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A
Proper Use of the Term: Empire and American National
Security
Philip Zelikow
(Adapted
from the Spring 2003 issue of The
National Interest)
Perhaps
the key question of international politics and
U.S.
national security
policy today is whether a genuinely new era has dawned
since the end of the Cold War. It has. The attacks of
September 11, 2001
did not create the
new era, but they were a catalytic moment in our
recognition of it. Like previous shocks to the
United States
in June 1940,
December 1941 or June 1950, this shock gave emerging
trends a form, brought them into mass consciousness, and
forced upon us the task of defining a comprehensive
national response.
Such
a definition appears in the Bush Administration’s
recently published National Security Strategy of the United States. This essay draws
out some of the ideas that appear to undergird the
administration’s emerging strategy. It focuses on five
essential redefinitions of what national security means
for the
United States
in the 21st
century—but first a note about the rhetoric of empire
that has come to dominate much current discussion.
All
national security strategies start with a mental image
of the world. The image of the new era is properly that
of a modern and truly pluralistic international system.
In the traditional world, populations, governance,
commerce, culture and habits of life evolved slowly and
changed gradually. The break point between this
traditional world and that of modernity arrives, at
different times for different societies, when social and
technological change severs the links that had defined
the relationships between humanity and the physical
resources of the earth; shatters the hitherto ageless
ceilings on productivity enforced by the physical limits
of humans, animals, wind and water; and transforms our
ability to communicate across distances, communities and
nations.
These
transformations acquired momentum in the 18th
century and spread in the 19th until by the
year 1900 the modern world extended to
Europe
,
North America
and to their limited
veins of settlement and commerce stretched out over the
rest of the planet. The 20th century saw the
further, nearly global extension of modernity and
wrenching, worldwide efforts to adjust to its impact.
Indeed, such has been the shock to many societies that
the last century has been dominated by great contests
over how to conceive, organize and provide moral
justification and political order for modern industrial
nations.
Those
great contests have now subsided. The world is no longer
so broken and divided. The militant utopias of class,
nation and race have been defeated and discredited. But
the challenge of change has not disappeared. Its
pressures have instead been internalized within every
society trying to adapt to a quickening pace of change.
In other words, the battle lines are less international and more transnational.
In
dealing with these pressures, some see the
United States
as a new source of
world order—fearing or welcoming that prospect. This
accounts in part for the current popularity of
“empire” as a reigning metaphor for
America
’s ambitions. The
metaphor is seductive, yet vicious.
What
is an empire? Once upon a time, “empire” was
casually applied as a positive expression, as with
Jefferson
’s “empire of
liberty.” In recent years “empire” been used to
describe—often with an edge—any circumstance where a
powerful country exerts influence over lesser powers,
whether direct or indirect, physical, cultural or
commercial. This shallow equation of all sorts of
economic and cultural influences with “imperialism”
was first popularized about a hundred years ago by
writers reacting to
Britain
’s war against the
Boers in
South Africa
. …
But
these imperial metaphors, of whatever provenance, do not
enrich our understanding; they impoverish it. They use a
metaphor of how to rule others when the problem is how
to persuade and lead. Real imperial power is sovereign
power. Sovereigns rule, and a ruler is not just the most
powerful among diverse interest groups. Sovereignty
means a direct
monopoly control over the organization and use of armed
might. It means direct
control over the administration of justice and the
definition thereof. It means control over what is bought
and sold, the terms of trade and the permission to
trade, to the limit of the ruler’s desires and
capacities.
In
the modern, pluralistic world of the 21st
century, the
United States
today does not have
anything like such direct authority over other
countries, nor does it seek it. Even its informal
influence in the political economy of neighboring
Mexico
, for instance, is far
more modest than, say, the influence the British could
exert over
Argentina
a hundred years ago.
The
purveyors of imperial metaphors suffer from a lack of
imagination, and more, from a lack of appreciation for
the new conditions under which we now live. It is easier
in many respects to communicate images in a cybernetic
world, so that a very powerful
United States
does exert a range of
influences that is quite striking. But this does not
negate the proliferating pluralism of global society,
nor does it suggest a will to imperial power in
Washington
. The proliferation of
loose empire metaphors thus distorts into banal nonsense
the only precise meaning of the term imperialism that we
have.
The
United States
is central in world
politics today, not omnipotent. Nor is the United States
or its Federal government organized in such a fashion
that would allow it to wield durable imperial power
around the world—it has trouble enough fashioning
coherent policies inside the fifty United States. Rather
than exhibiting a confident will to power, we
instinctively tend, as David Brooks has put it, to
“enter every conflict with the might of a muscleman
and the mentality of a wimp.” We must speak of
American power and of responsible ways to wield it; let
us stop talking of American empire, for there is and
there will be no such a thing.
Philip
Zelikow is the White Burkett Miller Professor of History
and Director of the Miller Center of Public Affairs at
the
University
of
Virginia
. He
contributed unofficially to the preparation of the National
Security Strategy of the United States, but the
views expressed in this article are solely his own.
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