Motions for Discovery: Thoughts on the Search for Iraqi WMD

A Conversation with Fritz Ermarth  

Q:  Seven weeks after the end of major hostilities in Iraq , the United States has yet to discover any weapons of mass destruction in Iraq .  Does this create a credibility problem for the Bush Administration?  

A:  Certainly not yet.  The significance of this is being misrepresented and exaggerated by critics of the Bush Administration.  

To be sure, the problem in locating Iraqi WMD highlights one factor that proliferation experts all along had known.  Biological and chemical agents are easy to get and easy to hide.  Tracking them is a very hard line of intelligence work.  

The fact remains, regardless of what we find or not, that Saddam Hussein was in the weapons of mass destruction business. He was actively seeking, acquiring and concealing these capabilities. He refused to permit effective UN inspections or to provide conclusive evidence that these capabilities were in fact destroyed.  The WMD threat emanating out of Iraq was very real, and Saddam's behavior could be terminated only by regime change.  

Given the ease with which these agents can be hidden, the jury is still out over what may be found. Let's keep in mind the "megadeath in a milk carton" reality--it takes only a small amount of a biological agent to cause large numbers of casualties.  One frightening possibility is that the stocks of biological and chemical agents that we knew existed up to the beginning of the war may have been moved out of the country into other irresponsible hands, or may have been hidden so effectively it may never be found.  

The Bush Administration has acquired a bit of a credibility problem in the way the issue was framed before the war. The administration's statements may have led to higher expectations of what would be found in the immediate aftermath of the war, but I do not believe that it engaged in a con job or deliberately exaggerated the threat.  

The most significant aspect of this question, however, is not connected to American public opinion--which largely believes the case made by the administration--but the reputed bad blood within the government itself between intelligence analysts and policymakers.   I have been in touch with former colleagues who tell me that this feud is exaggerated.  Tensions over intelligence--what it means, how it is to be interpreted, and so on--are endemic to the relationship. They were present during the Cold War in assessing the Soviet threat. They are usually kept under control by a system of checks and balances. I am no longer in government so it is not readily apparent to me the extent to which they are still operating, but I think they are better than some of the more vocal complainers to the press have made the situation out to be.

Q:  How imminent was the threat posed by Saddam? You currently have a vocal campaign in Britain that the Prime Minister exaggerated the threat posed by Iraq to the West.  

A:  Frankly, I didn't receive or hear anything that indicated that there was an imminent threat against the American homeland or Britain . What the U.S. and UK administrations had were clear indications that Saddam Hussein possessed biological and chemical agents and means to deliver them at short range via missiles or aircraft or via clandestine agents at longer range.  It also appears that the orders went out to ready Iraq 's forces for chemical warfare.  I don't know the content or basis of that warning.  The military was surprised at the lack of use of these agents, so the question exists--did we misread the details, or did they change their minds?  I, myself, am a little surprised and greatly relieved that Saddam did not threaten a terrorist use of a biological weapon on the eve of war and then execute such a plan after the attack.  When the dust settles, I think we can chalk this up both to good luck on our part and Saddam's bad planning on the other.

Q:  Is the media, therefore, the primary culprit in raising expectations?  

A:  What we have seen is a case of chains of threat inflation.  

Our intelligence had evidence and the administration was convinced that Saddam had the equipment and capabilities to produce WMD, but intelligence was not certain as to precise locations.  Convincing but appropriately caveated reports were drawn up.  The administration takes that, and in making its public case, emphasized what it finds convincing, inflating the threat.  The press takes it and simplifies the story as it always does, causing further inflation.  This leads critics now to claim that the entire case was based upon misrepresentation--a conclusion I find basically wrong.

Q:  Speaking of "appropriate caveats", what of the reports that information provided by defectors or opposition elements regarding Iraq's WMD program was perhaps given too much weight, and not subjected to more skeptical scrutiny?  

A:  It has been alleged in the media, and may well be true, that you have a case where a source provided a dramatic story that was discounted by some elements within the intelligence community but that was given more credence by policymakers.  The examples are legion of this happening in the last half century.  I don't think it has been demonstrated that defectors or opposition elements fabricated assertions or data.

Q:  What lies ahead?  Obviously the role of intelligence in detecting and verifying the existence of WMD programs elsewhere in the world will come under scrutiny?  

A:  One of the points that critics have rightly made is that if the Bush Administration, as has been laid out in the National Security Strategy and the President's recent speech in Krakow, among other places, aims to avert the threats posed by WMD proliferation through early interdiction--and here I think the term "pre-emption" was carelessly used--early interdiction is a better term--such a policy, to be sensibly executed, requires quality intelligence on where WMD components are and where they are going.  If so, we have to make serious improvements in our intelligence efforts, especially in detecting proliferation in its early phases.  These agents are becoming easier to obtain and easier to hide.  The world is headed in that direction.  Globalization of technology--especially biotechnology--is making it easier to acquire weapons of mass destruction.  

The hardest part of the nuclear challenge, of course, is gaining fissile material.  Saddam failed to do that.  He probably acquired many of the other components necessary.  As North Korea , and now Iran , demonstrate, it is not that hard to get into the fissile materials business and to hold the world at bay until you have two or three or four bombs ready.  This underscores why good intelligence early in the proliferation process is so important.

Fritz W. Ermarth is Director of National Security Programs at the Nixon Center . He is also a part-time Senior Analyst in the Strategies Group of Science Applications International Corporation. He served several tours on the NSC staff, served as Chairman of the National Intelligence Council (1988-93,) and retired from the CIA in 1998.