Four Observations about the Fate of the Chinese Communist Party

May 7, 2003
By Jinghao Zhou  

Today, only a few communist parties remain in power around the world.  China, of course, is the largest country still ruled by a communist party, and the Communist Party of China (CCP) is the largest party, with 64 million party members.  Yet, what is its future?  In the aftermath of the Sixteenth National Conference of the CCP, I visited China and concluded that, while the CCP is still in control of the country, its power is diminishing, its reputation is declining, the party branch at work units is paralyzed, Chinese elite are escaping from the party and the communist faith is disappearing.   Even through the party has managed to survive into the 21^st century, few Chinese people even within the party truly believe in communism.  The majority of the Chinese people see the potential for a serious crisis ahead.

Observation One: The Party is Disappearing From Sight

Before the reform movement, the CCP was the supreme power, controlling all aspects of Chinese society.  The authority of the party was not only reflected in its organizations, but it was made visible as well.  There were posters at roadsides and in public places; signboards proclaiming the location of party branches were displayed at the front of every work unit. They were as common in China as the signs for McDonalds and gasoline stations are in the United States .   TV and movies were filled with images of the CCP at work.  The Party was everywhere.

On this trip, my first stop in China was Shanghai .  It was about 20 miles from Pudong International Airport to my hotel.  On the way, I kept a close watch on the roadside, yet found no monuments or billboards concerning the party; in fact, I saw nothing except innumerable commercial advertisements. I traveled by bus from Shanghai to Nanjing through Zheng Jiang, Changzhou , and Suzhou , the most developed regions in China , and then took the train coming back from Nanjing to Shanghai .  Throughout my travels, I found that the visible signs of the party have been completely replaced by commercial buildings, housings, shopping malls, and commercial signs and advertisements.  In these cities, I spent at least two days walking on the street and trying to find visible signs of the party's existence, but failed.  All signboards of the party at the front of work units, companies, factories, hospitals, schools, universities, department stores, grocery stores, and residential committees had disappeared.  (The only exception was signs advertising the offices of the party committees at the district level or higher.)

If I were not native Chinese, I might not realize that China is still officially a communist country.  Whether termed "socialist" or "capitalist," the market economy in China is greatly expending. And, as the market expands, the party loses territory.  If China continues its rapid pace of marketization, the time will soon come when the party’s monopoly on political power will be over as well.  

Observation Two: Party Cadres Are Working Second Jobs

In the past, the main cadres of every party branch at a workplace took full-time positions, engaging in so-called political and ideological work.  In previous years, many people were eager to get this kind of appointment because these jobs were easy and came with great privileges.   An acquaintance of mine, a Mr. Tang, was a faithful party member and joined the party at 18 years old (according to the Constitution of the CCP, the age of 18 is the minimum age to join the party).  He had risen through the ranks to become the party committee (chair) at a factory. I remembered that his office was the most luxurious one, symbolizing his authority over the factory's operation.  I followed the well-remembered path to his office, but I arrived to discover that Mr. Tang no longer occupied that office; he had been displaced by the general manager of the factory.  (My assumption is that given the economic reforms, the manager was now truly in charge of the factory's operation.)  I went in search of Mr. Tang and finally located his office--the last door on the third floor.  Knocking on the door and waiting for a while, he finally opened the door and led me in.  He told me that he "asked" for this office, as it was quiet.  “What are you doing?” I asked directly--in the past, his office would have been open and filled with visitors, petitioners and so on. 

“You can figure out what I am doing, even if you haven’t lived in China for a long time.”  

“You must be doing something for yourself, I guess.”  

“Yes, I am doing my second job, chao gu (playing stock).”  He continued, “I have no choice.  I try my best, but I am preparing for the worst before my position is eliminated.  You know that gai zhi (the change in ownership of enterprises) has been going forward on a large scale.  The government requires all small and medium-sized enterprises to go private.  This reform will be completed by the end of this year.  Nobody knows what roles the party will have to play in work units.  So my job is unstable and my future is unpredictable.”  

Through my investigation, I have learned that some party cadres were already persuaded to retire; some became unemployed; some shifted their positions from political work to professional duties; and some, like Mr. Tang, work at "second" jobs.  It is evident that party cadres at work units no longer concentrate on party work.  In work units, there is no regular party meeting; party members are not required to write reports on their activities and those of their co-workers; party offices were absent of visitors; and party jobs no longer attract willing applicants.  The party in work units actually exists in name only.  Most of the time party cadres just stay in their office doing nothing.  The public opinion in China is that the full-time position of party cadres is not necessary at work units.  Mr. Liu, a friend of mine, is a head of the party committee at the district level, but I found he was also equipped with a pager and cellular phone.  Without doubt, he was dealing with “personal matters.”  This raises a very serious issue: if the party leadership at the provincial level (and higher) remains convinced that the party is the sole leadership for China , how can the party manage to implement its vision if, at the grass-roots level, this is the reality that awaits them?  As they say in Chinese, pi zhi bu cun mao jiang yan fu (with the skin gone, to what can the hair attach itself)?

Observation Three: Party Members No Longer believe in Communism

In China , I asked party members some basic questions: “Who is the author of the Manifesto?”  “What is communism?”  “What is the final goal of communism?” “What are the general tasks of the party at present?” It seemed that all these questions to them were funny and naïve, and therefore, beyond their consideration.  Before the reform movement, the Chinese people thought that the party was performing a sacred mission, and most party members had serious commitments to the party.  However, at present, party members no longer have serious faith in the party and communism.  They told me that their original intention to join the party was not for the goal of communism but for their personal interests.  In their words, “Communism has nothing to do with me!”   

So, why is it that membership has increased to 64 million?  First, the ratio of party members among the Chinese population actually is in decline.  China had 900 million people and 50 million party members in 1976.  At that time, 5.5 percent of the population were party members.  Today China has 1.3 billion people and 64 million party members.   So at present only 4.9 percent of the Chinese population are party members.  Second, a large number of party branches are actually paralyzed.  In urban areas, party branches at small work units do not function at all. In addition, there are about 20 million people who are "floating" between the countryside and the cities, and 47 million unemployed individuals in China .  It is certain that some of them are party members who are no longer active party members, although it is difficult to get an accurate percentage.  Third, the stratum of party members has been changed.  Based on the Research Report on Social Rank in China, published by the Academy of Social Sciences of China in 2002, in the post-Mao era, the most "advanced" social ranks are professionals, managers, big private owners, and general office workers.  The four social ranks altogether only make up 11% of the total Chinese population.  However, those people--by any definition the real elite of China-- are less interested in becoming party members.   

Observation Four: Chinese Elites Have Lost Interest in Joining the Party           

Prior to the reforms, the party had exacting standards for accepting party members.  Whoever wanted to join the party had to go through the following stages: submitting an application, handing in "confessional" reports, being evaluated and interviewed, having an extensive background investigation, filling out the formal application, having one's candidacy voted on by the party branch, and, finally, becoming a probationary party member.  One was qualified to become a formal party member after the swearing-in ceremony if she/he made no mistakes over the course of one year.  Although it was a very complicated and long process, the majority of the Chinese people tried very hard to seek the opportunity to join the party, because dang piao (the title of party member) used to be critical for professional advancement.   

When I interviewed non-party members, including Chinese officials, intellectuals, college students, businessmen, workers, and peasants, I asked them whether they were interested in joining the party.  95 percent answered "no."  The reason is very simple: the reform movement has opened up many ways for the Chinese people to reach their goals.  Becoming a party member is only one of the ways and is increasingly viewed as an uncertain guarantee of success.  In order to have a stable and good life, most Chinese people believe that three things—intelligence, education, and money—are the most important.  The slogan of “time is money” already has become popular.  The Chinese people look upon party activities as an “extra tax.”  They like to spend their time not on party activities, but on receiving education, making money, and having fun.  When I asked them the question: “Why don’t you join the party?”  They always answered my question with a question: “Why do I need to join the party?”  Since they are capable of making their life comfortable without dang piao, they do not like to be restricted by the political and spiritual shackles of membership.  Obviously, dang piao is no longer attractive to the Chinese people, especially to the talented elite and the younger generation.  Under these circumstances, the party must persuade people to become party members through different means, including reducing the requirements for membership.  Nonetheless, it is still not easy for the party to increase its membership.  I found that people who have less education, fewer professional skills and less money, are more interested in becoming party members.  

All of this will create problems in the future.  A party that cannot recruit the elite of Chinese society will have a great deal of difficulty remaining the governing body of China .

Jinghao Zhou is an assistant professor of Asian studies at Hobart and William Smith Colleges .