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Bush, Putin and Saddam
Stephen Sestanovich
(adapted from The National Interest,
no. 70 (Winter 2002/03)
Since President Bush’s "axis of evil"
speech, the United States and Iraq have again been on a
collision course. But Washington has no longer to take
all-out Russian opposition for granted, a strategic
transformation made possible by a series of changes in
Russian politics and foreign policy.
The first of these changes, of course, is the strong
rapprochement between Russia and the United States, and
the unprecedented, unequivocal endorsement of U.S.
military action that came with it. That President Putin
would also distance Russia from Iraq was made possible
by a second change—his complete authority over Russian
foreign policy, based on his extraordinary personal
popularity and reputation for a bristly attentiveness to
Russian national interests. Yeltsin believed that
denouncing every American military action made him look
tough; Putin sees that ineffectual public tantrums would
make him look weak.
Similarly, when Putin says Russian diplomacy must
serve economic interests, no one accuses him of putting
foreign policy up for sale. He enables low motives to
win respect as high principle. When American pressure on
Iraq resumed, Russian spokesmen started issuing public
reminders of Russia’s economic stake in the matter.
Iraq had never before been bargained over like this, but
U.S. officials got the hint. Russia, they promised,
would be rewarded for support.
The broader evolution of Russia’s economic elite
has also pushed policy toward accommodation with the
United States. Riding a four-year surge in oil
production, leading Russian business figures now say
that their prime goal is to gain access to Western
markets; they profess to be tired of being
bottom-feeders dependent on semi-illicit ties with the
world’s rogues. For businessmen with such an outlook,
Putin’s alignment with Bush did not sacrifice the
Russian corporate bottom line—it strengthened it.
Together these changes ruled out the reflexive
pro-Saddam stance Russia had adopted in the past. Saddam
might face defeat, but Putin would not let it become his
defeat as well. Some commentators even wrote of the
risks for Russia in standing by Iraq too long. Russia,
they said, might find itself empty-handed and isolated
when the war was over: what kind of hard-boiled defense
of the national interest would that be?
As such talk showed, the hardening of U.S. policy
against Iraq had narrowed the benefits that Baghdad
could offer Moscow. Yes, by taking advantage of a crisis
it might be possible to push Russian-Iraqi trade a
little higher, but the larger economic interests that
Russian officials have been invoking —the
repayment of Iraqi debt to Russia and the long-term
development of Iraq’s energy potential—can
best be advanced by working with Washington, not with Ba‘athi
Baghdad. (In fact, Saddam cannot bestow these benefits
even if war is averted, since they depend on the lifting
of sanctions, to which the U.S. administration will
clearly not agree.)
Much of Russia’s recent handling of Iraq has seemed
to follow from such calculations. Putin has avoided
personal identification with Iraq, declined to meet with
Saddam’s longtime deputy Tariq Aziz and authorized
official contact with Iraqi opposition figures. At the
end of last summer, when Iraqi diplomats began touting a
draft ten-year economic agreement, Russian officials
quietly declined to sign. Meanwhile, Russian oil
companies talked up cooperation with the United States.
From LUKoil's CEO, Vagit Alekperov, came the (probably
false) claim that the United States had promised to
honor the contract he had signed with Iraq in 1997; and
his rival at Yukos, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, urged the
Russian government to get assurances that Washington
would prevent too big a drop in postwar oil prices.
Putin actually joked that he was not trying to squeeze
more out of the West in some sort of "Oriental
bazaar." No one believed him.
The most telling sign that Russia does not want to go
down with Saddam was, of course, its vote for UN
Security Council Resolution 1441, warning Iraq of
"serious consequences" if it did not meet its
disarmament obligations. After two months of diplomatic
stalling, and of seeming to want above all to stay
America’s hand, Russia positioned itself to be able to
blame Saddam if war broke out. Between 1997 and 1999
Russia’s abstentions and endless haggling in the
Security Council had clearly encouraged Baghdad to flout
its obligations, knowing that Moscow would continue to
front for it no matter what. Joining a unanimous
Security Council vote in 2002 sent a completely
different message: You’re on your own.
Yet for all the seeming clarity of this message,
Russia will face continuing choices as Iraq’s
confrontation with the United States unfolds. And Moscow
will have many motives to try to tie the Bush
Administration down. There will be the unavoidably gray
areas of UNMOVIC's mandate and findings. There will be
those who say that Russia can’t defend its authority
in the UN Security Council—a
last residue of Soviet great-power status—by
supporting the United States, only by checking
it. There will be the example set by France, Germany and
other European critics of U.S. policy. There will be the
chance to wheedle concessions from Washington on Georgia
and Chechnya. Putin may even believe that protracted
haggling will further bolster his image as a tough
advocate of Russian interests.
Above all, Moscow will keep its options open if it is
not sure of the direction and conviction of American
policy. The United States, after all, has sought Russian
support by offering inducements on which it can make
good only if it wins outright. Until it is clear that
the United States will prevail, Russia risks more by
aligning itself prematurely with the United States than
by standing aloof. Were American policy to unravel and
Saddam to stay in power, what reward would Russia then
claim, and from whom? Putin no more wants to tie himself
to an American failure than to an Iraqi one.
In the 1990s, American influence with Russia was
limited by the fact that Washington clearly did not
intend to go all the way. The same is true today. A U.S.
policy that is not determined to solve the problem
actually revives Saddam’s leverage with Moscow.
Finally, Putin’s choices will be affected by how he
reads their likely impact on what has been his supreme
foreign policy achievement—a
partnership with the United States that elevates Russia’s
international status. Last time around, Russian
policymakers knew that their handling of Iraq would have
no material impact on their relations with the United
States. Washington had made clear it would not link the
two. In the current confrontation, however, no goal of
U.S. foreign policy is more important than success
against Iraq. For all their improvement,
Russian-American relations cannot be insulated from this
issue. If, when it’s all over, the administration
feels that it has been critically held back by Russian
policy, it will hardly be able to shrug off the
disagreement as it did before. Has President Putin told
President Bush he doesn’t want Iraq to harm
U.S.-Russian relations? If so, it’s surely true. But
has President Bush told President Putin that they will
be just as good friends if this disagreement keeps
American policy from succeeding? If so, it’s almost
surely false.
Stephen Sestanovich is a senior fellow at the
Council on Foreign Relations and professor of
international diplomacy at Columbia University. From
1997 to 2001 he was ambassador at large and special
adviser to the Secretary of State for the former Soviet
Union.
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