Written in the Stars?  The Future of the Russian-American Partnership

February 5, 2003
By Paul J. Saunders and Nikolas K. Gvosdev

 Some seventeen years after the Challenger disaster, the shocking disintegration of the space shuttle Columbia should focus attention not only on our terrible loss, the future of the U.S. space program, and the eternal human ambition to explore, but also on the transformation of the U.S.-Russian relationship.  And in fact, one of the most striking aspects of news coverage and analysis of the Columbia tragedy has been the amount of airtime and column-space devoted to Russia.  The degree to which the immediate future of the American space program now depends on Russia's ability to maintain a skeleton crew in the International Space Station (until shuttle flights ca resume) is both a reflection of considerable progress in the relationship and a demonstration of the very real opportunity to do more.

Unlike 1986—when Mikhail Gorbachev’s expressions of sympathy were undermined by Soviet attacks on the “military” objectives of the space shuttle program and the Reagan Administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative—current Russian condolences are entirely genuine.  The Russian media have given extensive coverage to the Columbia tragedy and, because of Russia’s own considerable experience with space exploration (including several tragic accidents), Russians are able to identify with Americans’ grief in a personal way.

At the same time, those Russians assessing the implications of the accident discuss not its effect on American military plans or on the competitive ratings between Russia and America in "the space race," but its potential impact on the future of an important joint project, the International Space Station.  American funding for the International Space Station project has sustained the Russian space program through difficult years when it might otherwise have been abandoned; it is now tangible proof of the degree to which U.S.-Russian relations have moved from a win-lose to a win-win basis.

Of course, there are limits to what Russia can do.  Since Washington did not envision the Russians playing a major role in the station project, its financial assistance was circumscribed, mainly to take advantage of existing equipment to provide a regular supply service to the station.  The Russian space program, run on a shoestring budget that would be a NASA administrator's worst nightmare, cannot quickly build new Soyuz and Progress capsules that could make up for the slack the suspension of shuttle flights will bring.

This situation highlights the potential value of long-term planning in the U.S.-Russian relationship, based not only on our assessment of Russia’s current capabilities, but a realistic appraisal of its potential. 

Of course, there has been a current in Washington for the last decade that maintains that the U. S. has nothing really to gain from cooperation with Russia, that it is Russia which is the dependent one.  It is ironic that, only a few years ago, cooperative programs with Russia--whether concerning the International Space Station or threat reduction issues--were often lambasted as thinly-disguised "charity" for Russia, a way for the rich uncle to dispense his largesse to his unreliable nephew. 

But when members of Congress declare that the future of the International Space Station lies in Russia's hands, one cannot help but realize the magnitude of the changes that have taken place.  Such a statement would have been inconceivable during the heyday of the Cold War, but it would have also been unlikely during the mid-1990s, when the prevailing opinion was that Russia was simply an "Upper Volta with missiles."

The events of the past year and a half, beginning with the September 11 terrorist attacks and continuing to the Columbia tragedy, demonstrate that the United States still needs partners; that despite its awesome technological and economic base, America cannot hope to meet all the challenges of a post-Cold War world entirely alone.  Those events also demonstrate Moscow’s potential contribution.  Russian intelligence proved to be crucial in securing a quick defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan.  And Russian rockets will be crucial to supplying the International Space Station for as long as the shuttle remains grounded.

Are there other areas where the United States and Russia could work together?  Yes.  Most immediately, more can be done to develop U.S.-Russian cooperation in space.

Such an effort should begin with a thoughtful and systematic evaluation of the various capabilities and technologies that Russia can bring to the table that avoids preconceptions of inherent American superiority.  It was clearly a sensible investment to help fund the Russian space program, preserving Moscow’s capabilities against our hour of need, and it is likely that other areas of mutual interest and benefit can be identified.  One inspiring choice, despite its obvious cost, would be a joint mission to Mars.

There are also other possibilities much closer to Earth and more tightly linked to both countries’ security priorities.   Here, joint efforts at developing and deploying a theater missile defense system in Europe are a good example.  Moscow has developed some effective systems of its own and could make a genuine contribution to such a project.  Moreover, to the extent that the ailing Russian defense establishment is funded through such common programs, the U.S. will be creating alternatives to arms transactions that we view as undesirable.  This is true not only for the state, but also at the level of individual firms, institutes, and scientists.

The word "partnership" is sometimes used cavalierly without real consideration of its implications for the U.S.-Russian relationship.   True partnership, however, arises not from joint declarations and photo opportunities, but from concrete work.  One of the more significant aspects of Russian cooperation with the United States, both after 9/11 and after the Columbia disaster, was that this help was completely unexpected.  On September 10, 2001, to suggest that the United States would turn to Russia for assistance in launching a major military campaign in the heart of Central Asia would have been greeted with incredulity.  Similarly, last week, the notion that Russia would need to take up the burden of sustaining the space station would have seemed far-fetched.  The fact that Russia could step in to offer assistance testifies to the practical, cooperative foundation that has been laid.  All of this goes to show what a good investment this relationship can be, both for Russia and the United States.  While predicting the future is a risky proposition, we are confident that it will include many unexpected new dangers—and that Moscow’s help in addressing them could make a real difference.

Paul J. Saunders is director of The Nixon Center.  Nikolas K. Gvosdev is editor of In the National Interest.