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On the
Road: A View from the Chinese Interior
Robert
A. Kapp
American businesspeople, journalists, and politicians
accustomed to running up and down the East China coast,
from glistening boardroom to humming
twenty-first-century factory floor to the front end of
the airplane, have often overlooked developments taking
place further inland. As China careers down the
path of marketization and rapid GDP growth, however, the
growing divergence of experiences--between East China
and the central and western regions, between large
cities and the rural hinterland, between those in the
dynamic sectors of the Chinese economy and those left
behind--has drawn the attention of policymakers and
social critics within and outside the People's Republic.
Earlier this year,
after concluding a speaking engagement in Tianjin (whose
"Economic and Technological Development Area"
houses advanced production facilities for some of the
world's most sophisticated companies), I ventured
westward to Sichuan, China's most populous province,
home to 130 million people. In the provincial
capital of Chengdu, I passed through a new airport that
compared splendidly with the new airports of the coastal
cities. I marveled at the extent of the urban
development that has swept over this inland provincial
capital since the days, 15 or 20 years ago, when Sichuan
was a regular stop on my China itineraries. I visited a
proud business owner whose brilliantly lit five-story
emporium sold only high-end furniture and accessories
made in Spain. Then I hit the road to see things I
really hadn't seen before.
This was no country road. Heading north from
Chengdu to Mianyang, I found myself traveling on a
gleaming, four-to-six-lane superhighway, perfectly
graded and paved. When we hit 170 kilometers per hour,
my eyes widened not just out of fear, but out of a
realization that, until a year or two ago, the Chengdu
to Mianyang trip was a matter of endless hours and
frustrations. Mianyang itself, with broad boulevards,
beautifully tended public spaces, the massive Changhong
Electric Company television production facility rolling
block after block through town, and a booming downtown
commercial core, has been firmly "launched",
no matter how far from the coast it lies.
On the other side of Mianyang, the superhighway ended,
and we exited onto another road--National Highway 108,
to be exact--which connects the great southwest (as far
as Yunnan) to the northwest and ultimately to Beijing
itself. Kilometer posts showed numbers in the 2,000+
range, the distance to the national capital. We
entered the foothills of the Qinling, the great hill
barrier that traditionally isolated the densely settled
Sichuan Basin from the old imperial capital of Chang'an
to the north (now the northwestern metropolis of Xi'an),
and, indeed, from all of North China. We seemed to step
back in time. The road was pitted and slow,
overwhelmed with heavy trucks moving cargoes in and out
of Sichuan on the only cargo route through the
mountains. Country buses lurched and swayed carrying
peasants and traders from town to town, from county seat
to outlying market villages, in this inaccessible
region. Road maintenance was underway mile after
mile--by hand. Sunburned men and women shoveled piles of
river rock out onto the highway, sprinkled shovels full
of asphalt over them, and waited for the passing traffic
to pack the surface of this road which could hardly be
called a "highway." When overloaded trucks
ruptured their springs, dozens of vehicles waited (with
a good-natured patience utterly unknown in Washington,
DC, I might add) to inch by the impasse. I was reminded
of the first thing that used to be said about Sichuan in
the last century: "Jiaotong bubian"--"Transportation
is difficult."
Roadside signs revealed that we had entered a region of
poverty and announced programs for local government
assistance to the impoverished. Aside from our highway,
roads were scarce; the hills, bigger than the
Appalachians but smaller than the Rockies, stretched out
in layers to the horizon.
We passed through the great Jianmenguan, a breathtaking
narrow pass through towering vertical rock faces. We
were on "The Road to Shu" (as Sichuan was
anciently called), formerly a stone track no wider than
a single person, immortalized in Tang poetry as
"more difficult than ascending to Heaven
itself." Steam poured from the engines of
overheated trucks on their way up to the pass and out of
Sichuan. Then we headed downward, with a racing river
just below the side of the road. Now steam jetted from
the hissing brakes of the heavily laden trucks
struggling to navigate the twists and potholes on the
steep descent.
By the end of the day, we had reached our destination:
Guangyuan County Seat, essentially the last stop in
Sichuan. The borders of Shaanxi Province and of Gansu
Province, the gateway to Central Asia, lay a few miles
further up the road. In bustling Guangyuan, I
learned from the mayor and his colleagues that I was the
second American visitor to Guangyuan in memory.
Guangyuan, however, was no sleepy backwater. Urban
construction had recently blossomed, much of it funded
by investors from the uniquely entrepreneurial city of
Wenzhou in the East China province of Zhejiang.
There was now a new airport, with daily flights to
key Chinese cities and connections through Xi'an and
Chengdu to destinations all around the globe.
Locals were excited about China's World Trade
Organization (WTO) membership and hoped that it would
bring opportunity to smaller and more distant
communities like Guangyuan. Wahaha bottled water
(the traveler's friend in the scorching Chinese summer)
had set up a bottling plant in none other than Guangyuan
itself--living proof of a bright future!
But, most staggeringly, I learned that the superhighway
that had taken me from Chengdu to Mianyang in an hour
and a half would be completed all the way to Guangyuan
by year's end: by 2003, Chengdu would be three hours'
drive from Guangyuan County Seat. And the mountain
communities through which we had labored would face a
different future.
Behind all of this
simmering change lie two ineluctable realities and at
least the skeleton of a broad policy approach to the
future of Chinese society. The first harsh reality is
that the farm economy has far more people in it than can
be efficiently deployed in agriculture, especially as,
under the WTO, the agricultural economy of China must
face the inflow of inexpensive high quality agricultural
products from the world market. The second harsh reality
is that the pattern of Chinese economic growth over the
past twenty years has created a self-exacerbating
discrepancy between the privileged and dynamic East
Coast corridor and the struggling western regions of the
country. The stronger the East becomes, the greater its
power to attract investment and build capacity, and the
weaker the power of the interior to do the same.
The skeleton of the
regime's policy response to this is the vision of
transforming hundreds of millions of underemployed and
impoverished rural dwellers into workers--not in the
state-owned behemoth heavy industries of the past, but
in some sort of dimly-perceived new urban environment
constructed within the until-now rural zones themselves.
Exactly what these new workers will do -- what they will
make, what services they will provide -- is the subject
of intense discussion, and the entire enterprise, as a
massive social engineering project by government, has
not yet really been launched.
What the regime has
launched, both with rhetoric and with infrastructure
investment, is the "Great Development of the
West", as seen in the shiny new freeways snaking
across the underdeveloped regions of the country. While
some have criticized this as budget-busting temporary
make-work gimmickry, it is fair to speculate that no
systematic economic development of languishing and
backward regions could be hoped for if the basic sinews
of a modern economy are not in place: transportation,
telecommunications, energy. Time will tell, but my
instinct is that "roads to nowhere", in China
as in the United States, may turn "nowhere"
into "somewhere" more effectively than
skeptics might imagine.
For the time being,
though, we have to ask how fully the dynamic modern
sector of the Chinese economy can progress if the rural
sector remains in deep economic distress. The rural
economy faces real problems: declining crop prices;
rising taxes and fees imposed on farmers by parasitic
local-level government bodies filled with cousins and
in-laws "eating imperial grain" (as they say
about those paid with taxes and fees extracted from the
peasants); rampant usurious lending to these peasants by
bottom-rung cadres struggling to secure the money that
must be sent up the administrative chain to meet tax and
fee obligations; outmigration of millions of rural
inhabitants unable to survive on the land and hoping for
better times in the neon-lit cities and humming
factories of the coastal enclaves; the difficulty of
implementing centrally directed economic, political, and
social reform in the face of entrenched holders of local
privilege; and the potential power of modern exposé
journalism.
A short trip off the
beaten path, combined with some sobering reading of
recent reports on rural problems, was a reminder that
much remains unsolved, and these challenges will
continue to bedevil the next generation of Chinese
leaders. What happens in Beijing, Shanghai, and the
other major coastal centers is critical to the future of
the Sino-American relationship. Even so, I have a
hunch we all ought to be thinking about what is
happening outside of town.
Robert A. Kapp is the
president of the U.S.-China Business Council (http://www.uschina.org).
This essay is adapted from his president's letter that
appeared in a recent issue of the China Business
Review.
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