My Enemy's Friend is My...?

Cole Bucy

Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s landmark visit to New Delhi two weeks ago may have been cut short by violence at home, but this did not stop him from having a productive trip.  Israel’s $1 billion sale of a Phalcon radar system to India was only the highlight of several diplomatic and military moves made which brought India and Israel closer together.  Some observers of the Israel-India courtship have euphorically proclaimed that this new “strategic alliance” will make India a key Israeli ally in the fight against terrorism.  The Brookings Institution’s Parag Khanna, writing in the September 10 issue of In The National Interest, believes that Israel and India, along with Turkey, can make up a pro-US, democratic counterweight to the famed “axis of evil.”  Such sentiment is not limited to outsiders – the chairman of the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee has even said that Israel’s relationship with India is now second only to its relationship with the US. 

However, one need only check Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s guestbook in New Delhi to understand how problematic Israel’s enthusiasm might be.  Only ten days before Sharon’s arrival, Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazzi visited New Delhi to reaffirm Iran’s own “strategic partnership” with India.  Kharazzi’s visit was only the latest in series of meetings between high-level Iranian and Indian officials.  In fact, Iranian President Mohammed Khatami was in New Delhi himself this past January for India’s Republic Day celebrations, and Vajpayee has been to Tehran several times in recent years, prompting a different set of observers to warily note India’s blossoming relationship with the Islamic Republic. 

Though this bizarre diplomatic twist appears to fly in the face of zero-sum, geopolitical logic, India has nevertheless managed to somehow profoundly improve its relations with both Israel and Iran simultaneously.   Given both Israel’s and Iran’s propensity to be hyper-sensitive on issues involving the other, India has achieved a rare feat indeed. A closer look at the dynamics of this peculiar situation reveals a very active Indian diplomatic corps driven to satisfy its rising power’s diverse demands, which Israel and Iran, combined, best meet.  While Israel offers India much-needed access to advanced military technology and counter-terrorism know-how, Iran offers India strategic, geographic advantages vis-à-vis Pakistan and a supply of energy India desperately needs for the future.

India and Israel

Thus far, military cooperation has dominated the Indian-Israeli agenda, though the two countries do have over $1 billion in commercial trade annually.  Israel has one of the world’s most technologically sophisticated militaries and has increasingly been willing to sell its products abroad.  India’s almost rabid desire for military modernization and the inability of its main arms dealer (Russia) to satisfy India’s demand for high-tech military equipment make it an ideal customer for Israel’s superior hardware.  India is now Israel’s biggest military customer and, in addition to the Phalcon radar system, Israel is considering the sale of its cutting edge theater ballistic missile defense system, the Arrow. 

In addition, Israel’s experience dealing with Islamic extremism and terror makes military cooperation even more attractive to New Delhi.  India’s fight against Islamic terror and extremism in Kashmir shares the same tactical challenges as Israel does with the Palestinian Intifada.  Though Israel has clearly not found a solution to its ongoing conflict with the Palestinians, Israeli security forces have become masters of the tactics and strategies used in counter-terrorism.  India cannot get better counter-terrorism training and assistance anywhere to aid its own military’s fight against Kashmiri separatists and Pakistan-backed terrorists. 

In return, Israel gains a large, powerful ally in a very hostile region of the world – something that should not be underestimated.  Plus, India shares Israel’s interest in fighting Islamic extremism and terror.  Israel will greatly benefit from Sharon’s and Vajpayee’s recent agreement on real-time intelligence sharing and help with tracking specific terrorist organizations and personnel.  As such, Israel has every right to be pleased in its success in turning a once extremely pro-Palestinian opponent into a close tactical ally.

India and Iran

Amid their frequent high-level meetings, Iran and India have produced several recent agreements for economic and military cooperation.  On the economic front, Indian-Iranian commercial trade has ballooned to over $25 billion and will only continue to grow, especially in the energy field.  During Khatami’s visit to New Delhi, the two countries agreed to a new, long-term energy deal, whereby Iran will supply India with 5 million tons of natural gas each year for the next 25 years.  More energy deals appear in the offing as India’s growing energy needs make it a natural market for Iranian oil and gas exports – currently there are talks about a major pipeline to connect Iran and India. 

In addition to economic cooperation, Indian-Iranian military cooperation is also growing.  In March 2003, India and Iran staged a joint naval exercise, and Iran has given India permission to build a naval port on the southeastern corner of the Iranian coastline at Chahbahar.

Both Iran and India were Soviet military client states and both of their militaries still largely consist of Russian-made weapons platforms and technologies.  As such, the substantially more advanced Indian military is ideal for providing Iran with crucial mid-life upgrades to its conventional forces, including its T-72 tanks and MiG 29 fighters.  In addition, Indian expertise in these conventional platforms can be passed on to Iran via new training and technical assistance programs, which will significantly improve the quality of Iranian armed forces.

There are rumors of even more intimate military cooperation; it is reported that India and Iran agreed to a defense pact whereby, in exchange for Indian military assistance and training for Iran, India is given access to Iranian air space and military bases in the event that India has another war with Pakistan.  If Tehran and New Delhi truly did agree to such a pact, Pakistan’s “rear” would be vulnerable to an Indian attack along Iran’s 568 mile border with western Pakistan.  Clearly, such an agreement would dramatically tilt the balance of power in South Asia in India’s favor.

It is highly unlikely that such a groundbreaking military agreement does in fact exist. However, the mere fact that its possibility is in question reveals how relatively close Iran and India have become.  Iran’s Islamic fundamentalism and India’s distrust of such Islamic extremism remain as pitfalls.  However, the ideological gulf that still separates Tehran and New Delhi, though partially alleviated by their mutual antagonism towards the Wahabi extremism found in Afghanistan and Pakistan, appears to have been largely trumped, for the time being, by geopolitical concerns.

International Reactions

India’s gravity-defying diplomacy shows that international relations are more complex than the old mantra “a friend of my enemy is my enemy” would indicate.  While Iran, India and Israel all seem willing to live with this extremely unique situation, its sustainability remains in question.  So far, India has been able to grow closer to Iran and Israel simultaneously because the respective areas of cooperation have been largely distinct. 

For example, there is very little crossover between Iran’s and Israel’s military ties with India.  Though Israel would obviously prefer that India not help Iran upgrade its conventional forces, especially its air force, Israel will not object too strongly.  Yet, Israel has kept a close eye on Tehran’s dealings with New Delhi and made it clear last week during Sharon’s visit that under no circumstances can Israeli military technology be transferred, or in any other way be used, to assist Iran.  Given that Israel has largely sold India very sophisticated military equipment and India has largely sold Iran last-generation upgrades for Iran’s conventional forces, India is unlikely to endanger its burgeoning arms trade with Tel Aviv by making illicit transfers to Iran. 

Washington has its hands too full to care too much about India making some extra cash selling Iran spare parts and fixing its old Soviet tanks, but it is worried about the prospect of greater Indian-Iranian military cooperation becoming more serious down the road.  There is concern that, as the relationship matures, personal contacts and rising levels of trust might give way to closer cooperation on Iran’s nuclear and missile programs.  To its credit, India is unlikely to help Iran in these more delicate areas, as it would be counter to India’s own interests to see another nuclear power in South Asia.  Still, India is no US ally when it comes to nonproliferation.  It sees American hostility towards Iran as being counter to its interests and vehemently opposes Iran’s “axis of evil” labeling as provocative and destabilizing.

Observers of future developments between these three countries need to keep in mind that a black-and-white, “with us or against us” view of the world overly simplifies the true complexities of South Asia’s geopolitics.  India is an emerging regional power with the world’s second largest population; its interests are so widespread that neither Iran nor Israel is likely to become too central to India’s future.  As such, Israel and Iran should only count on Indian support and cooperation wherever their interests overlap.  Thus, those who believe India is Israel’s new best friend should temper their expectations.  At the same time, Israel and India undoubtedly do have common vital interests on which it is advantageous to cooperate.   Those worried about India’s ties with a member of the “axis of evil” should similarly understand that India has economic and security interests worth maximizing through cooperation with Iran.  Conversely, Iran’s radical fundamentalism and clandestine proliferation ensures that Tehran’s and New Delhi’s coziness do not extend beyond where their mutual interests overlap. 

Cole Bucy is the Assistant Editor of In The National Interest.