|
SARS
and the Leadership Struggle in
China
Joshua
Eisenman
In
China
, the initial SARS’
cover-up, resulting in the dismissal of numerous Chinese
officials and the outbreak of riots, has brought to
light two primary truths. First, President Hu Jintao is
embroiled in a struggle for national stability and
leadership that will either secure his legitimacy or
disgrace him. Second,
China
’s disjointed system
of power distribution and transition, where the new
leader must co-exist with his predecessor, leaves the
country open to confusion during a crisis.
Unlike
western democracies-where the transition of position and
power are simultaneous- in
China
’s political system
this transfer is time consuming and arduous. For
example, during the twilight of his years (until his
death in 1998), a stocky, battle-hardened revolutionary
named Deng Xiaoping retained unquestioned power, yet
officially held only the position of president of the
Chinese chess association. For over half a decade Jiang
Zemin held the positions of power in China, yet took his
cues from Deng; deferring to the revered leader on the
most fundamental issues.
Currently,
Jiang Zemin
,
China
’s former president
and general secretary, is also attempting to maintain
his influence. Several months ago, Hu Jintao, a
technocrat relatively unknown to the West, became
China
’s head of state and
head of the Chinese Communist Party.
And while many predicted Hu’s difficult
struggle to gain supremacy, indeed the SARS epidemic
gave the populist Mr. Hu the opening he needed to begin
to market his own brand of Chinese leadership.
At
China
’s elite
universities students are excited and anxious for what
they see as the liberal tendencies of Mr. Hu.
In chat rooms a new slogan has appeared: “Keep
it up, Brother Hu.” And at Jiang Zemin’s alma mater,
Shanghai
Jiaotong
University
, Ms. Wang, a reform
minded student, was quoted as saying, “We need to show
our support for Hu Jintao, because if he becomes
weak…many of the reforms we are hoping for will not
have a chance to grow.”
Yet,
Hu faces threats from many sides.
Not only are his political competitors (many of
whom are Mr. Jiang’s associates) waiting to assert or
reassert influence, but over recent weeks the threat of
instability in
China
’s rural regions has
become a major concern.
Ignoring
the central government’s travel ban, thousands of
Beijing
’s migrant workers
have returned home and not surprisingly SARS is hitching
a ride with them. Compounding
SARS’ fears, the closing of construction projects and
retail businesses have left thousands jobless and with
few choices.
In
part due to the
China
’s lack of political
freedom, economic development and Party-centric
nationalism have become
Beijing
’s guarantor of
social stability. Unfortunately,
SARS has effected both the investment and production
side of the Chinese economic structure. Although in the
long run most analysts believe
China
’s economy will
recover, currently, falling foreign investment and
business closings caused by the epidemic have acted as a
catalyst for already disgruntled workers’ malcontent.
Experts claim
China
needs a minimum
growth rate of 7 percent per year in order to absorb
recent graduates and laid-off workers into the job
market. Unfortunately, at present this benchmark of
domestic stability appears unobtainable.
In
a world that changes in seconds, the Chinese system has
proven especially ineffective at crisis management. The
disturbing fact is that few people know Hu is the man to
call first.
China
’s arduous power
transition has left one man, former President Jiang
Zemin, as commander-in-chief of the military and
another, current President Hu Jintao, as head of the
government and the Party.
Indeed,
Russian President Vladamir Putin and Japanese Prime
Minister Junichiro Koizumi--leaders of two major powers
bordering
China
--still are unsure who
is in command; after the recent tragic submarine
disaster, they sent condolence messages to both current
President Hu and
former President Jiang.
This
has caused great confusion within the local civilian
leadership since when they must make a decision many
cadres are still unclear as to the real voice of import.
As a result, many high level bureaucrats have aligned
themselves with either Mr. Jiang or Mr. Hu.
China
’s officials must dedicate large blocks of time and energy to
deciding how to act and what to say in a winner take all
game of cat and mouse.
Rather than working to solve the country’s
fundamental problems, political strategizing and dealing
are a major distraction for
China
’s leadership. Many are
pulled in opposite directions and rather than make a
mistake that may cost their career, they do nothing.
SARS
is the perfect example. For many lower level officials
and cadres, to act decisively would have been too
politically risky. It
was better to let the top leadership develop the
strategy and then once a clear path had been drawn,
implement it. Over the last few months local officials
have received a plethora of opposing instructions.
At first asked to cover-up the virus, local party
cadres now face termination if they fail to report any
aspect of the disease’s spread.
China
’s pseudo-Leninist structure of government is based on the bottom’s
adherence to the polices of the top. Indeed, in the
comparatively slow moving world of early 20th
century politics this may have been effective. But now
the standard wisdom of Chinese politics, wait and smile
and comfort the people’s concerns in any way possible
and then do as you are told, cannot keep up with the
times.
Unfortunately,
in a crisis situation waiting can prove more damaging
then the crisis itself.
In the case of the EP-3 collision with a Chinese
fighter jet in 2001 it took weeks for the Chinese to
appropriately respond. The military and civilian
leadership were confused, each unsure of the others
role. In the
end, even though at the time Mr. Jiang controlled all
three primary posts, it took almost three weeks for the
American crew to be returned home, with every hour that
passed further damaging the Sino-American relationship.
But
now out of the ashes of
China
’s latest debacle,
the SARS epidemic, has risen a leader for the next
decade.
In
recent weeks, visiting hospitals and speaking with
health care officials in
Guangzhou
and Shenzhen, Hu has
employed a new brand of populism.
He has criticized the official media for its
focus on the Chinese leadership rather than issues of
critical importance. Hu even demanded health officials
confront the SARS issue with honesty and explicitly
warned against a cover-up.
Zhang Wenkang
,
China
’s former health
minister and Jiang protegee, displayed these differences
when he claimed the SARS epidemic was under control-only
to be contradicted by Mr. Hu that same week, and later
sacked. Actions like these were unheard of during the
tenure of President Jiang.
They
provide the impetus for the free dissemination of
information crucial for
China
to
effectively confront SARS and future crises. As one
reform-minded senior official explained, “This is the
beginning of the end. This is the spark (we) have been
waiting for.”
Some
reformers are pointing to the Chinese government’s
admission that 70 seamen died in a tragic submarine
accident as proof of Hu’s growing political strength.
The event was kept quiet for two weeks before
growing pressure from President Hu and the new
leadership pushed Mr. Jiang to speak candidly on the
issue. While
consoling the victims families Mr. Hu came as close as
any Chinese leader ever has to placing blame, and thus
pressure, on the military and its leader Mr. Jiang:
“The Navy should draw careful lessons from the
accident.” Hu said.
Thus,
as Hu Jintao’s headlines role into newsstands, Jiang
Zemin’s influence wanes. And in a twist of irony, the
very crisis that China’s leadership was so unprepared
to meet has provided the world a sneak peak into the
style and capabilities of a soft-spoken technocrat who
is staking his claim as the most powerful man in China.
Joshua
Eisenman is the Assistant Director of China Studies at
The Nixon Center (http://www.nixoncenter.org).
|
