Directing A Diplomatic Concert toward
Pyongyang
April 2, 2003
By Byung-joon Ahn
The fog of preventive war in Iraq obscures an
even more dangerous conflict in East Asia. A nuclear crisis is upon us in
North Korea. Taking advantage of America’s preoccupation with the war
with Saddam Hussein’s regime, North Korea has accelerated its moves
toward actual production of nuclear weapons, while continuing to demand
bilateral negotiation with the U.S. as a pre-condition for standing down.
Unwilling to reward what it sees as blackmail, the Bush Administration
insists that a multilateral negotiating environment is the most secure way
to ensure and verify the dismantling of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons
program. The U.S. should initiate more proactive diplomacy, for time is
rapidly running out.
America’s firm engagement in Asia—in
particular, leading the way in the formation of an ad hoc concert of powers—is required to resolve the threat of
nuclear conflict in the Korean Peninsula. What follows is an outline of my
proposal. First, though, a word is in order about why I argue for a
concert of powers to tackle the problem of North Korea. It is not only a
question of not wishing to reward bad behavior. More seriously, it is
because direct Washington-Pyongyang negotiations will open the way for a
non-aggression pact between the U.S. and North Korea that could result in
the withdrawal of American troops from the peninsula. This would have two
consequences. First, it would surely destroy the Washington-Seoul
alliance; second and relatedly, it would trigger a power vacuum that could
result in the strategic rivalry between China and Japan. While obviously
not in my country’s national interests, I see no way in which it could
serve those of the U.S. and other powers either.
A concert of powers approach is needed because
East Asia bears striking similarity to 19th century Europe. For
example, the region is awash in a rising tide of nationalism and its rules
of conduct are based on classic Realpolitik
balance-of-power scenarios. Each power’s strategy is dynamically
influenced by the strategic rhetoric and actions of the others. So while
the U.S. prevails as the dominant power, spending more than the defense
expenditures of all other powers combined, China, Japan and Russia, along
with the two Koreas, remain crucial players on the regional chessboard.
The U.S. openly pursues a strategy of “offensive realism,” seeking to
preempt the emergence of traditional rival powers or the new threats
emanating from rogue states in possession of weapons of mass destruction
or suspected of involvement with terrorism. In East Asia the other
extra-peninsular powers are adjusting in various ways to this reality.
China is conspicuously pursuing a strategy of “classical realism” with
a twist, combined as it is with a sense of “assertive nationalism”
that accompanies Beijing’s sense that the country is becoming a rising
political and military power. Japan, faced with its profound sense of
“wounded nationalism” arising from having experienced a “lost
decade” of almost no growth at all, is pursuing “defensive realism,”
as demonstrated by its grudging diplomatic support of the war with Iraq so
as not to shake the foundations of its alliance with the U.S. Lastly,
Russia is practicing “opportunistic realism” as a way to manage her
imperial decline.
Unlike Europe the status quo of East Asian
borders is not accepted. As a result, several territorial disputes simmer
beneath the surface, like a snake in shallow swamp. While the division of
the Korean peninsula and the threatening nature of North Korea’s nuclear
posture remain the twin pillars of instability in the region, we have also
the Taiwan Strait problem, the disputed Northern Territories off of
Hokkaido and the conflicting claims involving islands in the South China
Sea between China and other southeast Asian countries.
And yet East Asia has no institutional framework
such as the EU or the OSCE, nor does it have a collective security
infrastructure such as NATO, within which such disputes could be handled
amicably. The legacy of inter-state partnership is weak while that of
confrontation strong. Recent attempts at forming “co-operative
security” and economic interdependence arrangements (ASEAN, APEC and
ASEAN+3) remain “talk shops.” In this strategic environment, the
prospect for Asian security depends, in the short run, on the future of
the North Korean problem, and, in the long run, on the future of
Sino-Taiwanese relations.
I will confine myself here to a consideration of
the former. After “Operation Iraqi Freedom” is successful, the U.S. is
likely to shift its primary focus to Asia. This would be most welcome. An
increased American military presence ought to dampen the possibility of an
outbreak of open rivalry and confrontation in the region and reaffirm that
American security guarantees underwrite the region’s stability and its
remarkable economic growth. To illustrate this point, let me quickly
sketch what would likely happen were America to disengage militarily from
Asia. The race to fill the power vacuum would be won by either a Japan
forced to nuclearize quickly or emboldened ready-to-expand China. Either
way this would certainly intensify regional rivalries in degree and in
kind, and, at the very least, heat up the arms race.
In such environment, it is next to impossible to
build a formal or institutional concert of powers. It is however possible
and indeed necessary, for the U.S. to lead in the formation of an ad hoc
concert of powers lest the North Korean problem continue to proceed
unmanaged. My proposal complements the already existing trilateral
“coalition of the willing” (U.S.-Japan-South Korea). Together with
South Korea, only a four-power extra-peninsula concert of East Asia can
effectively provide the needed combination of carrots and sticks to
Pyongyang. Only then can we test North Korea effectively to see whether it
is ready to abandon the nuclear option and to accept joint security
guarantee and economic assistance. Once the North demonstrates its
commitment to dismantling its nuclear programs in a verifiable manner, it
ought to be possible for the U.S. and Japan to normalize diplomatic
relations with the North and assist in its economic transformation.
In this endeavor the role of China is crucial,
for China is the only power that still maintains an alliance treaty with
North Korea. China already plays a vital role in the North Korean drama,
working hard in its own way for reasons having much to do with the fact
that the two countries share a common border and a desire to prevent
refugee flows as well as a precipitous collapse of the regime (Beijing
keeps the North on life support by providing 88 percent of all its energy
needs and 90 percent of its non-aid food imports, among other things).
Failing to perform a constructive role in the prevention of nuclear
weapons proliferation will not only disappoint the international community
but also cause a reverse in the Sino-American partnership, which is a key
to continued and growing peace, stability and prosperity in East Asia.
This step must be initiated at the highest
level. American President
George Bush and Chinese President Hu Jintao must devote their concerted
efforts sooner and find a workable formula to prevent North Korea from
getting way with a fait accompli
similar to that of India and Pakistan. When these ad hoc efforts yield
substantive results, these can be transformed into a six-state conference
for the four powers plus the two Koreas in order that discussions may
proceed on broader matters of regional stability, nonproliferation and
other common problems facing the region and beyond. The many lessons of
European history bear down on East Asia, more than a hundred years later.
As we should follow the model of concert diplomacy, we ought to also
recall the peril of inaction. It is time to engage with the North more
actively now before it becomes too late.
Byung-joon Ahn, a Member of the Korean
National Academy of Sciences, is a visiting professor of International
Relations at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo,
Japan.
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