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In
the Aftermath of the Presidential Visit:
The Gulf Emirates and American Interests in the
Middle East
Jonathan Eric Lewis
After
nearly three years of bloodshed between the Israelis and
Palestinians, there is once again an opportunity to
advance the stalled peace process between
Israel
and its Arab
neighbors. President
Bush stated his commitment to both Israel’s security as a
democratic Jewish state and to the creation of a viable,
contiguous Palestinian state.
The administration that initially shunned nation
building has now entered into what will be a long and,
periodically, bloody process of democratizing Palestinian
society.
The
fact that President Bush met with both Sharon and Abu
Mazen without a simultaneous suicide bombing should be
considered a great success.
The president’s ability to get the leaders of Bahrain, Egypt,
Jordan
and Saudi Arabia
to agree to condemn
Islamic terrorism should also be viewed as a major
accomplishment. Nevertheless,
Bush, like the Arab leaders and the Israelis, will be
judged more by results than by words.
The
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, however, is not the only
arena in which the United States
will exert its
influence. Indeed, the removal of the Iraqi dictator
will reshape not only the geopolitics of the
Holy Land, but also of the
Persian Gulf. The American success in
Iraq
has eased
Israel
’s longstanding fear
of an attack on its western border; the two polities
that will see the most immediate gains after the war,
however, are
Bahrain
and
Qatar, two small but
incredibly wealthy island nations in the Gulf.
It was thus no accident that Bahrain’s King Hamad was
present at the Sharm el Sheik summit and that President
Bush’s last stop was
Qatar
, where he paid a
courtesy call to the emir.
For
too long, the United States
has relied upon Saudi Arabia
as its main ally in
the Persian Gulf.
Following September 11th and a series
of revelations regarding the Saudi Kingdom’s role in
spreading radical Islam and Wahhabi ideology throughout
the Muslim world, Washington realized that it could no
longer maintain the status quo with Riyadh.
This fact was not lost upon the leaders of the
smaller Persian Gulf states – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman,
and Qatar, in particular – all of whom, it should be
stressed, helped facilitate the American military
build-up in the region.
The
United States
needs solid allies in
the Arab world right now and has thus hedged its bets on
solid economic and political alliances with
Bahrain
and
Qatar
, both of which will
gain financially from their pro-American stance.
Bahrain
has a major U.S. Navy
base and will be an increasingly important strategic
base for the
United States
, particularly given
recent American tensions with the Saudis.
By allowing Centcom to be based in
Doha
,
Qatar
became the most
openly pro-American state in the Arab world.
Aside
from housing CENTCOM ,
Qatar
will likely be tasked
with playing the middleman between Washington, Tel Aviv
and the Arab League.
Indeed, it was no coincidence that just weeks
after the end of hostilities in Iraq, Qatari Foreign
Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr al-Thani met
with his Israeli counterpart, Silvan Shalom, at a very
public meeting in Paris.
Israel
and
Qatar
have maintained trade
relations since the mid-1990s and, despite enormous
pressure from other Arab states,
Qatar
refused to close the
Israeli trade mission in
Doha
following the
collapse of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in
September 2000.
Sheikh Hamad has hinted at the possibility of a
Qatari-Israeli peace treaty.
Qatar
will likely be the next Arab state to formalize
diplomatic relations with Israel and, thus, the Qatari
decision to have such a public meeting with an Israeli
official was calculated to demonstrate to Washington
that Doha’s foreign policy would not be dictated by
either the Saudis nor by the ‘Arab street.’
Interestingly, Qatar is a primarily Wahhabi country, but
is far more tolerant than its Saudi neighbors and,
considering its natural gas sales to Israel, is not
opposed to the existence of Israel as a Jewish state.
Bahrain, on the other hand,
will likely not enter into such an open relationship
with Israel, particularly given
Manama’s need
for better
relations with neighboring Iran, a state that the
Bahraini leadership considered responsible for the
Shiite uprisings of the mid-1990s.
Nevertheless,
Bahrain’s monarch, Sheikh
Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa, is pro-American and is willing
to promote close ties with
Washington
in order to serve his
country’s interests.
The
war with Iraq, however, has left Bahrain
in an unusual
position. While
it no longer has to fear an Iraqi scud missile attack,
it now faces serious questions on the domestic front.
With Saddam Hussein removed from power,
Bahrain
is now the only
majority Shiite Arab state that is ruled by a Sunni.
While the violent demonstrations and uprisings by
an aggrieved Shiite population seem to be a thing of
the past,
Manama
must realize that it
must continue down the road of democratization and
reform. At
the same time,
in order for
Washington
to forge good ties
with Iraqi Shiite, it will likely need to pressure
Bahrain
to enhance the rights
of Bahraini Shiite.
Much
as in 1991, a successful American war against
Iraq
has allowed for the
possible creation of a new
Middle East
, one not held hostage
to the whims of violent dictators.
Unlike twelve years ago, however, this Bush
Administration has realized that the best partners in
the Persian Gulf may not be the biggest states, but the
wealthy, smaller ones that have much to gain from taking
a pro-American stance and very little to gain from being
hostile to Washington.
Despite numerous differences between the parties,
Bahrain, Iraq, Israel and Qatar may yet emerge as a new,
prosperous, and pro-American bloc in the
heart of the Middle East –a new Baghdad Pact.
This is a strategic policy course that the
United States
would be wise to
consider and one that would well serve our energy,
financial and security interests.
Jonathan Eric Lewis is a
New York-based political analyst.
He has written previously for In
the National Interest on the Shiite challenge for American interests (http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol2Issue17/vol2issue17Lewispfv.html).
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