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Chechnya, Terrorism and U. S. Security
Interests
Ariel Cohen
The ripple effect of the
October Chechen terrorist act in a Moscow theater—when
nearly 1,000 people were taken hostage by radical
Chechen insurgents—is deep and long-term. Russia
stepped up rhetoric regarding extraterritorial use of
force against terrorists, their supporters, and funders,
such as those rich individuals in the Gulf states who
allegedly ordered the Chechens to shoot a
"snuff" movie in the theater.
Azerbaijan drew immediate conclusions and shut down a
Chechen representative office in Baku. Georgian
politicians remain nervous that Russian troops may pour
over the border and into the Pankisi Gorge. (1) U.S.
State Department officials in charge of Caucasus policy
are concerned that a sweeping Russian operation in the
Pankisi Gorge or elsewhere in Georgia could further
undermine Georgian sovereignty. Such a campaign would
deal a blow to the already weakened President Eduard
Shevardnadze, although for now he seems to have
acquiesced to Vladimir Putin’s pressure.
After the October attack and the more recent suicide
bombing at the headquarters of the Moscow-backed Chechen
government, chances for a future settlement in Chechnya
seem grim, and an emergence of an independent Chechen
state or even a parastate less likely than before. If
the fighting stopped tomorrow, the challenges to the
viability of a Chechen entity are towering. After the
1996 Russian troop withdrawal, organized crime and
Islamic militants have turned Chechnya into a haven for
kidnappers-for-ransom, slave traders, and murderers of
nuns and foreign aid workers. President Maskhadov was
pushed by Shamil Basaev into adopting repressive Shari’a
laws. Sources in the U.S. State Department said that
Maskhadov failed to prevent over $100 million funneled
to Chechnya by radical Islamist networks. He could
not forestall the invasion of Dagestan in July 1999 led
by Basaev and Khattab an invasion, which ended Chechnya’s
de-facto independence and propelled Vladimir Putin to
power. According to the State Department, today
Maskhadov is hardly a proper partner to negotiate peace
with the Russians, while radical Chechen groups may end
up on the U.S. terrorism watch list, further losing
their legitimacy—an even greater likelihood as further
revelations detail the links between radical Chechens
and terrorist organizations in the Middle East.
The October attack in Moscow has put a higher political
risk premium on energy investments in Russia and the
Caspian region. The peace settlement in Chechnya has
suffered a severe blow. Today it hinges on what kind of
an entity this proposed state could become: a
"Caliphate" run by terrorists, with an
educational system that brainwashes its youth to kill
"sinners" and infidels or a nascent democracy
with a love of secular education and the arts, such as
the Chechens have been capable in the past. In the
recent past, the rhetoric about creation of a
Chechen-led Caliphate "from sea to shining
sea" i.e., from the Black Sea to the Caspian
created panic among the leaders in Russia, Dagestan,
Azerbaijan and Georgia. A radical and impoverished
Islamist state in Europe, on the doorstep of Russia and
the weak South Caucasus states would unquestionably be
dangerous. It will act as a destabilizing factor, and
scare off the very investors who otherwise could improve
the lives of millions of people in the region.
Will the Chechens be able to break the ties to global
terrorist Islamic networks and to the funders of mayhem
in the Gulf, in "Londonistan", and elsewhere?
Will they be ready to disarm in order to assuage
its neighbors’ fears? Will Russia and the West be
capable of providing a massive humanitarian package for
refugee resettlement and rebuilding. Neither the
Maskhadov organization nor the Russian government are
equal to the task, as the history of previous Russian
assistance to Chechnya has demonstrated: the aid funds
budgeted during the post 1996 period for reconstruction
were stolen, and culprits never apprehended.
The United States is facing a deteriorating security
situation in the Caucasus and beyond, which may increase
the threat of WMD use. To help avert such terrorism, the
United States should expand anti-terrorism and security
cooperation with Russia, bilaterally and through the
NATO-Russia Council established in May, and other
Eurasian states. The U.S. should expand anti-terrorism
and security cooperation with countries in the region
and with the business community; undertake a security
audit of major possible targets; encourage higher levels
of protection of WMD storage sites and energy
facilities. Washington should offer Russian forces
anti-terrorism training and cooperation in hostage
rescue operations and expand contacts between security
services protecting WMD sites. The U.S. intelligence
community should develop cooperation aimed at
intercepting Chechen terrorist funding and operational
support from outside Russia. Cooperate with Russia to
facilitate the extradition of Chechen terrorist leaders
from the Persian Gulf havens.
The United States should also assist Russia in
finding Chechen partners for negotiations while
isolating Islamist radicals. Washington should
recommend, as President Bush did in the recent summit
meeting with Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg, that
moderate representatives of the separatists and the
Russian government enter into negotiations that can
produce a settlement while preserving Russia’s
territorial integrity. The Islamist wing of the Chechen
rebels, however, should be excluded from the negotiation
process. Moreover, the Chechen separatists interested in
a negotiated settlement must break their ties to global
terrorist Islamic networks. Those who maintain such ties
should be put on the U.S. State Department terrorism
watch list. Finally, the United States should take the
lead in working with its partners in the European Union
and among the Muslim nations, as well as with the
Russian government, to put forward a massive
humanitarian package for refugee resettlement and
rebuilding in Chechnya if peace is achieved. In
the past, Russian assistance has failed—the aid funds
were stolen, and culprits never apprehended.
It is time for the United States to face up to the
deteriorating security situation in the Caucasus and
beyond. The brutality of the Moscow hostage
taking, its undeniable ties to the same enemy the U.S.
is fighting, and the necessity for Russian support in
the global war against radical Islamic terrorism and a
possible war against Saddam Hussein, dictate a closer
cooperation. (2)
(1) See, for example, the comments made in previous
issues of In the National Interest by Russian
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and David Gamkrelidze,
leader of the "New Rights" party in the
Georgian parliament.
(2) See my comments on this question in the December
18, 2002 issue of In the National Interest.
Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is a Research Fellow at the Heritage
Foundation (http://www.heritage.org)
and author of Russian Imperialism: Development and Crisis
(Greenwood/Praeger, 1998).
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