EU vs. NATO: An Illusory
Struggle
October 22, 2003
By Jonathan S. Kallmer
The
past year has seen Europe's leaders do a good bit of
soul-searching over the future of European defense.
Initially refracted through the lens of
Iraq,
the debate has evolved into the larger question of
whether the European Union should develop military
capabilities independent of NATO. The EU, which may soon
be committed by law to a common defense policy, tends to
see such autonomy as an essential component of a nascent
European identity. The United States, on the other hand,
fears that such independence would cause deterioration
in the durable transatlantic alliance that NATO has so
long represented.
Yet
for all the volume of the dispute, the question of whether the EU should put
forward its own defense is not the right one. And as with so many fallacies,
this one springs from false premises about the nature of the problem.
The
first false premise is the belief that the EU and NATO are somehow
competitors in the business of providing defense. They are not. Although
NATO has guaranteed Europe's security for the past half century, the two are
qualitatively different entities. The EU is a supranational organization
that creates, implements and enforces substantive policies for its members,
including (if its current and future member states so decide) a common
defense policy. NATO, in contrast, is an intergovernmental organization that
provides a procedural mechanism for its members to form alliances and take
collective foreign policy action where their individual interests intersect.
EU and
NATO capabilities can of course overlap in a functional sense. Technically
speaking, both the EU and NATO have their own troops, their own facilities,
and their own procedures. Yet, at bottom, NATO is nothing more than an
instrument (albeit a highly effective one) of the individual nation-states
that make it up. Unlike the EU, NATO does not have interests separate from
of those of the nation-states which it comprises. Unlike the EU, NATO cannot
take action against the wishes of its members. And unlike the EU, NATO does
not have its own sovereignty; it is merely a vehicle for the sovereignty of
its member nation-states.
The
second false premise, which goes to the heart of the fallacy, is the notion
that the EU is itself the executor of its member states' defense policies.
It is not. Although its countries are currently considering whether to adopt
a Union constitution that would establish a common defense policy, it is
doubtful that such a policy could ever be meaningfully sustained. As the
debate over Iraq has shown, the foreign policy preferences of the EU's 25
current and future member states are too numerous, too divergent and too
strongly felt for unified positions to consistently emerge.
The
EU's difficulty in developing a common defense policy is easily explained.
In both theory and practice, defense policy (and foreign policy more
broadly) is still almost exclusively the province of the nation-state. It is
nation-states that have interests, nation-states that act diplomatically and
nation-states that fight wars, even if they do so under the auspices of
multilateral organizations such as NATO or the United Nations. Thus, while
the United States is right to be concerned, the object of its concern should
not be NATO's survival, or the EU's bravado, but the ambivalence of
individual European countries.
Until
its member states relinquish the sovereignty necessary to create a truly
common defense, the question of how the EU ought to act relative to NATO is
grievously premature. Indeed, the real question for the future of European
defense is not whether an EU defense policy will prevail over that of NATO,
but whether it will prevail over that of its own member states.
If the
EU succeeds in harmonizing its member states' defense policies, then it is
the EU that should represent its member states in NATO. If the EU fails to
do so (which is far more likely), then its member states should continue to
represent themselves. However the EU resolves its family feud, NATO's job
description - to let allies pool their efforts in waging war and making
peace - should remain the same.
The
author practices international litigation and arbitration at the
Washington
law firm of Hogan & Hartson. |