Baghdad and Beirut: Are There Analogies?

Geoffrey Kemp

As resistance to the Coalition forces grows in Iraq, particularly in the greater Baghdad area, it has become routine to allude to past American military operations that have gone awry.  The most frequently quoted analogy refers to the war in Vietnam, but there are also comparisons to the ignominious withdrawal of US forces from Somalia in 1993 after a US Blackhawk helicopter was shot down and 18 US soldiers were killed and dragged through the streets of Mogadishu.  Some observers refer to the events in Lebanon from 1982-1984 that culminated in the withdrawal of US Marines from Beirut and the end of the multinational force (MNF) that was deployed in the summer of 1982 following the Israeli invasion in June. 

While some elements of the Vietnam experience may be relevant to Iraq, it is too early to use this as serious analogy.  The only issue that has resonance today is the concern about the political honesty of the Administration’s civilian leaders, as they trumpet American success in Iraq and play down the bad news.  This is similar to President Lyndon Johnson’s credibility gap, but, during Vietnam, the US military was equally culpable of deceit, whereas today US uniformed military personnel are generally honest and forthright in outlining the difficulties that lie ahead.  The Somalia case is hardly relevant since the military operation was not regarded as a vital strategic interest of the US.  US troops were initially sent in on a humanitarian mission, and it was only when their mission became “regime change” that they became involved in combat.  Although the abrupt withdrawal of US forces from Somalia had a dampening effect on the Clinton Administration’s willingness to intervene in Third World conflicts, it had little impact on American power.

The Lebanon analogy, however, bears closer examination, in part because it happened in the Middle East and involved complicated Washington policies.  There were, of course, major differences between what happened in Beirut and the current situation in Iraq. During the 1980s, the focus of American strategic thinking concerned the Soviet Union, including its position in the Middle East and its close military ties to Syria and Libya.  Thus, American policy concerning Lebanon was seen through the lens of the Cold War and the ever-present fear that a Middle East conflict could escalate into a superpower confrontation.  Today, the Soviet Union does not exist, and possible Russian reactions were never a serious factor influencing the Bush Administration’s decision to go to war in Iraq.

A second difference is that the American intervention in Lebanon was part of a multilateral force, the MNF.  France, Italy, and Britain all contributed troops. The American contribution was small and primarily involved the Navy and Marines.  There was no regular Army or Air Force presence.  In contrast, Iraq is a huge, multi-service operation with the US Army carrying the bulk of the load.  Far more troops are involved in Iraq than in Lebanon and the stakes are much higher.  It is true that, in the case of Lebanon, President Ronald Reagan used the phrase “no reverse gear,” implying the US would never leave under pressure, but, in reality, there was always a “reverse gear” and the reason was very simple.  There were no vital interests in Lebanon; the US Congress was extremely dubious about the peacekeeping operation; and, the Pentagon, the most powerful interest group in Washington, was against the intervention.  Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs John Vessey were bitterly opposed to the Lebanon mission from the very beginning.  It was George Shultz and the State Department who were most vocal in pressing to sustain the operation.  If one lesson is clear in Washington, it is that if there are major bureaucratic disagreements on the use of force and the Pentagon is against such use, the Pentagon will eventually get its way.  Of course, the reverse has happened with Iraq.  The Pentagon civilians have been the superhawks and the military brass have saluted and followed orders.  Whatever objections the State Department may have had over Iraq, they were overridden by the strong alliance between Pentagon civilians, the Vice President’s office and the President himself.  Furthermore, unlike Lebanon, the war in Iraq was supported by the majority of Congress and remains today a vital US strategic interest. 

Another distinction is that the MNF entered Beirut in the midst of a civil war and ended up taking sides in that war, even though this was not the initial intention.  So far, there have been no signs of a civil war in Iraq, despite some dire predictions that this would happen.  However, if civil conflict were to break out – possibly between Shiite and Sunni factions in Baghdad – then the situation will become complicated and difficult for US forces and could resemble elements of the Beirut experience.

It is certainly true that the use of terror in Beirut, particularly suicide bombings, have their resonance in Iraq today.  American officials note with great anger that Syria’s Bashar Al-Assad used the analogy of Lebanon and resistance to American presence in Iraq when he gave an interview to Al-Safir on March 27, 2003.  It could well be that if there are more successful suicide attacks on American forces in Beirut, perhaps the equivalent of the October 23, 1983 Marine barracks attack when 241 Americans were killed, the comparison will be on everyone’s lips.  However, the big difference is that, if there is a serious Beirut-like attack on American forces, the military response will be ruthless, unlike what happened in October 1983, when the response was pitiful. 

It must be remembered that the US left Lebanon in the early months of 1984 without paying a serious strategic price.  In fact, the very month the US withdrew from Beirut, it increased its military presence in the Persian Gulf in support of Kuwait and indirectly Iraq at the height of the Iran-Iraq war.  “Cutting and running” from Lebanon had no measurable impact on American power and credibility throughout the region.  However, if the US was to “cut and run” from Iraq, it would be a strategic catastrophe worse than Vietnam.  For this reason, it is unlikely to happen unless things become far more dangerous than they are today. 

Perhaps the most useful lesson of Beirut is that Western military occupation in a Middle East country, however well-meaning, will eventually generate hostility unless a strong, legitimate national government emerges that requests the occupier to stay.  If not, then acceptance can turn to resentment and resentment can turn into violence.  In June 1982, Israeli forces were initially welcomed as liberators by the Shiite population of southern Lebanon, who were sick and tired of Palestinian hegemony.  Yet it was Shiite terrorism that eventually created a nightmare for the occupying Israeli forces.

US policy in Lebanon failed, not because of the misuse of the MNF, but because of poor political judgment in Washington.  Without a sound and realistic plan for bringing about internal reconciliation and the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon, nothing was going to work.  The MNF could have been given different roles, missions, and geographical areas to patrol, but it is doubtful whether this would have made much difference in the absence of a clear political plan. 

Ultimately, the US will succeed in Iraq only if it retains the support of the majority of the population, including the Sunni minority.  At present, the US is willing to pay the price in terms of blood and treasure to stay the course.  Clearly, a more creative strategy is necessary and remembering some of the lessons of Lebanon cannot hurt.

 This article was originally written for the Lebanese newspaper, The Daily Star.

Geoffrey Kemp is Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center in Washington, DC, and was Special Assistant to the President for the Middle East during the first Reagan Administration.