The
Coming Change in the U.S.-Korea Alliance
April 9, 2003
By Victor D. Cha
Even if the differences in perspectives on North Korea
between Washington and Seoul could be closed, the inevitable fate of the
Roh Moo-hyun presidency may be that the most critical foreign policy issue
it will have to contemplate before its departure in 2008 will not be North
Korea but the alliance with the United States.
This is because a historically unique constellation of
forces indicates that change to the U.S. military presence in Korea is
inevitable, if not imminent. The
presence of American ground troops has been successful in deterring and
defending against North Korean aggression, yet its finely tailored
forces (designed to repel a massive land assault) have grown less
useful to overall American strategy in East Asia.
At the same time, the ROK military has grown more robust and
capable, a far cry from the feeble force trained by the United States
fifty years ago.
Civil-military tensions over the U.S. military footprint in
Korea have grown immeasurably in past months, showcasing a younger
generation of Koreans who see the United States less favorably than did
their elders. The sunshine
policy also had the unintended consequence of worsening perceptions of
U.S. troops in the body politic. On
the one hand, the exaggerated success of the policy caused the public to
be less welcoming of the U.S. presence.
On the other, the failure of the policy led to the search for
scapegoats, for which the U.S. presence was a ready target.
Larger trends in U.S. security thinking also presage
change. The Pentagon’s
100,000 personnel benchmark in Asia is viewed as obsolete among experts.
The revolution in military affairs, moreover, with its emphasis on
long-range, precision-strike capabilities foreshadow alterations in the
face of the American forward presence around the world.
I do not view changes in the structure and number of U.S.
Forces in Korea (USFK) as a tool for tension-reduction on the peninsula.
Doves argue that the main rationale for restructuring USFK (or
withdrawing it) should be for the purpose of achieving peace on the
peninsula. Although there is an intuitive appeal to this view on the South
Korean side (especially if one posits a ROK military capable of standing
on its own), it is less appealing from the American perspective.
Such a view assumes that North Korea has implicit veto power over
the disposition of U.S. forces in Korea.
It underestimates the deterrent value provided by the U.S. presence
(i.e., willingness to negotiate away USFK may give the mistaken impression
that U.S. security commitments are not sound).
Moreover, it undercuts the notion that the future of USFK derives
from the future of the alliance. Changes
in USFK should not be the sacrificial lamb for peace on the peninsula, but
should be integrated with a larger U.S.-ROK joint vision.
At the same time, though, I disagree with the hawkish
argument that contemplation of any change in USFK must await a stable
peace on the peninsula (defined as elimination of the northern threat).
This view is too inflexible; moreover, it focuses on the easily
answerable questions at the expense of the most challenging ones.
USFK is composed of three components: the UNC (United Nations
Command), Combined Forces Command (CFC) structure, and the 37,000 men
troop and base presence. If a
peace treaty emerged on the peninsula, then this would obviate the need
for the UNC (primarily tasked after 1978 with armistice related issues).
Hawks accept that changes in the forward presence and the command
structure would likely follow such a peace.
The more interesting and challenging question is whether one can
contemplate incremental change in the CFC and USFK presence given
continued threats from the North. Such
a plan of action would maintain traditional deterrence against the North,
sustain America’s allied defense commitment to Seoul, but also resonate
with the gradual cultivation of a new vision for the alliance that looks
beyond the DPRK. In the end,
this plan for USFK would be least specious in that it would hold across a
spectrum of potential outcomes on the peninsula (i.e., from continued
stalemate to peace treaty to unification).
Those Koreans who believe that the U.S. is too comfortably
self-interested with its position on the peninsula to contemplate serious
change are dead wrong. The
images beamed back to the United States of “Yankee go home”
demonstrations, burned American flags, accosted GIs, and young Korean
assertions that George Bush is more threatening than Kim Jong-il have had
a real effect in Washington. There
is anger, expressed in Congress and in the op-ed pages of major newspapers
about South Korean ungratefulness for the alliance.
With no imperial aspirations, the United States indeed would
withdraw its forces in the face of an unwelcoming host nation.
Secretary Rumsfeld’s recent remarks about possible
modification of U.S. forces in Korea offers a glimpse, in my view, of a
deeper, serious, and longer-term study underway in Washington on revising
the alliance. The
anti-American tenor of the election campaign in Korea and the subsequent
“peace” demonstrations have created a momentum in Washington that
proponents of alliance revision can ride.
The ostensible goal of such plans is to have the same alliance but
with a smaller and different (i.e. less ground, more air/navy) footprint,
but if the vicious circle of anti- Americanism in Seoul and consequent
anti-Korean backlashes in the US continues unabated, then the outcome
could also entail a downgrading of the alliance in U.S. eyes.
Already, some South Koreans are concerned about the
apparent seriousness of Bush’s plans.
In the ultimate historical irony, Seoulites who once claimed that
the United States would forever keep their military footprint in the
center of the metropolis because it suited American geostrategic
interests, are now calling for the U.S. military to remain because it is
in South Korean interests that they do so.
President Roh Moo-hyun does not want to go down in South Korean
history as the leader who “lost” the alliance.
His entreaties to NGO groups to dampen down the anti-American
rhetoric, his meeting with USFK, and his remarks about how “precious”
Korea finds the U.S. military presence were all well-advised steps in this
regard. But he needs to do
much more. As is underway in
the United States, President Roh and his foreign policy team need to
undertake a bottom-up review of the alliance. They need to assess Korea’s long-term interests in the
alliance. And they need to
come up with a longer-term vision of what the alliance stands for, rather
than what it stands against.
This vision must showcase the new U.S.-Korea alliance as
the embodiment of values including democracy, open markets,
nonproliferation, counter-terrorism, human rights, rule of law, civilian
control of the military, and freedom of worship in a region of the world
that does not yet readily accept these values.
At its military core, the alliance’s regional stability
function would require a force presence that meets three criteria.
The revamped presence must be militarily potent, but flexible
enough to react swiftly to a broad range of regional tasks (deployable).
The presence, however downsized and changed, must still preserve
America’s traditional defense commitment to South Korea (credible).
Finally, as critical as being a potent, credible, and deployable,
the revised presence must not be seen as overbearing by South Koreans
(unobtrusive). On the
ground, this new presence would most likely entail the removal of Yongsan
headquarters in central Seoul and the upsizing of basing at Osan as a
replacement. Ground troop
presence would be drawn down and moved south of Seoul.
Air capabilities (at Osan and Kunsan) would remain constant and
enhanced with a larger naval presence on the peninsula, possibly with a
port or access rights on the southern end of the peninsula.
However this presence is reconfigured, it must be done in a
careful, deliberative fashion and not in a knee-jerk, reactive one.
There are undeniable military rationales for changing the US
military footprint on the peninsula. The value-added of such changes, however, would be even
greater if they could be accomplished to military satisfaction, and
without the negative political externalities.
Such negative consequences include a North Korean regime snatching
victory from the jaws of defeat by claiming “success” for having
pushed the Americans out, or acute abandonment fears on the part of Tokyo
and Seoul that compel them to self-help security alternatives.
Both outcomes would occur at the expense of losing traditional
American political influence and stature in the region.
The long-term scope of such a study should not belie its
urgency. Coming up now with a
mutually agreeable vision and military rationale for the alliance ensures
that future revisions to the force presence take place in the right
political context and are not misinterpreted.
Otherwise, the U.S.-ROK alliance runs the risk of entering its
middle ages as a brittle cold war relic, prone to being overtaken and
outpaced by events.
Victor D. Cha holds the Song Chair in Government and Asian
Studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service.
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