SARS
and the Leadership Struggle in
China
May 7, 2003
By Joshua Eisenman
In
China
, the initial SARS’ cover-up,
resulting in the dismissal of numerous Chinese officials and the outbreak
of riots, has brought to light two primary truths. First, President Hu
Jintao is embroiled in a struggle for national stability and leadership
that will either secure his legitimacy or disgrace him. Second,
China
’s disjointed system of power
distribution and transition, where the new leader must co-exist with his
predecessor, leaves the country open to confusion during a crisis.
Unlike western
democracies-where the transition of position and power are simultaneous-
in
China
’s political system this transfer is
time consuming and arduous. For example, during the twilight of his years
(until his death in 1998), a stocky, battle-hardened revolutionary named
Deng Xiaoping retained unquestioned power, yet officially held only the
position of president of the Chinese chess association. For over half a
decade Jiang Zemin held the positions of power in China, yet took his cues
from Deng; deferring to the revered leader on the most fundamental issues.
Currently,
Jiang Zemin
,
China
’s former president and general
secretary, is also attempting to maintain his influence. Several months
ago, Hu Jintao, a technocrat relatively unknown to the West, became
China
’s head of state and head of the
Chinese Communist Party. And
while many predicted Hu’s difficult struggle to gain supremacy, indeed
the SARS epidemic gave the populist Mr. Hu the opening he needed to begin
to market his own brand of Chinese leadership.
At
China
’s elite universities students are
excited and anxious for what they see as the liberal tendencies of Mr. Hu.
In chat rooms a new slogan has appeared: “Keep it up, Brother Hu.”
And at Jiang Zemin’s alma mater,
Shanghai
Jiaotong
University
, Ms. Wang, a reform minded student, was
quoted as saying, “We need to show our support for Hu Jintao, because if
he becomes weak…many of the reforms we are hoping for will not have a
chance to grow.”
Yet, Hu faces
threats from many sides. Not
only are his political competitors (many of whom are Mr. Jiang’s
associates) waiting to assert or reassert influence, but over recent weeks
the threat of instability in
China
’s rural regions has become a major
concern.
Ignoring the
central government’s travel ban, thousands of
Beijing
’s migrant workers have returned home
and not surprisingly SARS is hitching a ride with them.
Compounding SARS’ fears, the closing of construction projects and
retail businesses have left thousands jobless and with few choices.
In part due to the
China
’s lack of political freedom, economic
development and Party-centric nationalism have become
Beijing
’s guarantor of social stability.
Unfortunately, SARS has effected both the investment and production
side of the Chinese economic structure. Although in the long run most
analysts believe
China
’s economy will recover, currently,
falling foreign investment and business closings caused by the epidemic
have acted as a catalyst for already disgruntled workers’ malcontent.
Experts claim
China
needs a minimum growth rate of 7
percent per year in order to absorb recent graduates and laid-off workers
into the job market. Unfortunately, at present this benchmark of domestic
stability appears unobtainable.
In a world that
changes in seconds, the Chinese system has proven especially ineffective
at crisis management. The disturbing fact is that few people know Hu is
the man to call first.
China
’s arduous power transition has left
one man, former President Jiang Zemin, as commander-in-chief of the
military and another, current President Hu Jintao, as head of the
government and the Party.
Indeed, Russian
President Vladamir Putin and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi--leaders of two major powers bordering
China
--still are unsure who is in command;
after the recent tragic submarine disaster, they sent condolence messages
to both current President Hu and
former President Jiang.
This has caused
great confusion within the local civilian leadership since when they must
make a decision many cadres are still unclear as to the real voice of
import. As a result, many high level bureaucrats have aligned themselves
with either Mr. Jiang or Mr. Hu.
China
’s officials must dedicate large blocks of time and energy to
deciding how to act and what to say in a winner take all game of cat and
mouse. Rather than working to
solve the country’s fundamental problems, political strategizing and
dealing are a major distraction for
China
’s leadership. Many are
pulled in opposite directions and rather than make a mistake that may cost
their career, they do nothing.
SARS is the perfect
example. For many lower level officials and cadres, to act decisively
would have been too politically risky.
It was better to let the top leadership develop the strategy and
then once a clear path had been drawn, implement it. Over the last few
months local officials have received a plethora of opposing instructions.
At first asked to cover-up the virus, local party cadres now face
termination if they fail to report any aspect of the disease’s spread.
China
’s pseudo-Leninist structure of government is based on the bottom’s
adherence to the polices of the top. Indeed, in the comparatively slow
moving world of early 20th century politics this may have been
effective. But now the standard wisdom of Chinese politics, wait and smile
and comfort the people’s concerns in any way possible and then do as you
are told, cannot keep up with the times.
Unfortunately, in a
crisis situation waiting can prove more damaging then the crisis itself.
In the case of the EP-3 collision with a Chinese fighter jet in
2001 it took weeks for the Chinese to appropriately respond. The military
and civilian leadership were confused, each unsure of the others role.
In the end, even though at the time Mr. Jiang controlled all three
primary posts, it took almost three weeks for the American crew to be
returned home, with every hour that passed further damaging the
Sino-American relationship.
But now out of the
ashes of
China
’s latest debacle, the SARS epidemic,
has risen a leader for the next decade.
In recent weeks,
visiting hospitals and speaking with health care officials in
Guangzhou
and Shenzhen, Hu has employed a new
brand of populism. He has
criticized the official media for its focus on the Chinese leadership
rather than issues of critical importance. Hu even demanded health
officials confront the SARS issue with honesty and explicitly warned
against a cover-up.
Zhang Wenkang
,
China
’s former health minister and Jiang
protegee, displayed these differences when he claimed the SARS epidemic
was under control-only to be contradicted by Mr. Hu that same week, and
later sacked. Actions like these were unheard of during the tenure of
President Jiang.
They
provide the impetus for the free dissemination of information crucial for
China
to effectively
confront SARS and future crises. As one reform-minded senior official
explained, “This is the beginning of the end. This is the spark (we)
have been waiting for.”
Some
reformers are pointing to the Chinese government’s admission that 70
seamen died in a tragic submarine accident as proof of Hu’s growing
political strength. The event
was kept quiet for two weeks before growing pressure from President Hu and
the new leadership pushed Mr. Jiang to speak candidly on the issue.
While consoling the victims families Mr. Hu came as close as any
Chinese leader ever has to placing blame, and thus pressure, on the
military and its leader Mr. Jiang: “The Navy should draw careful lessons
from the accident.” Hu said.
Thus, as Hu
Jintao’s headlines role into newsstands, Jiang Zemin’s influence
wanes. And in a twist of irony, the very crisis that China’s leadership
was so unprepared to meet has provided the world a sneak peak into the
style and capabilities of a soft-spoken technocrat who is staking his
claim as the most powerful man in China.
Joshua Eisenman
is the Assistant Director of China Studies at The Nixon Center (http://www.nixoncenter.org).
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