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The
U.S.-Turkey Partnership: Looking to the Future
Zeyno Baran
The Turkish-American “strategic partnership” was
fundamentally shaken with the crisis over Iraq. From the
U.S. point of view, Turkey was no longer
“indispensable”—if it was not part of the most important
military operation for the Bush Administration and the
war ended successfully without a northern front, when
would Turkey be strategically relevant again?
Several points need to be emphasized:
Turkey Failed to
Grasp the Gravity of 9/11 for Americans
On a recent trip to Turkey with the Transatlantic
program of the Council on Foreign Relations, I realized
that at the root of the problem was the inability of
Turkish decision makers to fully grasp what a trauma the
attacks of September 11, 2001 were for the Americans in
general and, especially, for Washington policymakers.
Turkey has
struggled with terrorism for decades, and, maybe because
of that, did not comprehend the fundamental policy shift
Washington underwent. Even the Turkish military did not
understand how the world had changed for Washington
after the attacks. Not understanding the new rules of
the game led
Turkey to play
by the old ones.
Turkey Can Become a
Liability or an Asset in the Trans-Atlantic Relations
Ironically, in the new strategic thinking for the United
States, Turkey could now become a true strategic
partner, but the major caveat is whether Turkey will be
able to, in time, adapt to the changing priorities and
national security interests of Washington. The second
caveat is whether Turkish priorities and national
security interests can, in time, be formulated into a
coherent policy.
Turkey could
serve as NATO’s launching pad into the Middle East, the
Caucasus
and Central Asia. NATO is already present in Afghanistan
and will be involved in Iraqi stabilization as well. As
an EU accession candidate, Turkey could also bridge the
cultural and religious gap between the north and the
south and the east and the west. As a reliable energy
transit country,
Turkey
could also become an oil and gas hub for Russian,
Caspian, Iranian and Iraqi hydrocarbon resources. Thus,
Turkey would also help Europe
with its energy security needs for decades to come.
There are many more areas where Turkey could truly make
a difference, but the main question is whether Turkey
can take the historic opportunity to finally fulfill its
potential of becoming a major player, or whether it will
remain handicapped as a result of mismanagement and lack
of vision by its leaders? Will the United States
(Congress and the Bush Administration) send the right
signals to help the Turks come along? What are some of
the areas of cooperation that can lay the foundation for
a “revised strategic partnership”?
Strategic Areas of
Cooperation: Terrorism, proliferation, radical Islam
The first and foremost issue is the war on terror and
proliferation. Turkey has a long history of fighting
terrorism—mainly backed by Iran and Syria—and therefore
can be tremendously helpful for Washington to better
understand threats in the region. Moreover, Turkey can
share its experience of trying to keep an open society
while enforcing laws and taking strong measures against
terrorism.
For its part, the United States has already assisted
Turkey by bringing to an end the PKK terrorist threat
when it helped with the arrest of its leader Abdullah
Ocalan. The next challenge for the
United States
is dealing with KADEK, which is a continuation of the
PKK and is operating in Northern Iraq. Some in the EU
that recognize the PKK as a terrorist organization still
do not recognize KADEK as such, and this causes great
discomfort for Turkey.
Secondly, a related area of bilateral cooperation can be
in combating radical Islam, while managing and promoting
democracy. This is a major policy challenge for the
U.S., and Turkey’s experience and example can provide
some guidance. Turkey has asked for help from the United
States on this issue for many years prior to 9/11, but
got little assistance. To remedy this, there could be
more intelligence sharing on radical and militant
groups.
Rethinking Caucasus
Security: The Greater Middle East
Another strategic area for U.S.-Turkish cooperation is
in the
Caucasus and
Central Asia, which are now central U.S. national
security interests. In the Caucasus,
it is important to resolve issues that, left unchecked,
could become terror breeding grounds. Both
Turkey and the U.S.
see Georgia as a pivotal country in the Caucasus
and the Black
Sea region, and there are many areas of trilateral
cooperation. In Central Asia, Turkey could help
strengthen the weak states by providing military
training in Afghanistan or offering educational and law
enforcement assistance to countries dealing with radical
Islam.
The U.S. needs to get directly involved in the Caucasus
and provide a new security umbrella to the region. A
common threat to the
United States, Turkey
and the
Caucasus
emanates from Iran’s support of radical Islamic groups,
including in Iraq. Iran has posed security challenges to
Azerbaijan and could again play a negative role there
ahead of the Azerbaijani presidential elections in the
fall.
To achieve this goal, Iran may want to rely on its
strategic partner, Armenia. Armenia has developed close
relations with Iran, due to Armenia’s inability to get
to world markets via Turkey. While the United States is
promoting the border opening between Armenia and Turkey,
this needs to be framed in a package where Azerbaijani
concerns are also taken into consideration.
As part of the regional security umbrella, the U.S.
could also offer an agreement on territorial integrity
for the region. This would ease Turkish concerns about a
potential separatist Kurdish movement in Iraq.
Territorial integrity would also be important in
addressing some of the most contentious disputes, such
as Georgia’s Abkhazia, Russia’s Chechnya and
Azerbaijan’s Nagorno-Karabakh. Eventually, when there is
regime change in
Iran,
it would also keep the approximately 30 million
Azerbaijanis inside
Iran’s territory.
The Turkish Example
At the same time, Turkey could serve as a possible
“example” to the greater Middle East, which includes
Iran, the
Caucasus and
Central Asia. Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, at
a recent meeting of the Organization of the Islamic
Countries (OIC) in Tehran, stated that the current
Turkish government wants to prove that “a Muslim society
can be democratic, open, transparent, pluralistic and
modern, while preserving its identity.” He urged that:
“countries in the Islamic world must act with a
refreshed vision
in which good governance, transparency and
accountability will
reign, the fundamental rights and freedoms as
well as gender
equality are upheld, and there would be no place
for blunting
rhetoric and slogans….we should first put our
house in
order. Rationalism should be our driving force, as we
draw our
strength from our spiritual values. Creating a synergy
from these
values inherent in our being will be our test in,
as well as our
contribution to,
our modern age…I
challenge the view that modernity and democracy
based on the rule of law, political and economic
participation, and gender equality cannot exist in the
Muslim world. The Turkish experience proves otherwise.”
Gul also said the Turkish government would explore with
the United States and
Europe
ideas on:
-
Regional good
neighborliness charter or a code of conduct
-
Regional security
and cooperation process
-
Regional trade
liberalization
-
Enhanced economic
and cultural interrelationship
-
Regional
anti-terror pact
These approaches provide many opportunities for
cooperation. While the United States works with Turkey
on promoting the “Turkish example” for the greater
Middle East, however, it needs to better understand what
the “Turkish model” is—it is truly unique and the U.S.
ought not try to shape it to become a bit more religious
or a bit less secular so that it can be more applicable
for the Arab Middle East. The U.S. does not have a good
track record in dealing with political Islam and ought
to stay out of this area in Turkey as well.
American policy on
moderate Islam leading to anti-Americanism
In fact, with more and more people in
Turkey
believing that the United States wants a more religious
Turkish democracy, there is growing anti-Americanism
among the secular establishments, as well as among
Muslims who want to keep Islam out of politics.
Alternatively, the conspiracy theorists, worrying that
the U.S. and
Europe again
want to destabilize Turkey, are increasingly becoming
nationalistic and anti-American.
This phenomenon also explains the immense popularity of
Cem Uzan, the leader of the newly formed Youth Party.
Uzan is leading the polls on anti-American, anti-IMF and
pro-Turkish slogans. He was taken to RICO court in New
York by Motorola and Nokia for a $3 billion fraud case,
and instead of giving into U.S. pressure (political,
legal and commercial), he fought back. Many Turks were
proud of their “Robin Hood” who took the big corporate
money. As a charismatic and handsome young leader, he
seems to be imitating Turkey’s founder Ataturk in giving
Turks back their pride. With a beautiful wife and
holdings in media, telecom and major businesses, he
could become the next Berlusconi.
Prime Minister Tayip Erdogan has seen this threat and,
just a few days ago, decided to go after Uzan’s
businesses. If Erdogan succeeds, then he will get even
more votes and international support for having taken on
the “untouchable.” The risk is that Uzan will survive
and, playing the underdog against the person perceived
to be backed by the
United States,
strike big at the next elections. Uzan may also get
lucky if the government fails to improve the economy, or
if it gets bogged down on defending its commitment to
maintaining Turkish secular democracy.
While such domestic intrigues may not interest senior
policy makers in Washington, these officials need to
better understand the field they are playing so we do
not end up discussing “who lost Turkey” in a few years.
Zeyno Baran is
Director of International Security and Energy Programs
at The Nixon Center (http://www.nixoncenter.org)
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