraq, the specter of India and Pakistan going to war
re-emerges. (The bloodletting has not stopped in Kashmir
simply because media coverage is focused on Iraq.) There
is also the prospect of Russian armed intervention in
the south Caucasus. Substitute "Georgia" for
"Iraq" in the text of Monday's address, and
President Putin could have delivered it.
The United States is only making enemies at the
moment. It has to withdraw now from this rhetoric,
otherwise its diplomatic influence/bargaining power will
disappear in a second (irrespective of military success
in Iraq). Don't be flattered, in the coming days/weeks,
by any support coming out of Moscow/Beijing, for they
are laying a trap for you--for heaven's sake don't jump
into it! What will Washington say when Russia calls
for--and implements--"regime change" in
Azerbaijan, not to mention Georgia, or China moves
against Taiwan? The result would be international chaos,
and decades of hard work would be blown away, just like
dust.
We need more time.
Tim Potier is the executive director of the European
Rim Policy and Investment Council ( http://www.erpic.org).
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