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Aftereffects
of the Iraq War in the Middle East
Shibley Telhami
Strong opposition to the war in Iraq among regional
populations was primarily a result of deep skepticism of
U.S. intentions and serious concerns about the war's
likely consequences.
Most people in the region believed before the war
that America was actively following a policy of
undermining Muslim nations; this is a broad assumption
in Middle East. Similarly,
few thought that the United States was genuinely seeking
democracy, peace or development in the region.
On the contrary, most believed that Washington
really wanted only to control Iraq's oil and to protect
Israel. At
the same time, many in the region feared that the war
would produce more terrorism and (whatever the outcome
in Iraq) less democracy in their own countries, where
governments unwilling to defy America would be forced to
crack down on anti-war sentiment and impose new controls
to limit dissent.
Many
if not most people in the region are still in shock
after the rapid U.S. victory in Iraq.
Still, their instincts have not changed and they
remain suspicious of Washington.
Media reporting has heightened these suspicions,
emphasizing, for example, that U.S. military forces
moved first to secure Iraq's oil fields and only later
to protect hospitals, museums and other humanitarian or
cultural sites from looting.
Most are also concerned that the war in Iraq was
merely the opening move in a larger strategy; they ask
themselves which country will be next.
Syria has received considerable attention in this
context.
There
are also many challenges within Iraq.
Washington did not adequately understand the
extent of factionalism in Iraq or the ability of each of
Iraq's neighbors to influence particular factions.
All of Iraq's neighbors have vital interests in
the country and the will and capability to advance them.
This is, however, more complex that some in
America seem to believe.
For example, Iraq's Shi'ites are very devout, but
they are not "controlled" as a group from
Tehran. Some
Shi'ite groups are linked to Iran, but Iraqi Shi'ites
are Arabs, not Persians, and they see themselves as
Iraqis, not Iranians.
At
the same time, Saddam Hussein destroyed all viable
political alternatives within Iraq, meaning that only
religious groups can mobilize the Iraqi people.
Though these groups are deeply divided, there are
by default the major political forces in the country.
It will take considerable time to build a civil
society in Iraq and any elections held within the next
few months would be much to the advantage of powerful
religious leaders with anti-American sentiments.
It is important to remember in thinking about
elections in Iraq that proportions of various groups
within the population are much less significant than
which groups are organized and mobilized to vote.
Finally,
Americans must understand that the entire Arab world
views the U.S. through the prism of Arab-Israeli
conflict. There
is an opportunity for America to change regional
perceptions of the U.S. through the Israeli-Palestinian
peace process, but Washington will face many obstacles.
Because of these obstacles, the peace process can
only be successful if it is a real priority for the Bush
Administration--at a time when the administration must
deal with many other important issues.
Shibley
Telhami is the Anwar Sadat Professor for Peace and
Development at the University of Maryland, College Park,
and is a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings
Institution.
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