The U.S. Economic Outlook: Some Thoughts April
9, 2003 Let me begin by first noting that while
investment has stopped falling, growth in the future is likely to be
moderate. We have seen a
recovery in corporate profits to their pre-recession levels, but no sign
yet of a continuation of the growth rates achieved in the mid 1990s. This is not only due to short-term
jitters about the war. Sluggish
investment is not simply the result of war uncertainty, but is also a
result of excess capacity in manufacturing (at present we are operating in
the mid-70 percent capacity range). Economic
weakness in the rest of the world acts as a drag on demand within the
United States (U.S. manufacturers produced $1.664 trillion in durable
goods, of which thirty percent is exported.)
Moreover, the dollar, even with its recent slide against the euro,
remains too strong. Thus, the
excess capacity cannot be accommodated by increased exports. The service sector, however, remains
strong. Given that services are so important, investment is likely to pick
up in the second half of 2003, even as investment in structures stops
falling, investment in information technology grows and investment in
other areas experiences slight growth.
However, a strong surge in investment in the postwar period is
unlikely, and even this modest growth assumes that the oil price will
stabilize (or even continue to fall) and that war-related uncertainties
are eased. Moreover, the current overcapacity and
downward price pressure in a range of industries have weakened stock
prices, discouraged investment, made companies reluctant to hire new
employees, and slowed the recovery.
We have seen that there is no stable competitive equilibrium in
industries with high fixed costs and low marginal costs – for example,
steel, autos, chemicals, software, computer chips and airlines, among
others. Increased global
competition has undermined established pricing practices in many
industries. Things have been
changing for several years, but a weak world economy and a strong U.S.
dollar have intensified the effects.
The result has been a “loss of pricing power” and downward
pressure on a range of goods’ prices. There is, however, a benefit from this
downward pressure on prices. It
has forced companies to cut costs and increase productivity. Increased global and national competition has been an
important driver of improved U.S. productivity growth.
Indeed, a recent OECD study found that raising trade exposure by 10
percentage points increased output per employee by 4 percentage points. Productivity performance is an
important positive for the U. S. economy.
The current productivity growth trend is about 2.5 percent per
year. Despite weak
investment, productivity has grown rapidly recently, even though
investment and IT spending have slumped.
Strong productivity growth is good for employment over the long
term–for example, as occurred during the periods 1948-73 and 1995-2000.
In the short term, however, strong productivity growth with only
modest demand growth will result in a weak labor market—as we have seen
throughout 2002 and in the first part of 2003.
The weakness in the labor market, combined with higher oil prices
prior to the commencement of the war (and the accompanying uncertainty),
resulted in a plunge in consumer confidence.
Over time, however, rising productivity leads to rising incomes and
profits, and these encourage consumption and investment. What, therefore, can we expect will
happen with the American economy in the immediate future?
Most forecasters predict that the first half of 2003 will be slow,
but that we should see growth of four percent or more in the second half
of 2003. A modest pick up in
investment, strong growth in federal government spending, low interest
rates, and falling oil prices (OPEC is now scrambling to see whether the
$25 per barrel ceiling can even be maintained) should be enough to offset
areas of weak demand. If
there had been significant damage to Iraq’s oil fields or to other
nearby oil facilities, the chances of a double dip would have been higher
(a double dip is when GDP growth slides back to negative after a quarter or two
of brief positive growth).
That outcome seems to have been avoided, and coalition forces now
control about 900 of the 950 or so wells in the southern Rumaila field
(Iraq's largest). Additionally,
this forecast anticipates continued weakness, but not collapse, in the
European and Japanese economies. All of this, of course, assumes that
the war will be over fairly quickly.
Despite some statements to the contrary, Iraq cannot sustain an
all-out war for much longer. They
do not have the firepower to sustain large-scale resistance to coalition
forces. So what could go wrong in the Middle
East that might affect the economy? For
starters, the current regime in Iraq may cease full-scale military
operations and instead retreat to a prolonged guerilla war.
Growing resentment against the United States may incite new
terrorist attacks or suicide bombers in the U.S. or against U.S.
interests. In terms of the
war against terror, we have done well at catching Al-Qaeda's leaders and
cadres, but rather more poorly at protecting domestic targets.
One or more of the countries of the Middle East could destabilize,
and, although it is becoming increasingly less likely, Israel could still
be attacked or become involved in the conflict. I believe that the first outcome is
more likely than the others, but even a sustained guerilla campaign should
not have overly negative consequences for the economy. The others,
however, remain possibilities and if they occurred, would have much more
severe consequences. Any
outcome that results in large oil price increases that would make a double
dip much more likely. Martin N. Baily is a senior fellow
at the Institute for International Economics (http://www.iie.com).
He served as Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers during the
second Clinton Administration. This essay is adapted from a presentation made at the Institute on
April 3, 2003.
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