Al-Qaeda's Comeback and Germany's
Dilemma
Stefan Kornelius
Specialists from the United Nations who monitor Al-Qaeda
activities are quietly raising the alarm: the terrorist
organization is moving to regroup and train supporters
in eastern Afghanistan. In its third report, the UN
working group on terrorism states that Al-Qaeda has set
up several training camps along the Pakistani border.
Surveillance has focused its attention on the region
of Assadabad, north of the line running from Peshawar
and the Khyber Pass to Jalalabad. The area is not
unknown to antiterrorism units. German security
quarters, too, assume that Osama bin Laden is hiding in
this inaccessible mountainous region.
Of course, the news of the training camps sounds more
dramatic than it actually
seems to be. Experts suspect that there are up to 500
Al-Qaeda fighters in the region, meeting in loose groups
and dispersing again. These training camps house a few
members only and, as a rule, dissolve quickly—they
hardly compare with the large camps systematically set
up during the time of the Taliban.
Nevertheless, the five hundred or so cadres seem
determined to patch up the network broken in
Afghanistan. Intelligence experts believe their aim is
not only to give their sympathizers and active groups
throughout the world a boost through interviews or
Internet messages, but also to reestablish something
verging on active coordination of terrorist operations—
to be at least basically in control of terrorist
activities (target selection or operational planning).
Michael Chandler, head of the UN working group, talks
about a cobweb-like network of various groups in the
Islamic world, warning, "Al-Qaeda continues to
represent a worldwide threat to peace and
security." The network could muster up to 10,000
terrorists or active sympathizers.
All of this is of especial importance to Germany.
Once the Bundeswehr takes over the leadership of the UN
protection force in Afghanistan, the prestige of an
attack on Germans will, in the eyes of terrorists,
increase exponentially. Intelligence experts point out
that bin Laden and his associates are convinced that the
Western nations will withdraw from the Islamic world if
the cost in lives is high enough. In turn, this would
cause public opinion "at home" to withdraw
support for the fight against terrorism.
Al-Qaeda has never accepted the permanence of its
defeat in Afghanistan. We must assume that they will
plan to strike again in Afghanistan, because a
successful attack could soon lead to a withdrawal of
military and political forces from the antiterrorism
alliance. The warning is clear: Al-Qaeda may be
weakened, but it remains able to act.
Stefan Kornelius is the editorial page editor of
Süddeutsche Zeitung.