  |
Holding Syria
to Account?
Robert G.
Rabil
Answering a question on the Syria Accountability Act
during a news conference in New York last week, National
Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice stated “The Bush
Administration does not object to the Syria
Accountability bill because we believe Syria has not
been taken to account and because we believe Syria has
to be taken to account.” Coming in the wake of a series
of official warnings to Damascus, this statement
confirms that the ambivalent attitude of the
US
towards Syria,
which characterized US-Syrian relations for the past few
decades, has changed. This ambivalence stemmed from the
belief, dating back to the Baghdad Pact in the 1950s,
that Syria
could decide the outcome of competing political
initiatives in the Middle East, as well as help the US
foster stability there.
In sharp contrast, Washington today is ready to take
Syria to account. But the important question is to what
extent Washington is ready to go to take Syria to
account? Equally significant, does Washington have a
political strategy for Syria in sync with its plan to
reconstruct a democratic Iraq? The future of the Middle
East and the fate of the US war on terrorism, Iraq and
the Middle East peace process may well depend on how
Washington and Damascus deal with each other.
The Syria Accountability act calls on
Syria
to “halt support for terrorism, end its occupation of
Lebanon, stop
its development of weapons of mass destruction” and
holds Syria accountable for its role in the Middle East.
Initially, the Bush administration had deep reservations
about the act. In several letters to Congress dated May
2003, State Department officials said that while they
supported the spirit of the act, they opposed its
implementation today “in light of this [the] current
fluid environment.” Apparently, the Bush administration
was giving Syria some time to mend its ways. But
throughout the next few months,
Syria
did little to address US concerns.
In fact, Washington and Damascus are on a collision
course over terrorism, Iraq and the
Middle East
peace process. While formally committed to combating
terrorism (and did indeed prove helpful in intelligence
cooperation on al-Qaeda), Syria’s leadership insists on
a distinction between acts of terror and legitimate
resistance. The Syrians also oppose the American
occupation of
Iraq,
believing that the
United States seeks
to impose a Pax Americana at Syria’s expense.
As Syrian President Bashar Assad noted in an interview
with the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Anbaa, “we are a
neighboring country of Iraq and the war will have direct
effects on us … So taking Syrian interest into
consideration, it is only natural for us to be against
the war whose effects we are witnessing now … Targeting
Syria has preceded the war, and this is why we knew that
there will be threats after the war.”
At the same time,
Syria
has been sidetracked in the peace process, the key
agenda item in US-Syrian relations during the 1990s.
Syria stood
aloof from the “road map,” which included no Syrian
track. As the younger Assad recently said to the
London-based daily Al-Hayat: “The road map was
stillborn.”
Washington’s program of fighting terrorism in the Middle
East, stabilizing Iraq, and ushering in peace between
Israel and her neighbors now confronts Syria’s
insistence on having a say in all of these issues.
Responding to a question over American pressure on
Syria, the younger Assad stated, “We are neither a great
power nor a weak country, we are not a country without
cards or foundations. We are not a country that can be
passed over with respect to the issues.” President
Bush’s markedly supportive remarks following Israel’s
recent air strike deep into Syria, along with the White
House’s decision to let the Syria Accountability Act
move forward in Congress, may have confirmed Syria’s
premonitions that Washington sanctioned Israel’s attack
in advance in an effort to widen the war on terrorism,
with Syria as the next target. Obviously, Damascus fears
that under the aegis of the “war on terrorism,” the
US
and Israel
may try to impose their hegemony over the region, and
even remove
Syria’s
Ba’athist regime. Believing it is fighting for its
survival,
Syria may abandon all its traditional restraint and thus
trigger a regional conflict.
Similarly, Damascus is at fault for edging closer to a
confrontation with the US. Damascus is approaching
Washington’s greatest issues of concern with a
nonchalant, traditional way, which fails to fathom the
implications of September 11 attacks for the American
collective consciousness. The Syrian leadership has so
far failed to gauge the depth of socio-political changes
in the US following September 11. Believing that the
right dose of cooperation may ballast US-Syrian
relations, the Syrian leadership has ensconced itself in
the effigy of its own traditions and rhetoric.
Damascus has been hedging its diplomacy with the US
trying to reconcile incompatible policies. Its
cooperation with Washington on Al-Qaeda has been
markedly offset by charges that Damascus had supplied
the now deposed Iraqi regime with military equipment and
has allowed Jihadis to cross into Iraq to kill American
soldiers, while harboring Palestinian terrorist
organizations. Damascus denied all charges while at the
same asserting that resistance was legitimate,
especially against Israel, and that its long borders
with Iraq were hard to control.
Damascus can no longer adopt this equivocal position for
it is inadvertently leading US frustration with Damascus
to an open confrontation. Damascus may be wagering its
diplomacy on America’s embroilment in the “Iraqi
quagmire” and on Bush losing the presidency. But this
is simply a losing bet that does not reflect the psyche
of the nation. The reluctance of the Bush administration
to distinguish between acts of terror and legitimate
resistance and to disregard Syria’s connivance at the
infiltration of Jihadis into Iraq is simply a sheer
reflection of the mood of the nation. Consequently, half
measures by Damascus are not acceptable to Washington,
irrespective of whether Republicans or Democrats control
the White House. Instead of hedging and filtering its
cooperation with Washington, Damascus needs to
articulate a comprehensive strategy. It is time for
Damascus to decide whether to support or challenge US
foreign policy.
By challenging the United States, the Syrian leadership
can neither depend on the Arab states nor on the Arab
population to secure their survival. The Arab peoples
have long forsaken their support for autocratic regimes,
and the Arab states have abdicated their pan-Arab role
in favor of their own national interests. The political
discourse of the day is a muffled “Jordan First-like”
policy. But supporting the US is also problematic. Can
Damascus trust an ambiguous Washington sending mixed
signals to Syria? Can Damascus support a US policy that
sanctions Israeli strikes against Syria? Can Damascus be
certain that the U.S. and Israel will not attempt,
sooner or later, to remove the Syrian Ba’athist regime?
Inasmuch as Damascus needs to define its relationship
with the United States, Washington needs to clarify its
objectives in the region in general and with regard to
Syria in particular. Both countries need to articulate
their own strategies and political initiatives.
Otherwise, a regional conflict by miscalculation is
inevitable. Neither the U.S. nor Syria will benefit from
such a conflict.
For starters, Damascus should soothe American
frustration by first offering its help to interdict
Jihadis trying to cross into Iraq. Washington can hardly
reject a Syrian proposal for joint patrol along the
Syria-Iraq border. Washington, on the other hand, should
heed Damascus’s concerns by outlining a Middle East
political initiative that rewards Syria for its
cooperation, including renewing talks on Syria’s
occupied Golan Heights, while standing firm and clear
about its demands from Syria.
Robert G. Rabil
Dr. Rabil taught at Suffolk
University, Boston, and was former project manager of
Iraq Research and Documentation Project,
Washington.
He is a regular contributor to the Daily Star and author
of Embattled Neighbors:
Syria,
Israel
and
Lebanon
(Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003). |
 |