The Emerging Iraqi Polity:
A Case for US-Iran Cooperation
August 13, 2003
By Nasser Hadian-Jazy
Over the course of
the last few decades, Saddam’s Ba’ath party apparatus destroyed every
feasible form of civil society and prevented the emergence of any autonomous
associations and institutions. He ruled through terror and fear. The
resemblance with pre-revolutionary
Iran
is striking. The only remaining autonomous institution in 1970s Iranian
society was the clerical network. Mosques were an important public space
available to masses and elites for debating and adopting goals and
objectives for their collective actions and designing strategies to achieve
them. This is the case in today’s
Iraq.
The Shiite clerical
network, in Iraq
as well as in Iran, is relatively
hierarchical, with the Supreme Jurisprudent at the top, learned Ayatollahs
in the middle, and the lower ranking clergy among the people in the rural
areas and small towns. The pinnacle of the hierarchy expands from Qum
to Najaf (the two main centers of learning in
Iran and Iraq respectively) and consists
of deep relationships between the clerics of the two cities. The structure,
content and language of their training are almost identical. Intermarriage
between them further solidifies their relationship. This establishment has
influence within Shiite villages and towns in Iran and Iraq both. Even
withstanding the rivalry that exists between these two centers of learning,
substantial influence can be transmitted from the Qum
clergy to Iraq, and from the Najaf
clergy to Iran. Historically, this has indeed been the case. The return of
Ayatollah Hakim and a number of other senior clerics who have been residing
in Qum as a result of Saddam’s
repression, along with the Badr Brigade and other Iraqi exiles, can
seriously influence the course of events in
Iraq. It is reported that a number of
Shiites who have returned from Iran are already in positions of governance
in Iraq.
This powerful
clerical network presents an organized force with the ability to set
objectives, and ultimately set an agenda for society. Given the current
power vacuum in Iraq, the clerics are best positioned to organize and
mobilize the masses. This is the case, not only among the Shiites but also
among the more religious Sunnis. Mosques are excellent resources at the
disposal of the clerics’ for facilitating these processes. The potential
exists for a very powerful socio-political movement to be generated by this
force under the slogan of: “No to occupation, yes to democracy.” A review
of recent events in post-war Iraq underscores the potential power of this
idea. Demonstrations under this slogan are indeed becoming the most visible
expressions of “homegrown” empowerment.
Any government
installed by the U.S. or U.S-appointed Governing Council which is perceived
as a puppet by the majority of Iraqi citizens would fail. This would only
serve to strengthen the position of extremist forces within Iraqi society.
The credentials of the future Iraqi leadership will be of utmost
importance: an established history of anti-Ba’athi struggle within Iraq, of
moderate religious background and no fundamental allegiance to the United
States or any extremist party. The failure of the Allies to establish this
type of a leadership quickly will lead to the exacerbation of
anti-Americanism and a possible split in the Governing Council. The world
and its media can expect to see millions of angry Iraqi citizens chanting
anti-occupation slogans with a still pro-democratic leaning.
Iran
is in the position to influence greatly the tide of events in
Iraq. It can, if it chooses, complicate
the situation in Iraq by fueling the anti-American mayhem, or it can play a
constructive role in containing extremism. The initiative of calling for
Iranian cooperation is now in the hands of the United States. Iran and the
U.S. share a number of crucial interests (territorial integrity, stability,
fair representation for Shiite majority and WMD disarmament) in
Iraq.
The current climate of U.S.-Iranian relations does not lend itself to such a
bold initiative. However, with the future of
Iraq and the final verdict on the utility
and legitimacy of U.S.
intervention in the balance, this opportunity should be taken not only to
improve relations with Tehran, but
also to lay a more solid foundation to manage the ever-complex
socio-religious and political fabric of the Iraqi polity and move towards a stable
and prosperous Iraq.
The current momentum
should be utilized for U.S.-Iranian rapprochement. A concrete proposal from
the United States to Iran that deals with issues of concern to both sides,
especially on the question of Iraq’s future, will undeniably be well
received in Tehran at this moment.
Nasser Hadian-Jazy is a professor of international relations at
Tehran
University
in Iran. He is currently a visiting professor at the
School
of International
and Public Affairs at Columbia
University.
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