The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis- Part II

Chan-yeol Yu

[Part I of Chan-yeol Yu's commentary on North Korea appeared in last week's October 22 issue.]

III. Different Postures Among Related Powers

No one disputes that North Korea unilaterally breached the Agreed Framework. Every responsible liberal democracy believes its uranium enrichment to be a clear violation of the Agreed Framework, not to mention an outright contravention of the IAEA safeguard measures and the Declaration of North-South Korean Denuclearization.

For the last couple of years, however, administrations in the US and the ROK have analyzed Pyongyang’s nuclear intentions quite differently. Washington sees the buildup as a military matter, but Seoul has traditionally seen it in terms of politics. Surprisingly, President Roh Moo-Hyun completely reversed his position, and that of his predecessor, Kim Dae-Jung, at the US-ROK summit meeting on May 14, 2003, in Washington. Pyongyang, he admitted, could use the nuclear weapons for military purposes unexpectedly.  Additionally, he announced that: extra measures would be taken if North Korea’s nuclear arms cannot be eradicated through peaceful means; the Kim Jong-Il regime is hard to trust; nuclear issues and North-South Korean economic exchanges would be linked; and South Korea would actively participate in halting the dangerous, illegal and inhumane problems of narcotics trafficking and missile exports.

When Pyongyang made public its will to cancel the freeze of nuclear reactors by forcing out the IAEA inspection personnel, and later disclosed that it would withdraw from the NPT, the response from world governments and mass media was swift and uncompromising.  There is disagreement, though, over how to resolve the problem. The US demanded that North Korea abolish the nuclear facilities in question quickly, transparently and verifiably. Only after this has been done will Washington discuss compensation. In January of 2003, President Bush called this a "bold approach," a notably different tone from the earlier stance where there would be no compensation for abandoning the nuclear gamble[r1] . Washington proposed multilateral talks among all the parties with a stake in the issue. Washington opposes direct US-DPRK dialogue in order to counter Pyongyang’s rhetorical tactic of reducing the issue to a bilateral one. Nevertheless, US policy has slightly tilted toward "tailored containment" as the situation has progressed. Japanese Deputy Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, Abe Shinzo, demonstrated Tokyo's clear intention to join in American sanctions by announcing it might bar a North Korean cargo ship from using one of its ports.

South Korea has been opposed to most of the hawkish measures for fear of inciting the reckless regime and igniting an uncontrollable conflict. Seoul wanted to continue providing heavy fuel oil when Washington cut off the supply, observe Pyongyang’s response, seek dialogue rather than implement punitive measures and induce a peaceful resolution through negotiation. Seoul had hoped it might play the role of mediator in the US-DPRK conflict rather than lean towards one side or the other, and it expected Russia and China to play a similar role. As explained, however, President Roh’s stance totally reversed, and the new position of the South Korean government is anticipated to be in harmony with that of the United States. Contrarily, Russia and China object to punishment or containment. Both underscore that a package deal—the denuclearization of the peninsula, the return to the Agreed Framework guaranteeing Pyongyang’s security, and economic assistance—is the optimal scheme, by way of dialogue and negotiation.

IV. Options and Prospects

Prospects for resolution are opaque. As was true in the 1993–94 nuclear crisis, appeals and diplomatic pressure from international organizations in the form of resolutions from the IAEA and the UN General Assembly are not expected to phase Pyongyang. UN Security Council consensus seems difficult in light of the intricately differing positions of the member states. The US unilaterally demands unconditional denuclearization. The problem is that Pyongyang regards the American position as too shaming, on one hand and as an unacceptable, dangerous proposal, on the other.

The US, returning from its Middle East focus, is trying once again a soft diplomatic approach by providing the opportunity for negotiation, giving the rogue regime a chance to repent after observing the harsh destiny of Saddam's Ba’athist government.

The advantage of multilateral talks is to raise international understanding regarding North Korea’s illegitimate behavior and to make it harder for Pyongyang to breach the agreement when a decision is made. This is why the United States initially accepted the format of tripartite talks and currently promotes six-party talks. Thus, it is important to secure Chinese cooperation. China has been the largest source of support, including food aid, for North Korea since 1992. China did cut back its aid in 1994, as an expression of discontent with the nuclear entanglement at the time. Chinese pressure of this kind was an important backdrop to the US-DPRK Agreed Framework in 1994 and could be so again.

Cooperation between Washington and Beijing in subduing international Islamic terrorism has become visible since September 11, and it ought to extend its cooperation further to help resolve the problems on the Korean Peninsula. China has repeatedly expressed clear opposition to North Korea’s nuclear armament, despite its role as Pyongyang's political patron. Beijing is worried about the possibilities of Japanese rearmament, US establishment of missile defenses in the region and the responses of South Korea and Taiwan, which are difficult to forecast. Moreover, it is also difficult to foresee how erratically Pyongyang would behave after becoming more independent from Beijing’s political influence. (What a splendid division of responsibility it would be if Washington took responsibility for the non-nuclearization of South Korea, Japan and Taiwan—and Beijing for North Korea.)

The United States should apply an explicit warning of impending sanctions. It is almost a given, in light of Pyongyang's frequent brinkmanship, that the regime hates to comply with the demands of the international community. If North Korea does not voluntarily succumb to the threat of sanctions, the need for containment measures would incrementally rise. In fact, however, sanctions are already enforced: Spain searched of a North Korean vessel carrying missile parts heading to Yemen, Australia seized a North Korean ship smuggling heroin and Japan prohibits some North Korean vessels from entering its ports. The consensus for President Bush's Proliferation Security Initiative among the leading liberal democracies and international agreements reached at successive meetings at Evian, Madrid and Luxemburg will provide international legitimacy to exercising punitive measures against North Korea.

However, sanctions accompany enormous danger. If measures move beyond current interdiction of WMD or narcotics to pervasive economic sanctions such as a freeze of assets abroad, an embargo of food and energy imports or the restriction of foreign exchange remittance, Pyongyang might be tempted to resort to military measures that could incur horrendous casualties. Military sanctions obviously need extreme caution. The possibility of military measures is usually mentioned in the form of surgical strike or regime change relying on the use of precision weapons. A mistake could plunge the region into an uncontrollable confusion, accruing a far larger security loss than the potential gain of eliminating Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons and facilities.

One hopeful expectation is that, in a situation where its very survival is undeniably at stake, the shaky Pyongyang regime would simply be unable to ignore truly serious warnings from Washington. The "axis of evil" state has clearly seen the determined iron will of the United States and the decisive military instruments that support it and witnessed the state-of-the-art weaponry used in Gulf War II.

V. Implications and Lessons

To work out the second nuclear crisis without catastrophe, organic coordination among the major players is vital, especially a common US-ROK posture. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration should faithfully abide by the promises it made in Washington while the world was watching. If the US is disengaged, the nuclear problem cannot be solved. It is a grand miscalculation to suppose that economic subsidies from the South will entice the North to give up strategic weapons. And, substantial pressure from either Russia or China toward Pyongyang would be unlikely or impossible if not for a powerful American initiative or cooperation.

South Korea should stop oscillating between supporting the US-ROK alliance and anti-American ethnic nationalism. The Kim Jong-Il regime and the people who suffer under its dictatorship are two separate entities. The South Korean government, experiencing massive candlelight demonstration, urgency for transfer of USFK headquarters to peripheral areas and popular demand for a more equal alliance relationship should once again affirmatively evaluate the will and capability of the United States. The unilateral political and economic subsidies for Pyongyang witnessed during the South's previous administration should be restrained. Linkage of politics and economics is more effective than their separation, and all dealings with the North should require reciprocity. If South Korea really believes in the genuine value of liberal democracy as the most viable political system proven by history, it should avoid measures to strengthen the legitimacy of the irresponsible rogue state to its north. If regime replacement in the North is a controversial option, then Seoul should pursue a policy of “stick and carrot,” enabling transformation there more effectively than predisposed unilateral support. As long as the US-ROK alliance is dedicated and cogent, peace will prevail on the Peninsula.

Chan Yul Yoo is an associate political science professor at Duskung Women's University and is a former research director at the Korean Association of International Studies.  His most recent work is The Bush Administration and the Prospects for US-North Korean Relations (2001).