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Written
in the Stars?
The Future of the Russian-American Partnership
February 5, 2003
By Paul J. Saunders and Nikolas K. Gvosdev
Some seventeen years after the Challenger disaster,
the shocking disintegration of the space shuttle
Columbia should focus attention not only on our terrible
loss, the future of the U.S. space program, and the
eternal human ambition to explore, but also on the
transformation of the U.S.-Russian relationship.
And in fact, one of the most striking aspects of
news coverage and analysis of the Columbia tragedy has
been the amount of airtime and column-space devoted to
Russia. The
degree to which the immediate future of the American
space program now depends on Russia's ability to
maintain a skeleton crew in the International Space
Station (until shuttle flights ca resume) is both a
reflection of considerable progress in the relationship
and a demonstration of the very real opportunity to do
more.
Unlike 1986—when Mikhail Gorbachev’s expressions of
sympathy were undermined by Soviet attacks on the
“military” objectives of the space shuttle program
and the Reagan Administration’s Strategic Defense
Initiative—current Russian condolences are entirely
genuine. The
Russian media have given extensive coverage to the
Columbia tragedy and, because of Russia’s own
considerable experience with space exploration
(including several tragic accidents), Russians are able
to identify with Americans’ grief in a personal way.
At the same time, those Russians assessing the implications
of the accident discuss not its effect on American
military plans or on the competitive ratings between
Russia and America in "the space race," but
its potential impact on the future of an important joint
project, the International Space Station.
American funding for the International Space
Station project has sustained the Russian space program
through difficult years when it might otherwise have
been abandoned; it is now tangible proof of the degree
to which U.S.-Russian relations have moved from a
win-lose to a win-win basis.
Of course, there are limits to what Russia can do.
Since Washington did not envision the Russians
playing a major role in the station project, its
financial assistance was circumscribed, mainly to take
advantage of existing equipment to provide a regular
supply service to the station.
The Russian space program, run on a shoestring
budget that would be a NASA administrator's worst
nightmare, cannot quickly build new Soyuz and Progress
capsules that could make up for the slack the suspension
of shuttle flights will bring.
This situation highlights the potential value of long-term
planning in the U.S.-Russian relationship, based not
only on our assessment of Russia’s current
capabilities, but a realistic appraisal of its
potential.
Of course, there has been a current in Washington for the
last decade that maintains that the U. S. has nothing
really to gain from cooperation with Russia, that it is
Russia which is the dependent one.
It is ironic that, only a few years ago,
cooperative programs with Russia--whether concerning the
International Space Station or threat reduction
issues--were often lambasted as thinly-disguised
"charity" for Russia, a way for the rich uncle
to dispense his largesse to his unreliable nephew.
But when members of Congress declare that the future of the
International Space Station lies in Russia's hands, one
cannot help but realize the magnitude of the changes
that have taken place.
Such a statement would have been inconceivable
during the heyday of the Cold War, but it would have
also been unlikely during the mid-1990s, when the
prevailing opinion was that Russia was simply an
"Upper Volta with missiles."
The events of the past year and a half, beginning with the
September 11 terrorist attacks and continuing to the
Columbia tragedy, demonstrate that the United States
still needs partners; that despite its awesome
technological and economic base, America cannot hope to
meet all the challenges of a post-Cold War world
entirely alone. Those
events also demonstrate Moscow’s potential
contribution. Russian
intelligence proved to be crucial in securing a quick
defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan.
And Russian rockets will be crucial to supplying
the International Space Station for as long as the
shuttle remains grounded.
Are there other areas where the United States and Russia
could work together?
Yes. Most
immediately, more can be done to develop U.S.-Russian
cooperation in space.
Such an effort should begin with a thoughtful and
systematic evaluation of the various capabilities and
technologies that Russia can bring to the table that
avoids preconceptions of inherent American superiority.
It was clearly a sensible investment to help fund
the Russian space program, preserving Moscow’s
capabilities against our hour of need, and it is likely
that other areas of mutual interest and benefit can be
identified. One
inspiring choice, despite its obvious cost, would be a
joint mission to Mars.
There are also other possibilities much closer to Earth and
more tightly linked to both countries’ security
priorities. Here,
joint efforts at developing and deploying a theater
missile defense system in Europe are a good example.
Moscow has developed some effective systems of
its own and could make a genuine contribution to such a
project. Moreover,
to the extent that the ailing Russian defense
establishment is funded through such common programs,
the U.S. will be creating alternatives to arms
transactions that we view as undesirable.
This is true not only for the state, but also at
the level of individual firms, institutes, and
scientists.
The word "partnership" is sometimes used
cavalierly without real consideration of its
implications for the U.S.-Russian relationship.
True partnership, however, arises not from joint
declarations and photo opportunities, but from concrete
work. One
of the more significant aspects of Russian cooperation
with the United States, both after 9/11 and after the
Columbia disaster, was that this help was completely
unexpected. On
September 10, 2001, to suggest that the United States
would turn to Russia for assistance in launching a major
military campaign in the heart of Central Asia would
have been greeted with incredulity.
Similarly, last week, the notion that Russia
would need to take up the burden of sustaining the space
station would have seemed far-fetched.
The fact that Russia could step in to offer
assistance testifies to the practical, cooperative
foundation that has been laid. All of this goes to show what a good investment this
relationship can be, both for Russia and the United
States. While
predicting the future is a risky proposition, we are
confident that it will include many unexpected new
dangers—and that Moscow’s help in addressing them
could make a real difference.
Paul J. Saunders is director of The Nixon Center.
Nikolas K. Gvosdev is editor of In
the National Interest.
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