It is true that on the current world stage we can see
elements of a "clash of civilizations" between
Islam and the West. However, a more serious (if slowly
emerging) clash of competing visions for the future is
unfolding within Arab and Islamic civilization.
In the Arab world, this clash is occurring in a
"political vacuum" where governments have
ossified and have been slow to respond to change.
Regimes (with very few exceptions) embraced inaction
during the last decade, failing to renew themselves by
embracing younger capabilities and effective systems.
They have relied on privilege and a variety of
repressive techniques in order to preserve a rigid
status quo. On the other side is a tiny but committed
opposition group of extremists capable of skilled
operational and logistical feats. But groups like Al-Qaeda
have no solutions to offer for the Arab world's grave
problems that have been caused by the existing set of
regimes. They offer only anger while relying on
destruction to pursue their ends. The extremists are
puritanical; they offer simple platitudes instead of any
comprehensive program for coping with the region's
exploding population, smothering poverty, vanishing
water supply, collapsing social welfare systems, rigid
governments, and overall diminishing chances for
successful entry into and competition within a
globalized economy.
Squeezed in between the repressive status quo and the
violence of the extremists are the vast majority of
Arabs. Over time, mainstream Islamic opinions and the
political inclinations of the educated classes (in which
Moslem liberal, moderate and pragmatic views far
outnumber extremist ones) have gone silent, squeezed out
both by political systems obsessed with preserving a
non-democratic status quo against any challenge and by
smaller, fanatical groups of extremist opposition.
The existing governments of the Arab world have
blocked the calls voiced by moderates and liberals for
renewal and accountability. Much of their nonviolent
intellectual activities were not tolerated. Seeing
little hope for change and frustrated by the present
order's inertia, too many activists and intellectuals
have given up and have chosen silence.
The few who decided to proceed in their activism for
encouraging pragmatic, moderate reform along liberal
lines have suffered many losses. For example, in 1990,
Dr. Nasr Abu Zaid, formerly a lecturer of Islamic
Studies at Cairo University, provoked a national
controversy in Egypt over his book The Concept of the
Text Zaid argued that the only way to understand the
Koran is to reinterpret it according with today’s
circumstances and needs. To do that, it needed to be
understood as a text and to place it in its proper
context of time and principles. After publicizing these
views, Zaid received death threats from extremists, and
in 1995 he was branded an apostate by Egypt's highest
court. The court ordered him to divorce his wife because
under Islamic law, marriage between an apostate and a
Muslim is forbidden. He left Egypt with his wife to seek
refuge in Holland.
Another example is that of Saad Eddin Ibrahim, the
Egyptian sociologist and founder of the Ibn Khaldun
center. Ibrahim was jailed by a state security court (an
extraordinary court that operates outside the purview of
the regular judicial system and has only minimal
safeguards for the rights of the accused). He was jailed
last July (at 62) for seven years with hard labor (his
sentence is now before a civilian court for appeal and
he already spent long months in jail waiting his trial).
The sentence came in the context of his articulation of
critical opinions about the status quo in Egypt and his
pro-democracy views. His acceptance of funding from the
European Union and other well-known international
institutions for the work of the center was used to
further buttress the accusations that his activities
sought to undermine Egypt.
The environment in other countries in the region has
contributed to the collapse of moderation. In Algeria,
after decades of dictatorship, the country prepared for
free elections. The army did not like the winners (the
Islamists) and canceled the election results. Since then
Algeria has been in a constant civil war, in which tens
of thousands have been brutally murdered. In Sudan,
national democratic elections were also cancelled in the
mid-1990s when a coup ended the elected government of
al-Sadiq al-Mahdi. Many other Arab countries from Saudi
Arabia to Syria and from Egypt to Libya and Iraq have
not yet accepted the concept of a functioning opposition
(whether it is loyal or not). Public critical opinion
(and in many cases private opposition) is not welcomed
in most structures. The nature of difference between
people and interests, and the nature of change and
politics has not yet been accepted in much of the Arab
world.
Given such an environment, it is not surprising that
the moderate voice has grown silent. However, other
significant factors have also contributed to the retreat
of the moderates from the Arab street—in particular,
two unaddressed conflicts. In spite of the "New
World Order's" optimistic inauguration in 1991,
Saddam Hussein has remained a looming regional menace
for more than a decade. His intelligence apparatus
prowls for dissenters to silence and eliminate while his
propaganda machine blames the suffering of Iraq’s
children on those countries maintaining sanctions
(including those in the Arab world). His emissaries
openly menace Arab leaders. Eleven years after the Gulf
War, Saddam still influences Arab and Muslim
perspectives and adds to the poisoned atmosphere of
politics in the Arab world.
United States policy after the liberation of Kuwait
in 1991 contributed to Saddam’s ability to subdue to
the people of Iraq. The policy of ensuring a
"balance of power" was predicated on the
premise that a Saddam contained is better than Saddam
overthrown. Yet this logic contributed to the
radicalization of the region and the alienation of the
people of Iraq. A real policy of change in Iraq may have
the end result of liberating the people of Iraq from a
repressive nightmare. Any American intervention should
be sensitive to the Iraqi context. Working genuinely
with the forces of change in Iraq is key to a peaceful
and independent Iraq—and also critical to the revival
of liberal Islam in the Arab world.
At the same time, the failed Arab-Israeli peace
process has crushed dreams of a new dawn for the Arab
world. Leaders like Israel's Shimon Peres once promised
a "New Middle East", an
Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian "Benelux" of
open borders and economic prosperity, but the reality
promised by the Oslo Accords soon shimmered like a
mirage, and now the former peace partners have hands
empty of the fruits of peace. As Oslo evaporated so did
the liberal dream of peace, common markets,
interdependence, and a Gaza "Hong Kong" or a
West Bank "Singapore." Any injection of hope
in the region must and should find justice for the
Palestinians and permanent peace and security for the
Israelis. The requirements of peace seem clear, and
should take place within an overall regional context.
American policy cannot ignore the necessity of solving
this conflict after Iraq. It is a truth that will
contribute to the kind of moderation and democratization
many Arabs aspire to.
All of the above—an underlying lack of democracy,
the lack of peace, and the unaddressed conflicts—have
produced dramatic shifts in public attitudes throughout
the 1990s. The Arab and Muslim mainstream shifted
rightward. This has been manifested by the rise in
puritanism, increased suspicion of the West and a
growing tendency to fuse religion and politics. In most
cases religion and puritanical manifestations became the
only uncensored public expression in most Arab
countries. In some ways September 11 marked the climax
of a complex trend that was destined to explode at the
world stage, because it could not at the regional level.
Most of the regimes have developed excellent security
mechanisms and even won the wars against terrorism in
the 1990s, as occurred in Egypt (and somewhat earlier in
Syria). Yet none of the regimes declared victory over
terror and did not subsequently move to open up the
systems for democratic processes able to absorb and
mediate the frustration and anger of their populations.
In many ways the "victors’ burden" was
absent in Arab politics.
The task today is to unlock this move to the right
among the mainstream. It is a task of opening the
political process to the younger generation and
addressing some of the dire problems of the region. The
resolution of the clash within the Muslim world—between
the moderates and the extremists—will determine its
very future.
The problem with moderation may be that it is in fact
too easygoing, too accommodating, too ready to appease.
The moderates and liberals lack the extremists'
organizational structure, their well-organized
hierarchy, conspiratorial secrecy and group cohesion.
The moderates and liberals lack the extremists'
certainty and sense of righteousness. Unlike the
extremists, Muslim moderates value cultural pluralism.
They are not obsessed with changing or erasing the
thoughts of others. They do not forego all comforts in a
single-minded quest. Perhaps more motivated and
"fanatical" moderates are needed in the Arab
world.
Yet with so much at stake, the pragmatists, liberals
and moderates must re-engage. This is a trend that is
expressing itself in private and public debate in the
region. It is a trend found among small groups of
intellectuals, younger policy makers (the second and
third generations in ruling families and policy makers)
and even among many members of the silent majority. This
trend supports the democratic process in order to
reclaim the Arab and Muslim heritage hijacked by the
extremists and to bring about a different future for the
region. The extremists have shown that there is a far
worse alternative to the status quo's quagmire. An
organized, committed, skilled network of liberal
moderates and enlightened Muslims is desperately needed.
Moreover, it needs to disabuse itself of the notion, so
often articulated in the 1970s and 1980s, that
"99 percent of the cards" are in the hands of
the United States, which encouraged a type of fatalism
about the possibility of bringing about real change in
the Arab world. It is the power of change, development
and democratic life that has not been tried yet. This
could be the only new order able to help the mainstream
of Arab society reclaim its religion, and redirect its
path.
Dr. Shafeeq N. Ghabra is Director of the Center of
Strategic and Future Studies at Kuwait University and a
professor of political science.
