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Turkey’s
Difficult Balancing Act
Zeyno
Baran
Turkey
is trapped—between the requirements of its strategic
partnership with the United States and a strong desire
to avert war with Iraq. Despite overwhelming
international and domestic opposition to a war with
Iraq, the Bush Administration is gradually laying the
groundwork for a war to start in late February or early
March. For the war to end successfully within a matter
of weeks and with few casualties, it is essential that
Turkey allow the U.S. military to launch attacks from
its territory. While the U.S. has good logistics for a
southern front attack, it needs Turkey for a second,
northern front if it hopes to divide Saddam Hussein’s
forces and provide security for the Arabs, Kurds and the
Turkomen as well as the oil fields of Kirkuk. Clearly it
is in Turkey’s interest to see a potential war
concluded quickly and with minimal bloodshed, but with
nearly 90 percent of the Turkish public against a war
with Iraq, it is difficult to give the U.S. a clear
green light.
As unnamed U.S. officials were quoted in newspapers hinting that
Turkey’s indecisiveness about the degree of
cooperation with the U.S. might endanger the long-term
bilateral strategic relationship, Turkish Prime Minister
Abdullah Gul sent a letter to President George Bush on
January 16, reminding him that Turkey stood by the U.S.
during the Korean War and the operations Bosnia and
Somalia and would again cooperate with Washington.
Moreover, Turkey has been a key ally in
Afghanistan peacekeeping and its Incirlik airbase has
been home to Operation Northern Watch, in which U.S. and
British aircraft patrol the Iraqi no-fly zone north of
the 36th parallel.
Gul added the caveat, however, that final
approval for participation in a war with Iraq would have
to be granted by the Parliament.
Gul is well aware that getting on the wrong side of Bush, who strongly
values loyalty, would mean losing U.S. backing for key
issues that affect Turkey. The United States has been
very supportive of Turkey’s EU accession and a
solution to the Cyprus issue, and the continuation of
this support will be essential over the next couple of
years. With an $86 billion foreign debt and $91 billion
domestic debt, Turkey is dependent on America to avoid
an Argentinean scenario, and this reality limits its
room to maneuver. Indeed,
even if Turkey did not fully cooperate militarily with
the United States, it would nonetheless still bear the
economic burden of the war—and there would be no
economic compensation. Gul
realizes that if Turkey hopes to have a portion of the
reconstruction contracts and a say in the post-war
configuration of Iraq, it must be one of the countries
that form part of the U.S.-led coalition and assume part
of the burden of war. Consequently, when the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers
visited Ankara on January 20th, he received assurances
that the Turkish government has, in principle, agreed to
allow U.S. air and ground forces to use Turkey as a
staging point for military strikes against Iraq.
Gul,
therefore, is engaged in a two-track
diplomacy—cooperating with the United States in
preparing for a possible war while at the same time
doing all he can to prevent such a war from breaking
out. Earlier this month,
Gul visited Syria, Egypt,
Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iran, urging them to
collectively convince Saddam to comply with the weapons
inspections. He then hosted the foreign ministers of
these countries for a follow-up meeting in Istanbul on
January 23. Gul,
and his party chairman and the likely next Prime
Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, have continued their
diplomatic initiatives in Davos, including in a private
meeting with U.S Secretary of State Colin Powell. Turks
now believe they have a historic opportunity to avert a
war that could be used by Al-Qaeda and other militant
groups to claim that the United States is wantonly
"shedding Muslim blood"—setting off a
chain of terrorist attacks against the U.S. and its
allies.
Of
course, the short-term concern for Turkey is the impact
of the war on its already devastated economy. Turkey
claims to have incurred up to $100 billion in losses as
a result of the Gulf War in 1991 and the subsequent
embargo on Iraq. Initial estimates indicate that a
second war with Iraq would cost Turkey anywhere between
$28 and $100 billion (considering the indirect costs).
While Washington considers these figures too high, it is
willing to come up with an assistance package that may
range anywhere between $4 and $15 billion. In
addition to new, bilateral assistance from the United
States, Turkey also hopes to get American support to
restart its IMF program. Turkey’s $31 billion IMF
economic bailout program has been on hold since October,
after the previous government reneged on market reforms.
With around 18 percent of Turkey's 67 million people
living below the poverty line (and a per capita income
around $2,160), Turkey faces the very real possibility
of an economic and social collapse without the IMF
package.
A
more strategic concern for Turkey is the likely power
vacuum in a post-Saddam Iraq. Even if the war were quick
and successful, creating a democratic Iraq would be a
Herculean task. The two main Kurdish groups—the KDP
and the PUK—do not have a good history of cooperation
and the outbreak of a civil war cannot be ruled out. If
Iraqis will decide to create a federal system,
then the Turks would hope for a geographically based
federation, so that the Turkomen, who are the third
largest ethnic group of Iraq, would have a proper say in
government and the management of the Kirkuk oil fields.
If Iraq becomes an ethnically based federation, however,
then the Turkish fear is that KDP leader
Massoud Barzani will dominate the north—and Barzani's
embrace of Kurdish nationalism may not give the Turkomen
a fair say in the political and economic life of the
region.
Therefore,
Turkey would like to see Iraqi territorial integrity
preserved, and is wary of any federal solution that in
the long term could create a basis for a Kurdish state.
Such a development could encourage Turkey’s own Kurds
to revive separatist ideas. There is already some
Kurdish terrorist activity in southeast Turkey, which
has a 250-mile border with Iraq. Following the
ending of the emergency rule in the southeastern parts
of Turkey on 30 November 2002, the first military
confrontation between KADEK members and Turkish security
forces took place last week, where one soldier was
killed and five wounded. There is serious concern in
Turkey that the civil war that lasted over a decade may
restart following an attack on Saddam: in order to take
revenge, Saddam could send Islamic and Kurdish
terrorists to Turkey. To get protection, Turkey wants to
invoke NATO’s Article 4 ("The
Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion
of any of them, the territorial integrity, political
independence or security of any of the Parties is
threatened") but Germany and France so far
are reluctant to approve NATO’s involvement in
ensuring Turkey's security.
In addition to increasing terrorist activity in the southeast, the flow
of refugees is another serious worry for Turkey. Nearly
one million refugees came to Turkey following the
Halabja massacre and later the Gulf War, causing
tremendous humanitarian, social and economic burden.
This time the Turkish military is likely to set up a
buffer zone in Northern Iraq for the refugees. While
reassuring the Turkomen, the Turkish military presence
in Northern Iraq would be a matter of concern for the
Kurds.
As
military planners proceed with their logistical
preparations, the Bush Administration needs to keep
Turkey’s concerns in mind and not take the strategic
partnership for granted. Since the United States is seen
as bullying its most vulnerable NATO ally, Turkish
public opinion is gradually turning in an anti-American
direction. Granted, Turks understand that they are
fairly dependent on the United States for political and
economic reasons, but they are also a proud people and
opinion may shift in an upredictable direction if the
perception grows that Turkey is trapped, with no
feasible choices. Moreover,
there is already increasing tension between the ruling
party’s Islamic elements and the secularist watchdogs
in Turkey, and U.S. policy on Iraq may inadvertently
contribute to instability in Turkey.
In
case of a war, given that control of the Kirkuk oil
fields could easily lead to a military confrontation
between the Kurds, Iraqi Arabs and the Turkomen in the
absence of a stable Iraqi government, the U.S. ought to
protect these fields to ensure an uninterrupted oil
supply. Yet, American protection of Iraqi oil fields
could engender anti-American sentiments in the Middle
East and could unleash further terrorist attacks. To
mitigate this risk, the U.S. would need the active and
public participation of its Muslim allies in
humanitarian assistance and reconstruction.
The United States needs a Turkey that is actively
engaged and consulted in this process.
Zeyno
Baran is the Director for
International Security and Energy Programs at The
Nixon Center (http://www.nixoncenter.org).
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