President George W. Bush has made a persuasive case
for disarming Iraq through intrusive inspections if
possible or, more likely, through military action. In
essence, the President argued that Iraq is a
"unique" threat to the United States and that
after repeated violations of UN cease-fire resolutions,
it is also already in a state of semi-war with America.
Under the circumstances, he explained, we cannot afford
to trust that Iraq would not use weapons of mass
destruction against the United States or secretly share
them with our terrorist enemies.
Both the United States Congress and the United
Nations Security Council are likely to support the
President. Though the precise language of a new Security
Council resolution or resolutions remains to be seen, it
is increasingly clear that the body’s Permanent
Members—who hold veto power—will be prepared to send
Saddam Hussein an ultimatum and deliver President Bush a
mandate to enforce it.
Considerable credit for this goes to the President’s
personal determination, which created a sense of
inevitability around American action that was a virtual
precondition for productive discussions with our allies
and others. The President’s father took the same
approach in building the Gulf War coalition against
Baghdad. But the administration’s decision to focus on
Iraq’s particular dangers and misdeeds—rather than
some officials’ and advisors’ original arguments
about America’s mission to reshape the entire Middle
East in the name of democracy (and, coincidentally,
Israel’s security)—also made an essential
contribution. Not surprisingly, no Arab states, and none
of Iraq’s neighbors, had welcomed the prospect of
Saddam’s fall as the first step in an American program
of regime change throughout the region. Taking into
account that the support of many such countries,
including Saudi Arabia, is important to the success of
an attack on Iraq, the administration’s shift in
rhetoric was not inconsequential.
As President Bush asserted during his second debate
with then Vice President Al Gore, the extent to which
other nations are willing to follow the United States
"really depends on how our nation conducts itself
in foreign policy. If we are an arrogant nation, they
will resent us. If we are a humble nation, but strong,
they will welcome us." One of the reasons that
selling American policy on Iraq proved to be so
difficult both at home and abroad was that the Bush
Administration initially gave in to the messianic
unilateralist temptation rather than begin the complex
and time-consuming task of humble but effective
leadership. It is now clear that the latter approach is
especially important precisely because the United States
is the world’s only superpower and, accordingly,
suffers inevitably from suspicion of its motives and
goals.
From this perspective, there is a considerable
difference between arguing that American power and,
indeed, its military preponderance create a favorable
environment for freedom worldwide and, alternatively,
claiming that American values are universal and that
whoever is in charge of the United States is therefore
entitled to Godlike power in telling other peoples and
governments how to organize their affairs. More broadly,
the notion of an universalist ideology aimed at global
revolution seems much more a product of Leon Trotsky and
his Bolshevik comrades (albeit with nobler aims) than
Thomas Jefferson and America’s Founding Fathers. The
latter group assumed quite explicitly that men were
imperfect and, accordingly, believed in representative
government, checks and balances, separation of powers,
and the protection of minority rights. The entire
American political ethos rejects the notion of
enlightened autocracy. Yet in the wake of the collapse
of the Soviet Union, when it may seem easy to throw our
weight around, an influential movement has emerged
composed of those Americans eager to place the United
States in just this role as a benign global hegemon. And
omnipotent and ambitious self-appointed hegemons rarely
appear benign to others. In fact, they often provoke
opposition even when their cause is just and, as in the
case of disarming or even removing Saddam Hussein, when
it does not clash with the legitimate interests of other
important nations.
In confronting Saddam, the administration has tried
parading its hegemonic capabilities and acting as a
genuine leader. It has discovered that acting as a
leader both builds greater respect for the United States
and delivers better results.
Dimitri K. Simes is the president of The Nixon Center
and the publisher of In the National Interest.