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Security
Council Reform: How and When?
Marcel H. Van
Herpen
There is
today a widespread consensus that the UN Security
Council urgently needs to be reformed. Two factors are
specifically being mentioned as undermining the
Council’s legitimacy: first, its biased composition,
second the veto-wielding power of its five permanent
members (P-5).
To start
with the first: the present membership of the P-5
reflects the post-World War II situation, in which
France, Britain and Russia were still global powers.
This is, however, no longer the case today. New powers
have emerged and are asking for their rightful place in
the Security Council. Two solutions are suggested:
-
to
bring in the ‘losers’ of 1945 by making Germany and
Japan permanent members.
-
to
‘rebalance’ the Security Council further by enlarging
the circle of permanent members with representatives
of the Southern hemisphere – mostly developing
countries.
For the
second group the U.S. has proposed a ‘regional’
representation in which one country represents a
continent. This would mean that Brazil could be the
permanent member for Latin America, Nigeria for Africa,
etc. This has, however, immediately lead to negative
reactions from jealous regional competitors. Argentina
contests any claim made by Brazil, South Africa and
Egypt compete with Nigeria for the African seat,
Pakistan is not ready to accept the permanent membership
of India, and, in Europe, it is Berlusconi’s Italy that
is unwilling to support Germany’s claim.
Rotation
Rotation
might be the solution. Several countries could
alternatively occupy one seat for several years. In
regards to the German claim, rotation is a solution to
stop the European Union from being over-represented with
three permanent members. France, Britain and
Germany could rotate the two seats presently held by
Britain and France. The question is whether France and
Britain be prepared to share their seat with Germany in
the name of European solidarity.
Abolishing the Right of Veto?
A second question is whether the new permanent members
should obtain a right of veto. It is clear that an
extension of the Security Council with more
veto-wielding members would risk paralyzing the Council,
perhaps even more so than during the Cold War. New
members, therefore, should not obtain the right of veto.
In order to avoid that the new power structure in an
enlarged Security Council remains biased in favour of
the P-5, they too should give up their veto right. Given
the fact that it is more difficult to give up something
right now than at some point in the future, the
permanent members of the Security Council should decide
to give up their right of veto on January, 1st, 2010.
At the same time, they should immediately start to use
this right in a more restrictive way, reserving their
veto for circumstances in which their national interest
is really at stake. A delay of six years to give up this
no longer defendable privilege would give them enough
time to prepare for a more genuine multilateral and
multipolar world.
It would be a good test case for France to take the
lead. One might have some doubts, however, if Chirac’s
neo-Gaullist France – although it considers itself as a
champion of a multipolar world – has the will and the
courage to do so and to promote a genuine multipolar
Security Council in which the P-5, including France
itself, have given up their veto rights. Despite their
recent struggles in the Council, France and the U.S.
might find themselves, therefore, in the end on the same
side of the table: as close allies defending the status
quo against the newcomers.
Marcel H. van Herpen is director of the Cicero
Foundation, a Pro-EU Think Tank.
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