Why Iraq’s WMD Matters

June 4, 2003
By Paul J. Saunders and Nikolas K. Gvosdev

Readers of In the National Interest are well aware that its editors and publishers endorsed all necessary methods, including war, to eliminate what would be a major threat to American national security—a hostile Iraqi regime with known links to international terrorism that possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  Accordingly, we have been surprised and disturbed to see frequent denunciations of anyone who raises important questions about the evidence of Iraq ’s WMD programs, a central element of such a threat.  One of the more extreme examples of this approach is William Safire’s characterization of those who raise such issues as a "crowd that bitterly resents America's mission to root out the sources of terror" and “opponents of this genocidal maniac’s removal” in The New York Times on Monday, June 2.  An editorial in The Wall Street Journal on the same day implies that those who believe that finding evidence of Iraq ’s WMD is important are "opponents of war" out "to damage the credibility of Mr. Blair, President Bush and other war supporters.”  

Secretary of State Colin Powell made a powerful case that Iraq indeed did possess weapons of mass destruction (in violation of UN resolutions) and that Baghdad had forged links with terrorists in his February 2003 presentation to the United Nations Security Council.  CIA Director George Tenet’s seated presence behind Secretary Powell symbolically reinforced that case.  By the time President Bush made the same case to the American people in March, the Congress and the attentive public (not to mention the policy community) had already accepted many if not most of its details put forth by the Bush Administration.  

Taking into account that Iraq’s WMD programs were a central element of the administration’s argument for war, it is troubling that so little evidence of such programs has so far been unearthed (both literally and figuratively).  This is a particular problem in view of the urgency with which the administration insisted that it was necessary to deal with the Iraqi threat.  

It is extraordinarily difficult to believe that President Bush, Secretary Powell or Director Tenet would deliberately mislead the Congress, the American people, or the rest of the world about Iraq ’s weapons programs.  All three are honorable men and our open society does not facilitate such manipulations.  There are, however, a number of other possible explanations for the failure to find Baghdad ’s WMD arsenal.  

It is legitimate to argue that Saddam Hussein’s regime was preoccupied with concealing its weapons programs and that finding them (or translating documents or identifying and interviewing relevant individuals) will take time.  This may yet be proven true.  It is also legitimate to argue that the Iraqi government or military or Baath loyalists may have destroyed much of the evidence during the war.  This may also eventually be proven true.  

It would similarly be legitimate, if disappointing, to admit that U.S. and British intelligence agencies made an honest mistake, perhaps in relying too heavily on information from defectors or other opponents of Iraq ’s tyrannical regime eager for a U.S. solution to their problem.  This is always a possibility in dealing with intelligence reports from closed societies.  It would even be acceptable, though more distressing, to admit that a few overly enthusiastic analysts may have slanted their interpretations of invariably ambiguous data and to follow this disclosure with a commitment to taking corrective action.  Worse has happened in America and elsewhere.

What is not legitimate is to argue that the questions of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction do not matter or worse, that asking such questions is somehow anti-American or supportive of Saddam Hussein’s tyrannical regime.   

We respectfully but vehemently disagree.  The failure to discover evidence of substantial WMD programs (a standard not met by the two apparent mobile laboratories) is a real credibility problem for the administration.  It calls into question the imminence of the Iraqi threat and, as a result, the need for immediate action over the objection of important partners who could otherwise have shared much more substantially the human, financial and political costs of war and reconstruction.  With the former costs surpassing 100 lives and 100 billion dollars, respectively—and still growing—this is not an inconsequential point.  

The evil nature of Iraq ’s former government is not a substitute for demonstrating Iraq ’s WMD capabilities.  No one denies the brutality of Saddam's regime, but there are many other brutal tyrannies in the world.  The administration received a bipartisan mandate from Congress and broad support from the American people for military action because Iraq was said to be a real and imminent danger to the United States .  There were (and still are) other candidates for American attention—Kim Jong-il is no less tyrannical than Saddam Hussein and, unlike Iraq, North Korea already appears to have nuclear weapons that it has threatened to share with others.  Secretary Powell and other U.S. officials went to the United Nations and sought to build an international coalition against Iraq not because Saddam was a criminal butcher but because he was a menace to America , his neighbors, and international peace.  

Moving forward, it could be very damaging to U.S. interests if a continued failure to find Iraq ’s WMD calls into question the evidence the Bush Administration provides in dealing with North Korea , Iran , and other proliferators.  It also reinforces the worst instincts of those in the Arab world and elsewhere who never really believed that the war was about the weapons at all.  

It is fair to insist to America's critics that U.S. forces be given the same eighteen months that others insisted be extended to Hans Blix and his team of UN weapons inspectors to search Iraq and to establish that it had been disarmed.  And there remains a strong presumption that Iraq indeed had clandestine programs to develop weapons of mass destruction.  But looking again at American intelligence—which Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and CIA Director George Tenet have already ordered—is a worthwhile endeavor to assess our effectiveness in determining Iraq’s capabilities.  

The bottom line is that arguing that the evidence of Iraq’s weapons of destruction is insignificant because Saddam Hussein was an evil dictator—and that those who question the intelligence supporting an immediate Iraqi WMD threat are somehow supporters of mass killings and repression—is preposterous and irresponsible.  It is just plain wrong to insist that the question of Iraqi WMD simply doesn't matter and to attack the loyalty, motives and morality of those who do.

Paul J. Saunders is director of the Nixon Center. Nikolas K. Gvosdev is editor of ITNI.