Reform in Syria? Prospects and Assessments

Robert G. Rabil

In his presidential inaugural speech before the Syrian parliament, Bashar Al-Assad focused on repairing his country’s ailing economy, modernizing the bureaucracy and enhancing democracy. He emphasized the importance of introducing reforms, but, at the same time, he gave no sign that Syria’s democratic experience will resemble that of the West. He stated: “Western democracies are the product of a long history…We should have our own democratic experience springing from our history, education and civilized personality…and arising from the needs of our people and reality.” What kind of democratic experience was Bashar alluding to?

In official Syrian parlance, this democratic experience is known as Ta’dudia, meaning pluralism. Central to this is the concept that reforms will enhance political representation and inclusion and, by extension, freedom. Admittedly, Syria is fairly known for its religious pluralism, a vestige of its Ottoman heritage and structure of government (known as the Millet System). The hardening in attitudes toward, persecution and/or harassment of minorities in the former Ottoman provinces have not, to a more or less extent, become part of the socio-political landscape in Syria. Historians and analysts contribute this condition to the fact that Syria itself has been governed by a minority sect, the Alawite, which is regarded by orthodox Sunni Muslims as heretical. Interestingly, as some historians point out, the esoteric Alawi religion contains certain liturgical features that are partly Christian in origin. For example, Jesus Christ occupies a prominent place in Abu Abd Allah Ibn Hamdan al-Khasibi’s teaching, a leading tenth century (fourth century by the Islamic calendar) Nusayri jurist. Alawis were previously known as Nusayris, a word with arguably Christian connotations. Others argue that the leadership in Syria has sanctioned cultural and religious freedoms in exchange for political acquiescence. In either case, thanks to religious pluralism, co-existence among Syria’s religious communities has been fairly harmonious.

In sharp contrast, Syria’s religious pluralism has not been matched by economic and political pluralism. Will the Syrian leadership, as Bashar promised, introduce reforms that will bring about political and economic pluralism? Will Syria’s religious pluralism provide the conditions for accepting political pluralism? And what kind of political pluralism does the leadership and, particularly the reformers, envisage for Syria?

Ta’dudia was first launched by the late president Hafiz Al-Assad, who upon his assumption of power established the Majlis Al-Sha’b (Parliament) and the Progressive National Front—a group of parties affiliated with the ruling Ba’ath party—and promulgated a new constitution. These institutions, according to the regime, offered political participation and thus represented a pluralistic system. These institutions, in practice, have been none other than a means to broaden Assad’s basis of support by co-opting and containing political forces. Assad sought to legitimize his regime by institutionalizing it. For example, when Syria’s influential merchant class, along with some independent forces, had begun to call for some economic liberalization and political participation, Assad, in 1990, enlarged the parliament from 195 to 250 deputies. Third of the seats have been reserved for independent deputies, the majority of whom have been businessmen. Still, on account of their overwhelming majority, the Ba’ath party and its affiliate, the PNF, have controlled the agenda and decision-making process of the parliament.

Significantly, the call for significant reforms and reform under Assad’s tenure had been respectively tabooed and insignificant. This has changed under Bashar’s rule. Bashar’s statements and initial actions of political liberalization, such as permitting the publishing of newspapers (Al-Domari, the first privately owned published newspaper in over three decades) and releasing political prisoners, fostered an atmosphere of change that was speedily capitalized upon by many Syrians.

In September 2000, a group of 99 Syrian intellectuals issued a statement calling for political reforms. The statement called for ending the state of emergency, issuing a public pardon to all political detainees, establishing a rule of law recognizing freedom of speech, expression and assembly and freeing public life from all forms of state surveillance.

Obviously, this was a political manifesto, albeit not a revolutionary one. The statement was mildly crafted. It adhered to neither an ideological line nor a position threatening the regime. Interestingly enough though, the signatories included the most prominent intellectuals in Syria (such as Adonis, Sadek Jalal al-Azm and Haidar Haidar), many of whom were employed by state-run institutions.

Before long, public forums addressing reform and revitalization of civil society, hitherto banned, mushroomed in Syria. In January 2001, the initial document ballooned into another statement signed by 1000 Syrians of all walks of life. Obviously, religious pluralism in Syria played an important role in uniting the voices of reformers by fostering a climate free of sectarian tension and antagonism. In fact, Alawis were at the forefront in signing the statement. In addition to repeating the demands of the first statement, this new document emphasized holding democratic elections at all levels and importantly reconsidering the principle of “the party rules the state and society, and any other principle that alienates people from the political life.” This “principle of party rules the state and society” was a direct reference to the Ba’ath party, which is constitutionally billed as “the vanguard party in society and state.” 

The boldness of that statement and the speed with which civic forums spread caught the leadership by surprise. ­ Apparently, it feared the trickle of reform would turn into a deluge. The leadership struck back by banning all forums without a government license and accused several activists of undermining the constitution and national interest.

Prominent state officials, such as Vice President Abd al-Halim Khaddam and Minister of Defense Mustafa Tlas, charged the activists with abandoning the struggle for Arab rights since they did not address the Arab-Israeli conflict. Importantly, Assad, in an interview with the London-based daily Asharq al-Awsat on Feb. 8, stated that “the government will stand firmly against any work that might cause harm to the public interest.” The dragnet of the regime’s anti-reform measures caught well-known personalities including parliamentarians. Prominent among them were the former head of economics at Damascus University, Aref Dalila, and independent parliamentarians Riad Seif and Mamoun Homsi. The first was sentenced to 10 years in prison while the others got five years each.

Obviously, the regime sent a clear message to the public that it would not tolerate any reform it could not control. Yet Assad was careful not to erode the image of modernity he projected for himself. He continued to address economic and political reform by reconstituting a hyped-up anti-corruption campaign, while introducing mobile phones and the internet.

Following the collapse of the Ba’athist regime in Iraq, 287 Syrians petitioned Assad in late May, bearing in mind the regime’s past actions against activists, calling for “comprehensive national reform.” They stressed Syria’s urgent need for political reform to supplement economic change without threatening the president’s rule. They asked him to implement reforms, including the revocation of martial law and security trials, the immediate release of all political prisoners and freedom of opinion and assembly.

The group stressed the situation Syria is facing: “The occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip by Israel and the occupation of Iraq by the United States have changed the strategic conditions surrounding the homeland and put it between two enemies who possess strength which Syria has never faced before.”

According to a prominent intellectual, Sadek Jalal Al-Azm, the “reform movement strives to create a political environment similar to that in Turkey where the democratic process would not only legitimize the government, but also protect the country from outside threats and pressure.” Syrian democrats point out that the U.S., prior to invading Iraq, could not tell Turkish Prime Minister Erdoghan to “go to hell” when the Turkish parliament voted against U.S. wishes to open a second front with Iraq in Turkey. 

The reasons and arguments in favor of a Turkey-like democratic process and structure, overseen and protected by a strong army, however, were not the only ones on the minds of the reformers. Apparently, reformers, of all ethnic and religious hues, be they intellectuals, professionals or businessmen, fear that, under certain circumstances, political Islam may make a comeback and thus threaten the political discourse and Syria’s stability. The memories of the gory and destabilizing clash between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood are still fresh in the collective consciousness of the nation. Ironically, the Syrian leadership share in the reformers’ concerns about political Islam resurgence.    

The new petition of the reformers and the swiftness with which the Ba’ath regime next door fell apparently re-energized Assad to cautiously continue economic and political reform. In July, he issued decree No. 33, which abrogated decree No. 24 (and No. 6) that banned foreign exchange. Accordingly, normal civil courts, instead of economic security courts, would handle breaches of the law. He issued a decree providing full pardoning of several exiled and political detainees (Haitham Manna’ and Riad Al-Turk) and permitted Syrians banned from traveling to move freely inside and outside the country. He also issued a decree allowing the establishment of a private university and ordered that the “military” color of school uniforms be changed. In the name of the Ba’ath Party Regional Command, he signed decree No. 408, separating the party from the authority’s executive work, emphasizing that the selection of employees should be according to merit rather than party affiliation.

In addition, the Syrian government approved, ­ for the first time since Syria nationalized its banking system, ­ three private banking licenses and specified a period of seven years to restructure the economy (mainly so Syria can join the World Trade Organization and the EU-Mediterranean free trade zone).

At the same time that these reforms were introduced, the government revoked the license of Al-Domari. Importantly, none of the reformers’ main demands were satisfied. Admittedly, the Ba’ath party still dominates the political process (two thirds of Syria’s 250 parliament seats are reserved for the Ba’ath party and its affiliate the National Progressive Front). In addition, the composition of the new government indicates that reform will not be its top priority. The new government comprises 17 Ba’athists, controlling the most important portfolios—Foreign, Defense and Interior Ministries, 6 independents and 7 PNF members. Obviously, the reforms are still selective and of an ad hoc nature meant to blend dominant state power with economic development without breaking the system. This is the crux of Bashar’s democratic experience. In fact, Bashar has so far given no indication that he is willing to introduce reforms that will threaten his regime. At the same time, it is going to be very difficult for Bashar to pursue selective reforms and reconcile incompatible policies without endangering the very system his father built. 

The reform movement and Ta’dudia face three main challenges. The Syrian leadership has not resolved the dilemma over how much change is acceptable before the regime itself is threatened. The dilemma lies in the fact that, unless the institutional and constitutional advantages of the Ba’ath party are revoked, reform will be insignificant and inconsistent.

The reformers will most likely fail in pushing for significant reform without outside help. Absent support from NGOs and governments for reformers, the Syrian leadership will have little incentive to introduce reforms paving the path to a peaceful transition to democracy.

Finally, Bashar has to decide whether to partner with the reformers and wean himself from the old guards by putting Syria on a true path of reform, or wither in the stagnation of maintaining the political status quo.  

Yet, as a prominent Syrian recently told me, “change is inevitable in Syria despite all the blockage from the government. It is about time. The extent and scope of changes taking place both in the region and in Syria may well in the near future compel the Syrian leadership, mainly the Alawi barons, to reach a compromise with the opposition. The barons may opt to play the role of gatekeepers of a Turkish-like parliamentary model of government from their army barracks. This will form the basis of political pluralism with which we can live.” In this case, political pluralism will take place at the expense of “politicized” religious pluralism, mainly political Islam. 

A portion of this article was adapted from a talk delivered at John Hopkins University. Dr. Rabil served as chief of emergency with the Red Cross in Lebanon, taught at Suffolk University, and was project manager of Iraq Research and Documentation Project, Washington. He is a contributor to the Daily Star and author of Embattled Neighbors: Syria, Israel and Lebanon (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003).