What
Lies Ahead
April
16, 2003
By Stefan Kornelius
States
that are led by a dictator, as a rule, are plunged into instability once
the potentate at the top has been overthrown, as we have seen in the last
few days. In this day and age, when it does appear that international
politics are being personalized, the remark by the Prussian strategist
Clausewitz, that war is nothing but a duel on a higher level, seems
apropos. One could almost think that Clausewitz is right, that the second
Gulf War boiled down to a clash between George W. Bush versus Saddam
Hussein. In fact, many have
suggested that the conflict was little more than a blood vendetta pursued
by the son on behalf of his father.
Even if
this is much too shortsighted, it is correct to say that, from an American
perspective, it was above all Saddam's system that motivated the war.
Washington saw Saddam as the source of all evil, a mass murderer
out to plunge the Middle East and the entire world into chaos.
This is why, behind all the demands for disarmament and
inspections, there had been, above all, one overriding objective: this man
must go. President Bush
was never before as close to this truth as last October when he said that
complete disarmament was equivalent to regime change.
In
fact, regime change has always been the primary American goal, even when
the United States put forward other pretexts for war: weapons of mass
destruction, terrorism, and threats posed by Saddam to his neighbors and
the Iraqi population. These
grab-bag of reasons to go to war was needed because the actual cause for
the war was difficult to legitimize under international law and
politically presumptuous. The
request for a regime change is an expression of imperial design –
aspirations the likes of which the world has seen only in rare moments in
its history.
This
realization has embittered the friends of the United States.
They were bitter about American inability to listen; bitter about
its rigidity; bitter about Washington's refusal to compromise; and bitter
it was willing to sacrifice all other goals to achieve that one objective.
Behind
the argument between the United States and the dictator of Baghdad, a much
bigger conflict has built up, which does not make the world more secure
but rather more unstable.
The
rift between the United States, its allies and the other main players in
the international system in the pre-war phase, the almost obsessive
exaggeration of the Iraqi threat, and the non-stop changing of objectives
and reasons to wage war all made this conflict fraught with so much
unnecessary ballast that even after a quick invasion with only a few
victims there can be no question of peace. Yes, the Americans are correct
in their accusation that most European governments, particularly Germany,
had not yet grasped the threats of the new era.
A large part of Europe has indeed shied away from a ruthless
political analysis of security issues, hiding behind a supposedly higher
morality and legitimacy. The
continent does not know how to use its political and economic weight to
give the world a turn for the better.
At the
same time, however, the United States has meanwhile been asking radical
questions: does one have the right to fight a danger preemptively once it
looms on the horizon? Is
one entitled to overthrow a dictatorship at all costs?
Does the United Nations, in its World War II setup, function in a
globalized world? Is
international law of any use when tyrants may hide behind it?
The
answers provided by the Bush Administration are troubling. As much as the imminent end of the dictator and his regime
must be welcomed, circumstances that have now led to war are just as
tormenting. The second
American-Iraqi war lacks a political, legal, and military basis; it lacks
a credible post-war vision. The
risks of the war are great, the scenarios for what comes after are vague.
I fear
that the United States will not have the staying power to remain in Iraq
for many years to come to build a stable, democratic government there.
It will founder on its claim to bring about peace and stability and
be accepted as a benevolent hegemonial power.
Rather, the policies of the Bush Administration risk breeding anger
that will be turned against the United States for a long time to come.
Stefan Kornelius is the editorial page
editor of Süddeutsche Zeitung.
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